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In t ro d u c t i o n
This book is about “the elaborate, copious emptiness of the whole Henry
James exploit.” That phrase is from H. G. Wells’s notorious 1915 attack on
James in Boon, the satiric miscellany in which Wells captures with per-
versely brilliant exactitude the dimensions and scale and governing ethos
of the Jamesian novel, which is “like a church lit but without a congrega-
tion to distract you, with every light and line focused on the high altar.
And on the altar, very reverently placed, intensely there, is a dead kitten,
an egg-shell, a bit of string. . . .”1 All of these images are precisely chosen
(even if their fidelity to the Jamesian text is slightly grotesque); taken
together, they map out both the properties of the material world in Henry
James and the poetics, the rhetorical figures, to which those properties give
rise. The egg-shell reflects those fragile collectables—often cracked ones—
around which human relationships are so often arranged in James: objects
like Madame Merle’s teacup, and Poynton’s spoils, and Maggie Verver’s
golden bowl. Then, too, the image literalizes Madame Merle’s insistence,
in her great speech on what she calls “appurtenances,” that “every human
being has his shell and that you must take the shell into account” (3:287).
The carefully preserved string conjures up those collectors in James who,
finding themselves in economically diminished circumstances, fulfill their
acquisitive impulses by accumulating the ephemeral, focusing their finely
tuned sensibilities on the lowest common denominator of the world of
objects; it is the sort of thing that Fleda Vetch’s father in The Spoils of
Poynton, who collects pen-wipers, old calendars, and match-boxes, might
pick up. (More slyly, Wells’s string suggests the Jamesian concept of the
ficelle, literally string or twine but also theatrical terminology James adopt-
ed in his comments in the New York Edition prefaces on the role of minor
characters.) The dead kitten, suggestive of a morbid investment in a tiny
body, outrageously exaggerates the immense amount of meaning carried in
James’s novels by vulnerable children (The Turn of the Screw, What Maisie
Knew) and a diminutive and dying heroine (The Wings of the Dove).
The kitten, the shell, and the string add up to an “elaborate, copious
emptiness,” a cornucopia of insignificance, because for Wells the Jamesian
novel focuses too much on too little of the material world: overly refined
technique (“intensely there”) is devoted to representing tiny bits of refuse.
Indeed, the passage turns the characteristic materials of the Jamesian novel
xv
Otten_FM_3rd.qxp  4/19/2006  1:36 PM  Page xv
into trash; unlike the empty vessels of The Portrait of a Lady and The
Golden Bowl, which serve to symbolize the ways in which forms, empty in
themselves, can contain and focus human contents, this eggshell is perma-
nently empty, nothing but rubbish. Like still-life paintings of dinner tables
on the morning after, Wells’s version of Jamesian materialism grotesquely
magnifies the husks and rinds left in the wake of consumption. While the
precious object in James’s texts is often an antique splendidly toned by
time, in Wells’s account the Jamesian object is simply used up.
Wells’s critique argues that James is both too materialist and not mate-
rialist enough, overly invested and invested in the wrong way in a materi-
al world he also largely effaces or ignores. If we consider Wells’s argument
not as an evaluation and instead as analysis, we are still faced with a tex-
tual problem, an inconsistency or even a paradox in James’s narrative
economy. Few things—and no material things—seem more characteristi-
cally Jamesian than the teacups and tapestries, the Limoges and
Wedgwood and chinoiserie, the portraits and even the pagodas that at
moments seem spotlit in the fiction. Such objects give the reader purchase
on “the Jamesian”; they offer something like a cognitive handle (they are
frequently objects that are meant to be grasped) on the highly, sometimes
almost forbiddingly, nuanced surface of the texts and the highly, some-
times almost forbiddingly nuanced surface of the cultures the texts repre-
sent. In other words, the golden bowl is the most fungible thing a reader
can find in The Golden Bowl because its represented material qualities,
such as its hardness and its definite form, become cognitive ones the read-
er can keep in mind.
But if James’s texts encourage a readerly overinvestment in their mate-
rial surfaces, they also argue that these objects are ultimately inadequate as
receptacles of meaning. The texts find closure by contesting the logic of
their most central and material image (as in The Portrait of a Lady) or shat-
tering that image (The Golden Bowl) or burning it (The Spoils of Poynton)
or burying it (“The Last of the Valerii”). James’s fictions end by largely and
often flamboyantly divesting themselves of whatever acquisitions they’ve
made along the way. They follow the pattern exemplified by The Wings of
the Dove, which closes by reducing Milly’s vast wealth to a check, demate-
rializing it into a slip of paper, one that Densher and Kate neither cash nor
return.
Yet as that unresolved bit of almost-dematerialized matter suggests,
texts never really can cancel images once they’ve introduced them; even a
negated possibility must appear within a text in order to be negated, and
so it makes its presence felt. Effaced objects in James’s fictions leave behind
a residue of shards and fragments; they remain present as a sort of after-
image that shapes our readings of the texts, even though the image itself
INTRODUCTIONxvi
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has been crossed out. Like the infamous pagoda of The Golden Bowl, which
exists only in the space of metaphor, such afterimages lend a sense of mate-
rial immediacy to critical accounts of more serious topics—like conscious-
ness or pragmatism or love—even as their ghostly quality means that ques-
tions of materialism need never be engaged. To put in one more way the
large ambiguity I am attempting to capture here: spectacularly foreground-
ed but narrowly framed, finely detailed but ultimately expunged, the mate-
rial world in James is governed by a variety of impulses that are difficult to
read and rectify. Perhaps there is a kind of interdiction against reading that
expunged world too closely, inasmuch as a matter like consciousness has
been afforded a critical gravity denied to matters like curtains and coif-
fures.
Jamesian criticism has consequently had a difficult time catching hold
of this indeterminate matter; James’s critics tend to speak in their least
nuanced voices and to shape their arguments into their most rigidly
schematic patterns when taking up the work the material world performs
in the fiction. Maxwell Geismar’s outrageous assertion, in his hatchet job-
cum-period piece Henry James and the Jacobites (1962), that “James
thought the function of the artist was to teach the rich how to use their
money better,” might serve as an extreme example of that line of criticism
that critiques James’s commodifying vision, that holds, as Wells did, that
James’s fiction is overinvested in the material world or, to cast the point in
a more contemporary critical idiom, continuously complicit with the
strategies of capitalism and the leisure class. For Geismar, James’s oeuvre is
scandalous because it constitutes—and reduces to—“the Book of Good
Taste,” a vast manual for the economically prosperous but culturally inse-
cure.2 Laurence Holland’s The Expense of Vision (1964)—as meditative and
appreciative as Geismar is outspoken and cranky, and so a period piece of
the opposite sort, almost Geismar’s enemy twin—stands at the opposite
extreme as it continually brings forward material particulars, only to
evanesce these spoils away, taking them as symbols in a drama of Christlike
sacrifice, allowing them to evaporate into a timeless realm of “memory and
. . . art.”3 Because it works as a kind of foregrounded cancellation, the
material world in James can generate exactly opposite critical views of
itself, but in either case the position advanced keeps the things of James’s
texts from being read: matter disappears into the abstraction of commod-
ity culture or into an equally abstract plot of what Holland calls “redemp-
tion.” If for one kind of critic, a close reading of things runs the risk of
recapitulating the commodity fetishism that governs the Jamesian text,
then for another kind of critic, a close reading of things runs the risk of
contaminating the reassuringly humanist ethos that lies at the center of the
Jamesian project, repeating the failure of some of James’s characters to
Introduction xvii
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draw a sufficiently bright line between their relations with persons and
their relations to things. In either case, matter emerges as something to be
purged, and what looked like an opposition in critical approaches eventu-
ally emerges as complementary varieties of antimaterialism, which is why
Jean-Christophe Agnew can combine them in a single, highly influential
essay, “The Consuming Vision of Henry James” (1983), an essay that
argues first for a “visually acquisitive” James who is “wholly complicit”
with the world of commodities, and then for a “wholly critical” James who
in the late fiction “renounces” that commodity world he has presumably
internalized.4
Even in more recent, more historicist, and considerably more nuanced
studies by Martha Banta, Jonathan Freedman, and Mark Seltzer, the spe-
cific qualities of Jamesian material are ultimately abstracted away or treat-
ed anxiously and at a distance. In Taylored Lives (1993), her study of nar-
rative and the rise of managerial systems, Banta considers Maud Lowder
and Kate Croy in The Wings of the Dove and Charlotte Stant and Maggie
Verver in The Golden Bowl as “efficiency experts and modern managers,”
female exemplars of the new culture of time-motion studies, employee
supervision, and mechanized rationality.5 Hence for Banta what is of inter-
est is a deeper cultural structure that lies beneath Maud’s “brilliant gloss,”
her “perpetual satin,” her silk-covered sofas, her “huge heavy objects” that
seem to Merton Densher both uniformly splendid and British, yet some-
how various and so not containable within a single “rubric” (19:30, 76,
78). In Banta’s brief analysis, all these materials disappear as a world of
things and a text infamous for its ambiguity are breathtakingly abstracted
into a parable of modern managerial systems. At least in this instance,
ambiguities of the surface must yield to rationality for there to be a criti-
cal account at all.
Similarly, in the long reading of The American in Mark Seltzer’s Bodies
and Machines (1992), the materials of everyday life can enter into criticism
so long as they serve a system of supervision, of disciplinary self-fashion-
ing, of “determinations of the individual.”6 In the power-centered model
of criticism that takes its conceptual core from Michel Foucault’s
Discipline and Punish, the sensory details represented in the literary text
must ultimately be dematerialized into a diagram (Seltzer indicates that
The American is “almost diagrammatic” as it “charts” the “relays” between
bodies and objects and between persons and representations) or a “cultur-
al logic” (a term that in Seltzer’s usage is rephrased as “logistics” and so
once again identifies materialist studies with the task of delineating a
rationalized system).7 In other words, the welter of objects and the endless
moments of contact between bodies and things that make The American
so materially rich that its wealth sometimes seems hard for a reader to
INTRODUCTIONxviii
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manage must in the end give way to the abstraction of a set of logical
proofs.
In Professions of Taste (1990), Jonathan Freedman begins his delineation
of James’s relation to aestheticism with a wide-ranging survey of the move-
ment’s distinguishing characteristics in Britain and its importation to
America—a survey that examines changing ideals in home decor, the influ-
ence of Ruskin on the itinerary of the Grand Tour of Europe, and the bric-
à-brac and cartoons that accompanied Wilde’s lectures in America.8 But as
Freedman’s study unfolds, and especially as it shifts its attention to James’s
fiction, this specificity about material objects and processes vanishes, blot-
ted out by a critique of reification. In Freedman’s hands, the concept of
reification reduces various styles of ownership and use to an overly capa-
cious category of “objectification” which itself effectively cancels the object
as an object of scholarly inquiry. Hence the particular attributes of The
Portrait of a Lady’s materialism are of little relevance to Professions of Taste
because close engagement with that materialism is construed as a kind of
ethical scandal, a repetition of Madame Merle and Gilbert Osmond’s error
of defining “the self as a mere collection of reified qualities”; thus the crit-
ic’s task becomes one of neutralizing the novel’s explicit, even extravagant,
interest in “the shell,” in “appurtenances,” in “things,” as Madame Merle
calls them (3:287).9 More specifically, the novel’s complex idiom of surface
and pliability, of opacity and polish, is in Freedman’s reading sacrificed to
the need to wrest a salutary ethics from a text so immoderately absorbed
in the material world.
In making this critique of these three studies, I do not mean to be quar-
reling with their specific claims so much as I mean to be gaining some ana-
lytical distance from a convention that governs the genre of literary criti-
cism, a protocol that ultimately hides from view the layers of the Jamesian
text that will be my concern here. The disciplinary mandate I mean is the
one that stipulates that material details need to be brought forward but not
for too long; the grossly material, the sensing body, the space of touch and
texture, the culture of the tabletop and the writing desk must lend their
substance to scholarly writing’s claims, but they must also in the end be
effaced by the kind of abstraction through which critical writing achieves
its own closure. I am suggesting, then, that some of the antimaterialism of
earlier studies of James—those of the first wave of Jamesian criticism,
which founded themselves on the relatively abstract thematics of “con-
sciousness,” “the imagination,” and “renunciation”—persists in more
recent, newly concretized critical practice. There is a micromaterialism of
the Jamesian text that criticism has a hard time turning into criticism, an
intimate interest in the world of objects and the life of the senses that read-
ers register as a kind of signature for the Jamesian, yet that is ultimately dis-
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avowed, dismissed as peripheral to the work of making meaning, discard-
ed like the refuse in Wells’s caricature. A superficial reading of Henry
James, it turns out, is not easy to maintain.
The present study is an attempt to make something of such surfaces
and such traces of meaning; it is an attempt to capture in criticism the
James who is “extremely preoccupied with the concrete,” to employ The
Europeans’ description of its heroine.10 By describing Gertrude Wentworth
in that way, the novel underlines the fact that “she doesn’t care for abstrac-
tions,” that she critiques a style of life that cultivates a lack of style (“total-
ly devoid of festoons,” as she terms it), that she preempts a morality—an
ethics of interpretation—that dispenses with the material world, finding
surfaces a superficial obstruction of true significance (163, 79). The drama
of The Europeans is the struggle to liberate surfaces from the abstractions
that cancel them out, to pre-occupy thought accustomed to working with
capacious terms of moral imperative (“self-control,” “moral grounds”) by
waylaying it with material detail (75, 183). At many moments, the novel
straightforwardly juxtaposes Puritan rectitude with a life lived according
to the desires of the sensory imagination: the material pleasures of curtains
and lace, imported by the European cousins Eugenia and Felix (they
import both the things and the capacity for taking delight in those things),
are in stark contrast to the Bostonian barrenness of the houses of the
Wentworth and Acton families. But this opposition blurs considerably in
The Europeans’ more radical moments where the novel defines Puritanism
as its ascetic but expensive, beautifully restrained material trappings:
earnest New England Protestantism turns out in the novel to be the
“clean, clear, faded” colors, the “small cylindrical stools in green and blue
porcelain,” the “highly-polished brass knocker” of the Wentworth’s piazza
(46–47). What might in the work of another writer be understood as
articulated doctrine or formalized tenets of belief is instead in James
understood as a style of thought, and that style of thought is in turn char-
acterized as a style of things—even if that thought understands itself as
inadequately expressed by the material practices that it can hardly avoid.
“Extremely preoccupied with the concrete,” James’s cultural analysis in
The Europeans defines history as the changing surfaces of the material
world; his representation of the postbellum world of things in The
Bostonians, with its rapidly expanding economy (“so many objects,” “so
many accessories,” Basil Ransom will marvel) and its sharply different sys-
tems of taste, will differ enormously from the native asceticism and
imported opulence of the pre-War novel.11
In rendering historical change and cultural difference as matters of
material style, the Jamesian novel might quite accurately be seen as a fore-
runner to the new materialist criticism of our own time: like Susan Stewart
INTRODUCTIONxx
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in On Longing, it blurs the difference between philosophical abstraction
and quotidian practice, finding in the objects of daily life figures that sus-
tain and reiterate seemingly deeper cultural values; like Naomi Schor in
Reading in Detail, it performs a “valorization of the minute, the partial,
and the marginal”; like the later Raymond Williams of Marxism and
Literature, it resists the “separation of ‘culture’ from material social life” and
collapses the distinction—crucial to Williams’s earlier work—between eco-
nomic base and ideological superstructure.12 For all of the theoretical dif-
ferences and disciplinary distance that lie between them, these critics sim-
ilarly presaged a turn to the material world in contemporary criticism;
while they do not quite share a methodology, their versions of materialism
are indeed united by certain habits of mind, especially a skepticism over
the distinction between the superficial and the core, the empirical and the
conceptual, the detail and the whole. As Williams notes, in commenting
on a passage from The German Ideology, “‘consciousness’ and ‘philosophy’”
are no longer “separated . . . from ‘real knowledge’ and from ‘the practical
process,’” as new materialism resists the abstraction of ideology by pulling
it into concrete practice.13 As immoderately absorbed in the quotidian as
he is in the consciousness that criticism has kept separate from that world
of things, surfaces, and history, James might serve as a means of bringing
more particular definition to new materialism even as new materialism
provides a way of reading layers of the Jamesian text that have been
smoothed out and rubbed away by idealist aesthetics.
This book has three purposes. The one that may seem the most straight-
forward is that of getting the right historical account of James and the mate-
rial world, and so of showing how the texts change when the details of their
surfaces are spotlit, conserved, collected, even obsessed over. Each of the
chapters of Part II takes as its focus some small interchange between the
sensing body and the world immediately adjacent to it, the world that
forms the body’s material edge. In chapter 3, the emphasis is on James’s sur-
prisingly strong preoccupation with touch and on his tendency to conceive
of domestic spaces as tactile ones; the argument here is that through touch,
the categories of social class are transformed into physical identities and so
given a seemingly irrefutable bodily basis. Even when, as at the end of The
Spoils of Poynton, the Jamesian narrative seems to flee from the world of
things and all its contingencies and take refuge in the vagaries of isolate con-
sciousness, a material grain and a stubborn physicality remain. Chapter 4
extends these emphases on materiality, interchange, and process into fin-de-
siècle narratives of painting: James’s “The Liar,” “The Real Thing,” and The
Tragic Muse, Oscar Wilde’s Dorian Gray, the aesthetics of Bernard Berenson
and Giovanni Morelli, and the suffragist tactic of slashing paintings in pub-
lic galleries, as well as the depiction of physical exchange within painting
Introduction xxi
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itself in the case of John Singer Sargent’s The Breakfast Table. As it surveys
these moments that dramatize the encounter between painted surface and
viewing subject, this chapter argues that the space of viewership is a thor-
oughly dynamic one, rife with material consequences—a dynamism and a
materiality that critiques of reification simply cannot account for or
acknowledge. Like the chapter on painting, chapter 5, “Bodies, Papers, and
Persons,” reveals a set of social principles arranged around the materiality
of representations: this chapter takes up the frequent fascination in James’s
texts with books, manuscripts, and newspapers, and shows how doctrines
of privacy are given substance by a conflicted, unstable homology between
writing and the body. In its readings of The Aspern Papers and “The
Birthplace,” this chapter shows how the melding of body and habitat
comes to shape conceptions of the self ’s presence within the texts it pro-
duces and the printed matter—like newspapers or personal libraries—in
which it invests itself. Chapter 6, “Adulterous Matter,” brings the center of
this book to its conclusion by testing its materialist approach on the
abstractions of the late fiction. Beginning with the scene of adultery in the
basement of the Soane Museum in A London Life and continuing with
analyses of bodily and material metaphors in The Sacred Fount and The
Ambassadors, this chapter argues that the displaced, largely occluded adul-
tery plots of James’s last major fictions reappear as an account of the mate-
rial world. What is radical about the late fiction is that it evolves a materi-
alism without reference, “promiscuous properties” that will not remain
affixed to their bodily referents but instead come undone and circulate like
museum pieces that are never in situ. Reading the late fiction in the con-
text both of property theory and of fin-de-siècle museum handbooks and
histories, this chapter argues that adultery becomes for James a cultural
model, a way of conceiving artifacts that fully allows for flux, dynamism,
and indeterminate boundaries.
The core of this book, then, limns in James’s practical aesthetics; it
charts the flow between persons and artifacts that, for James and his con-
temporaries, makes up everyday experience. In diagramming that inter-
change, this book makes several specific revisions to the usual way of
understanding the role of the material world in James’s writing: it argues
that there is in James a significant interest in the sense of touch and hence
in understanding the material world in terms of immediacy and reciproc-
ity, as opposed to the distancing effects of vision; it argues that for James
consumption is always reproduction and that stratifications of class are
hence defined as various styles of use; it argues for the presence and impor-
tance of psychological and physiological theories—especially theories of
empathy—which hold that objects become states of mind, and hence that
consciousness always has a material grain, a physical character.
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One way of generalizing on these claims is to say that this book offers a
materialist and historicist rereading of Jamesian ambiguity; it identifies the
ambiguity of the limits or edges of the body with grammatical patterns of
aporia and indeterminacy both at the level of plot (an argument pursued
in chapter 1) and at the level of prose style (chapter 2). Thus the second
purpose of this book is to argue that James’s narrative poetics presuppose—
indeed, are made from—a specific set of material practices, customs, and
objects. More broadly, I propose that the practical aesthetics of daily life
detailed throughout this book shape the practices of close reading that
compose narrative poetics and literary theory, poetics and theory decisive-
ly influenced by James’s writing. In other words, critical ways of reading
take a set of material conditions as a norm, an assumption that transcends
the difference between critical schools. In chapter 7, I test and specify these
claims by staging an encounter between materialist and rhetorical practice,
arguing that a particular conception of the house and of the shaping of the
body as fin-de-siècle culture conceives them becomes a myth buried deeply
within the very opposite-seeming work of Paul de Man and Elaine Scarry.
If this argument holds, then the stuff of the Jamesian text—the houses, the
teacups, the ribbons, the Limoges—are still molding our conceptions of
literary meanings, still giving material shape to our sense of texts.
This book’s third purpose, practiced throughout and focused in the
concluding chapter, is to bring clearer definition to new materialism, to
make explicit the assumptions and methods that shape what has often
seemed more of a critical sensibility than a school or movement guided by
precepts and hypotheses. Much more particularly, my goal will be to con-
tribute something to the understanding of the role literary language can
play in the study of material culture. Here I would like to preview that
closing argument so that the purposes of the approach adopted in the
intervening chapters will be clear. In choosing James as the focal point for
this work of theorizing, I choose a writer both closely identified with the
material world and closely identified with the slippages of language that
belie the sense of solidity and location that material world so often seems
to promise in contemporary criticism. In the opening paragraph of Bodies
that Matter, Judith Butler summarizes the purpose that inaugurated that
book as one of trying to hone in on “the materiality of the body,” a pur-
pose that led to the realization that “the thought of materiality invariably
moved me into other domains”: “. . . I could not fix bodies as simple
objects of thought. Not only did bodies tend to indicate a world beyond
themselves, but this movement beyond their own boundaries, a movement
of boundary itself, appeared to be quite central to what bodies ‘are.’ . . .
perhaps this resistance to fixing the subject was essential to the matter at
hand.”14 Butler’s observations would, I think, be wholly intelligible to
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Henry James, for a similar identification of materiality with movement is
what governs Madame Merle’s famous “analysis of the human personality”
in The Portrait of a Lady: “What shall we call our ‘self ’? Where does it
begin? where does it end? It overflows into everything that belongs to us—
and then it flows back again” (3:287–88). “The body,” William James
writes in an almost equally famous passage in The Principles of Psychology,
is “an abstraction,” because “never is the body felt all alone, but always
together with other things” (286).
“Together with other things,” a “flow” back and forth, an “essential”
“resistance to fixing”: what I take from these quotations is that materialist
criticism must be concerned with the linguistic operations by which sub-
stances of different orders—bodies and their objects—are forced together,
assimilated, and inevitably split apart. This means not only that material-
ist criticism must be flexible, mobile, and heterogeneous as it constellates
the histories of disparate realms, of incongruous domains of meaning:
decor and costume, physiology and painting, philosophy and newspapers
(or “a dead kitten, an egg-shell, a bit of string”). It also means that mate-
rialist criticism will have to be rhetorical criticism as well, will have to con-
cern itself with the similes and metaphors that fold together disparate
objects and substances, with the metonyms by which the perceptually
ungraspable matter of the body takes on the impress of identity, even with
the long paragraph of description that renders the body and its material
milieu as indistinguishable (as will be demonstrated in chapter 2). In
chapter 8, then, I will conclude with a frankly eclectic and frankly specu-
lative exploration of the material history that lies within rhetoric by argu-
ing that language is successively reconceptualized as a medium according
to its analogues in a changing material world.
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Turning to Matter in Henry James
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c h a p t e r  o n e
Revolving Heroines
n “Rose-Agathe” (1878), Henry James’s most frankly fetishistic tale, a I collector of bric-à-brac focuses his desires on a Parisian hairdresser’s
wife, a woman whom he finds “the most beautiful object” he has ever
seen.1 The connoisseur, named Sanguinetti, becomes a habitué of the shop,
staring longingly through its plate-glass window, which displays “detached
human tresses disposed in every variety of fashionable convolution,” “ivory
toilet-implements,” and two rotating wax figures, “wig-wearing puppets”
that display the newest styles; he invents little errands, purchases of cold
cream and glycerin, that bring him closer to his beloved (121). Eventually
he arranges to buy the hairdresser’s wife, or so his friend, the tale’s narra-
tor, understands, ascribing this brazenly commodified approach to sexual
relations to his friend’s “Parisianized” morals (129). But when, in the tale’s
surprise ending, the narrator visits Sanguinetti’s apartment, he finds he has
been in error all along about which woman is the object of his friend’s
desires and even what sort of object-choice his friend has settled on. The
woman in his friend’s embrace is not the hairdresser’s wife at all, but rather
one of the wax manikins: as she “slowly turn[s] and gaze[s]” with her
“beautiful brilliant face and large quiet eyes,” the narrator discovers that
she exists “only from the waist upward,” “the skirt of her dress” is “a very
neat pedestal covered with red velvet,” and as she turns, her mechanical
insides make a “creaking” sound (140).
If the story itself seems a creaky one—a contrivedness James perhaps
puns on at the close—then all of its contrivances are ones James will ren-
der in far more convincing fashion two years later in The Portrait of a Lady.
The diminutive connoisseur who lives in “a perfect little museum” will
become “pretty” little Ned Rosier (both have a taste for Louis Quinze and
Dresden shepherdesses). The creepy desire—both erotic and sterile—for a
woman who is wholly tractable, whose body is decorative and manipula-
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ble even as it also lacks genitals and hence an autonomous sexuality,
becomes not only Ned’s desire for that “uncanny child” Pansy but also
Gilbert’s need for a wife who has “nothing of her own but her pretty
appearance” (3:394, 4:195). The literal fact of buying another person in
“Rose-Agathe” becomes only slightly more metaphorical in the way
Gilbert and Isabel make each other’s acquisition, and the acquisition of an
effigy in the tale presages the ways in which the novel’s lovers mistake each
other’s image for the real.
But “Rose-Agathe” might be most revealing for the way it exaggerates
a certain Jamesian way of being interested in the material world, a
Jamesian way of dwelling on the edges of the body and of aligning the
body’s malleable shape with the shape of a plot. Madame Merle’s famous
pronouncement in the Portrait that “we’re each of us made up of some
cluster of appurtenances” becomes literal truth as the story’s heroine is
made up of nothing but decorative materials, nothing but outer surfaces
subject to endless reshaping, and a machine inside that is made to turn
perpetually (as if it objectifies the restless minds of James’s more celebrat-
ed heroines). As her compound name reflects, Rose-Agathe is made out of
parts and serves to promote a line of commerce that sells accessories—
“detached human tresses”—which, when worn, become indistinguishable
from the body itself (so to speak) (121). In the oscillating logic with which
we think of our bodies both as our possessions and as ourselves, hair is
especially liminal, neither an appurtenance nor a body part, but some-
where in between. In this respect, hair might be said to embody a bodily
ambiguity, epitomizing the uncertainty of the limits and logical status of
our physical selves. As the tortured and hilarious debate in Melville’s
Confidence-Man over whether a bald man’s wig can rightly be said to be
“his own” hair suggests, the possessive pronoun itself blurs the distinction
between essence and accident.2
The plot of “Rose-Agathe” is shaped by this equivocation between
body and object as the narrator’s perception shifts from thinking that a
person is being treated as a thing (both because her beauty is assessed with
a connoisseur’s eye and because she is purchased) to realizing that a thing
is being treated as a person (not only because the friend half-jokingly
ascribes emotions and desires to her but also because his desire for her,
almost frankly sexual, displaces onto a surrogate the needs and emotional
investments usually reserved for persons). When at the story’s end she
turns toward the narrator as she revolves on her pedestal, she turns from a
person into a manikin, turns into mere matter. Nor is this final turn of the
plot the only kind of bodily transformation at work in “Rose-Agathe.” As
the display model of “Anatole, Coiffeur,” the best hairdresser in Paris,
Rose-Agathe’s changing styles set the trend: “All the knowing people keep
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note of her successive coiffures” (136). Hence the uncanny effect Rose-
Agathe has as a replica of the human figure is endlessly reenacted as
Anatole’s patrons successively restyle themselves, turning themselves into
something strange yet simultaneously familiar. While the story of a
manikin mistaken for a real person would seem a textbook case of the
uncanny (that scenario is indeed one of Freud’s examples), what is striking
in James’s story is how thoroughly the shock of the uncanny is tied to econ-
omy, linked to the commerce of the endless fashioning of the physical
body.3 More specifically, the unsettling effect of looking in the shop-win-
dow at a thing that resembles a human body repeats itself as one subse-
quently looks in the mirror and tries to take in the small collision of the
familiar and the strange that characterizes the new haircut the model has
prompted. As Mark Seltzer has argued in an essay centered on The
American, the kind of confusion of body and thing epitomized in “Rose-
Agathe” is a central operating principle both of the realist project in fiction
and the economy of individuation that governs acts of consumption.4 If
the tale seems a trifle frivolous, then, this generalization of the uncanny
into a broad model of economy, into a cultural model, suggests that fol-
lowing this text’s twists and turns will be a critically productive enterprise.
At least in “Rose-Agathe,” turning to matter in Henry James involves
three kinds of turns that happen indistinguishably. The crucial turn of the
story’s plot (twisted like the “convolution” of a curl) and the turning or
transforming of the human body (not just Rose-Agathe, but all Parisiennes
who covet her “chic”) coincide with and depend on the physical turning of
the story’s heroine (121, 128). At the coiffeur’s, she is located behind plate-
glass, is constantly in motion, and is successively restyled; hence she serves
both as the embodiment of an ideal (the very “picture of a gracious lady,”
one might say in the language of the Portrait) that incites desire and as one
that, for all its concreteness, remains inaccessible (4:105).5 The text’s nar-
rative technique remains rigorously true to this ambivalence of emphatic
embodiment that nonetheless cannot be grasped: James gets the body and
its vicissitudes to center stage and then, in the last-minute transformation
of human body into manikin, releases the referential hold the text has
seemed to gain on the body, substituting artifice for the real thing. For all
of the physical specificity of the narrator and Sanguinetti’s conversations
about Rose-Agathe—they have discussed her hair, her jewelry, how she
looks from the rear—in the story’s last paragraph it turns out the two have
had in mind referents of wholly different orders as Sanguinetti has meant
the coiffeur’s manikin and the narrator has meant the coiffeur’s wife. If at
the end of the story the turning figure is associated with the emergence of
a physical body, then it is also associated with something very much like
the opposite: the failure of language to catch hold of the body and the
Chapter 1: Revolving Heroines 5
Otten_CH1_3rd.qxp  4/19/2006  1:36 PM  Page 5
emergence of a figure that, because it bears only a metaphorical resem-
blance to the body, gestures toward the fictive nature of language itself. In
other words, the end of the story seems a matter of concrete materiality—
Sanguinetti holds the beloved object in his arms—even as the figure
Sanguinetti embraces is one that serves as a material emblem for language’s
inability to keep the body firmly within its grasp.
For James, then, the image of turning turns in its own right, oscillates
between rhetorical figure, as in The Turn of the Screw, where it names a
narrative effect, and bodily figure, as in the Jamesian topos of the turned
back, the recurrent moment in which one character turns away from
another, substituting the opacity of the body for the legibility of the face.
“Turn” is the root meaning of trope, of course, and so by making the word
serve double duty, James forces a link between language in its most explic-
itly figurative sense and the body at its highest degree of physical density:
James’s idiom blurs the difference between something as rhetorical as a
story and something as impenetrably material as a body. More specifical-
ly and more significantly, a reading of “Rose-Agathe” begins to show that
James’s famously ambiguous style reflects a material ambiguity, as the
turned back and the unnamed referent—familiar vehicles of Jamesian
equivocation in the critical tradition—here emerge as hesitations about
the nature of the body and its objects, as representations of a body that is
itself equivocal. If this is more widely true within James’s writings, then
Jamesian ambiguity carries with it a history of the body and its objects that
much criticism has failed to read; the syntactic reversals and hesitations,
the inassimilable sentences, and the referentially unmoored pronouns cir-
cle around and reproduce a conception of bodies as densely material—
inarguably real—and as endlessly protean—composed of shifting shapes
and styles. In chapter 2, I will detail this identification between rhetorical
and bodily styles by analyzing some peculiar features of Jamesian syntax.
Here, I will begin to test the hypothesis that Jamesian ambiguity bespeaks
an unstable bodily morphology—and begin to mark out the limits of that
claim—by turning to a scene from the Portrait that is analogous to the
closing scene of “Rose-Agathe.”
The scene, from early on in the Portrait, is the one in which Lord
Warburton presses his proposal of marriage to Isabel during an afternoon
spent in the picture gallery at Gardencourt. Having turned away from
Warburton and his probing of her motives, Isabel
walked to the other side of the gallery and stood there showing him
her charming back, her light slim figure, the length of her white neck
as she bent her head, and the density of her dark braids. She stopped
in front of a small picture as if for the purpose of examining it; and
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there was something so young and free in her movement that her very
pliancy seemed to mock at him. (3:185)
This passage’s description of the turned back is poised between “density” and
“pliancy.” On the one hand, the “density,” the solidity, of the body blocks
Warburton’s drive to know Isabel and her motives for rejecting him; while
there is a long tradition of understanding faces as so legible that watching
them is comparable to the experience of reading, this passage takes the colors
of printed language—the whiteness of Isabel’s neck, the darkness of her
braids—and transforms them into an unreadable blankness and a black abyss
where vision fails. But if the body here has a dense imperviousness, as if it
were an impenetrable statue, then it is also defined by “pliancy,” as if it were
a manikin with the capacity for being refigured and reshaped or, perhaps, for
refiguring and reshaping itself. (Isabel is understood as having an autonomy a
figure like Rose-Agathe lacks, after all, but that autonomy proves more limit-
ed than it at first seems, and it seems even more attenuated if we think of the
manikin of the 1878 story as the predecessor of the heroine of the Portrait two
years later.) Bodily motion and flexibility become metaphors for the openness
to experience Isabel will name later in this scene as the state of “not . . . turn-
ing away,” not “separating” herself from “life,” from “the usual chances and
dangers” (3:187). Two different claims about the body—nearly opposed but
also mutually sustaining—are here tightly braided into a single conception
that is almost impossible to unweave: the body has both a solidity that resists
the incursions of others and a pliancy that allows it to change its shape. The
pause in front of the painting in this scene suggests both these implications
even as it leaves their relation unresolved, failing to indicate both whether
Isabel is to be seen as continuous with the painting or distinct from it, and
whether painting is here to be understood as the epitome of stasis (as it is so
often in the Portrait) or fluid (as is also the case in the Portrait).
Virtually all of the elements of “Rose-Agathe” find their way into this
segment of the novel. Their settings—the shop window and the portrait
gallery—are both devoted to the shaping and display of the human figure,
and much is made in both texts of the future setting a man can provide for
the object of his devotion—Sanguinetti’s “perfect little museum” of a salon
where Rose-Agathe ultimately takes center stage and Warburton’s numer-
ous houses from which Isabel may choose if she will (140). Both plots are
frankly devoted to the effort to possess the embodiment of the ideal
woman: Sanguinetti finds Rose-Agathe “the most beautiful object [he has]
ever beheld” (125), while Warburton takes Isabel to be the realization of
his “ethereal” “idea of an interesting woman” (3:12). And both women
turn out to be the essence of “pliancy” (so to speak), open to endless refig-
uring, whether by the coiffeur or through experience.
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It is just here, where the comparison begins to feel strained, that the ter-
ritory of this book lies. The comparison between “Rose-Agathe” and the
Portrait feels strained at this point because while the kinds of restylings of
the self imposed by the hairdresser and by life’s “usual chances and dan-
gers” are conveyed through the same language—through a vocabulary that
represents the pliancy of the human figure—the kinds of remakings at
work in these texts (not to mention the kinds of bodies) seem to be of such
different orders that comparing them amounts to a sort of mistake.
Specifically, the mistake is one of taking a rhetorical resemblance for a
denotative one, of mistaking a similarity of language for a similarity of
what that language conveys. More specifically still, while a coiffure can be
contained within—is even self-identical to—a body, it is not clear that the
body is an adequate container for the meanings at work in the scene from
the Portrait. Indeed, while the body is clearly at center stage in “Rose-
Agathe,” it is not altogether clear that the body is really the important
issue in the passage from the Portrait just examined: perhaps matters like
the inaccessibility of other minds or James’s ironic handling of the conven-
tions of the courtship plot would be the right things to stress instead.
Finally, if the narrator of “Rose-Agathe” makes the mistake of taking a
thing for a person, the reader of the Portrait makes something like the
opposite mistake, understanding Isabel as a static and visible entity, only
to be pulled up short in the novel’s closing pages, where he is told what
she would have looked like “if you had seen her,” if she had been as static
as the novel’s title seems to promise, and so possible to hold in the field of
vision (4:424).
Speaking very generally, this book will argue that James continually
translates his interest in the concrete into figures that presuppose the
body’s presence, even as that body is nearly cancelled, effaced, fined down
to the ontologically nebulous status of mere nuance, denied. James’s writ-
ing traffics in matters that are difficult to conceive except in the bodily
terms that that writing crosses out. James’s figures for fiction itself presup-
pose a materiality that can never be grasped; their intuitive appeal (and so
their enormous influence on subsequent criticism) depends on their mak-
ing available the image of a world that has spatial coordinates, coordinates
nowhere discoverable within or even logically applicable to fictional nar-
rative. Just as the poetics of point of view presuppose a body located in
space, so too does the psychological novel’s devotion to tracing the ripples
of cognition presuppose a center of consciousness lodged within some
bodily locale.6 Similarly, the figure of the “house of fiction” asserts solidi-
ty and illusiveness at the same time; what seems often unnoticed about
this hugely quotable phrase is how it simultaneously promises and effaces
a sense of physical location, splices together terms for the most and least
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materially solid entities in a double gesture that has made the phrase equal-
ly amenable to the goals both of the most historicist critics and the most
deconstructive.7 “The figure in the carpet” epitomizes this tendency of
James’s narrative poetics, not only because the phrase brings together a
word that conjures up the highly decorated Jamesian interior with a
frankly rhetorical term and so links a sense of place with something
unplaceable, but also because “figure” itself wavers between a bodily figure
and a rhetorical one (15:217). The problem of the body is lodged within
the conceptual center of James’s poetics, then; James folds a sense of
embodiment and physical location into the language with which we think
about novels even as his terminology also acknowledges the novel as a
purely rhetorical pattern. In other words, the turning that is flamboyantly
at work in “Rose-Agathe,” and more quietly present in the Portrait, turns
into a formative critical idiom.
Still speaking very generally, this book will argue that there is in James a
powerful account of the material world, a deeply formative ontology that is
continually overwritten and obscured by James’s epistemological concerns.
To move from “Rose-Agathe” to the moment I have identified in the Portrait
as a revision of the tale is to hear the same story told with a significantly dif-
ferent accent. While the body and its penumbra are emphatic, almost obses-
sive concerns in the tale, constituting a theme in their own right, matter’s
role in the scene from the Portrait is to give grain and texture, a sense of com-
pelling solidity, to the drama of knowledge which both depends on and
effaces that materiality. While it is not clear, as I noted earlier, that to take
the scene from the Portrait as being about the body is to take it in the right
way, it is certainly clear that the scene depends for its force on the invocation
of a substance—a body—that in fact makes substantial the scene’s concern
with the opacity of persons. In his 1875 essay on Balzac, whom James simul-
taneously adopts as a model and poses himself against, James wrote of how
the “palpable world of houses and clothes . . . pressed upon” Balzac’s “imag-
ination”: “There is nothing in all imaginative literature that in the least
resembles his mighty passion for things—for material objects, for furniture,
upholstery, bricks and mortar.” Such a passion, for James, crowds out any
“moral life” (LC 2:48). The essay on Balzac is a partial rough draft here for
Madame Merle’s speech in the Portrait professing her “great respect for
things,” and in both the essay and the novel, James emphatically brings for-
ward the material world and at the same time begins the process of its can-
cellation, implicitly marking it in the one as an artistic option he will not
exercise, and in the other as the philosophy of a liar.
If the body and its objects often become hard to see in the Jamesian
text, then in many ways this is true because James quite consciously
attempts to cover them up. As I indicated in the introduction, this book is
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conceived as an attempt to work against the covering up and canceling of
the material world in James, an attempt to highlight and dilate that side
of James which, like Balzac, has “a might passion . . . for material objects.”
But much more exactly stated, this book’s argument is that the delineation
and the effacement of “things” are both materially specific processes in
James and his culture. The very idiom with which we characterize those
moments in which James turns away from matter—“effacement,” “cancel-
lation,” “erasure,” even “turn,” as I have explained above—presupposes
the concrete, identifies the expunging of the world of things as a concrete
practice, suggests that such erasures are themselves a way of imagining
matter.8 To conceive of the effacement of matter (taking that word as car-
rying a dual sense of material stuff and of signification) is to conjure up
the image of the tool—the brush, the pen, the chisel, the knife—in imme-
diate contact with a substance that is made visible even as it is defaced.9
Taking my cue from this idiom and the facts about creation it implies, I
will argue that the body and its objects in James “embellish” and “disfig-
ure” each other, to adapt a set of terms James opposes to each other in
writing, in the preface to Daisy Miller, about his American girls (LC
2:1277). Objects obscure and overwhelm the body, sometimes to the
point of making the body invisible, as we will see in the next chapter; the
body takes on the characteristics of and absorbs the objects that surround
it, sometimes to the point of eliminating objects’ existence as independent
entities, as I mentioned in the introduction. The material world in James
and his culture is literally defined (that is, made representable) by this
antithetical and edgy commitment both to material surfaces and to their
effacement. This double process is a matter both of prose style and of
material history, as the next chapter will detail.
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c h a p t e r  t wo
A Culture of 
Faulty Parallels
wo passages from novels adjacent to each other in James’s career willT focus the ambiguity at issue in this chapter. The first is from The
Spoils of Poynton, that novel in which James gives freest play to his fascina-
tion with what he saw as Balzac’s plot of materialist grasping. Having tem-
porarily parted from her friend Mrs. Gereth, Fleda Vetch attempts to cre-
ate a mental image of Poynton’s mistress:
The mind’s eye could indeed see Mrs. Gereth only in her thick,
coloured air; it took all the light of her treasures to make her concrete
and distinct. She loomed for a moment, in any mere house of com-
partments and angles, gaunt and unnatural; then she vanished as if
she had suddenly sunk into quicksand. (10:146)
The assumption that governs the passage is that Mrs. Gereth’s visibility,
almost her reality as a character, depends on the rarities she has amassed in
her own house; thus, to think of her from any other vantage point (“any
mere house”) is to see her disappear. Objects make persons legible to oth-
ers, then, an idea in keeping not only with the qualification in Madame
Merle’s appurtenances speech (“one’s self—for other people—is one’s
expression of one’s self ”), but also with our critical sense of how objects
within novels elaborate, fix, and locate character.1
What complicates this already complex relationship is that a closely
analogous passage in James’s next novel contradicts the implications of the
passage from Spoils, drawing very nearly the opposite conclusion from the
same phenomenon. The novel is The Other House, a title which signals this
novel’s status as a sort of pathological other, a dark double to James’s more
11
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orderly and subsequently much more canonized houses of fiction (in rela-
tion to Spoils its title is practically eponymous); the scene is one in which
a “showy” and “splendid” drawing room is so full of things that its occu-
pant momentarily disappears. Overaccessorized with “many large pic-
tures” and “many flowers” and dominated by “a huge French clock,” “the
colour of the air, the frank floridity,” and the “interposing objects” tem-
porarily blot out Rose Armiger, one of the rivals for the hero’s affections,
as Jean Martle, the other rival, enters the room.2
These two moments are almost exactly opposed because the one claims
that objects make the female body “distinct,” articulating it as a figure,
while the other dramatizes the effacement of that figure by the objects
which surround it. But like any neatly opposed elements, these passages
share a conviction that allows them to be brought into relation with each
other. What the passages agree on is that the human (here specifically
female) figure is composed of the ground that the figure is typically under-
stood as set off from. The accessories and furnishings usually expected to
confer upon the figure a location, a context, here constitute that figure
instead; the distinction between figure and ground wavers, and so, in
either passage, the lady vanishes. An oddly elaborated passage from The
Other House clarifies the point here (or, rather, crystallizes the confusion)
because it begins by making a fairly conventional observation on the influ-
ence of setting and then exaggerates that importance until the figure’s
identity apart from the setting becomes questionable. As Jean Martle looks
at Mrs. Beever, the grande dame of the house that, in the scene quoted
above, obscures its lesser occupants, she
perceive[s] once for all how the difference of the setting made anoth-
er thing of the gem. Short and solid, with rounded corners and full
supports, her hair very black and very flat, her eyes very small for the
amount of expression they could show, Mrs. Beever was so “early
Victorian” as to be almost prehistoric—was constructed to move
amid massive mahogany and sit upon banks of Berlin-wool. . . . Jean
knew that the great social event of her younger years had been her
going to a fancy-ball in the character of an Andalusian, an incident
of which she still carried a memento in the shape of a hideous fan.
(14)
It is not just that Mrs. Beever’s body has adapted itself to her furniture,
nor even that she has come to look like her furniture, that suggests how
amorphous the boundary between the body and its objects can become in
James; it is also that the defining moment of her life has been a triumph
of accessorizing, and that the fan, the visual focal point of her person,
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appears against a ground made up of furnishings. If we push on this acces-
sory a little harder, we can say that a large temporal unit (Mrs. Beever’s life)
is compressed within a single, nonessential object, and so made part of a
continuous material surface.3
This continuity between the body and its things becomes for James
both a prose style and his theory of materialism; indeed, I ultimately want
to show how these two perspectives on this continuity themselves become
indistinguishable, and then to locate this continuity within American lit-
erary and cultural history. I will begin by considering a slip in the Jamesian
syntax, a slight wobble that functions as the grammatical equivalent of
what I have so far been treating only thematically. Consider, for example,
the opening sentence of “The Chaperon”: “An old lady, in a high drawing-
room, had had her chair moved close to the fire, where she sat knitting and
warming her knees” (10:437). Very strictly speaking, this sentence contains
a small grammatical infelicity because it comes too close to suggesting that
the woman is knitting her knees as well as warming them; because the par-
ticiples “knitting” and “warming” are in parallel position and parallel form,
the object that follows should be governed by each. In a sense, this is just
the sense the passage wishes to convey, since sitting at a fire and knitting
an article of woolen clothing are both actions that keep a body warm.
Further, if it seems strained to suggest that the grammar of the sentence
blurs the distinction between body and appurtenance, then it is also a
nuance the paragraph goes on to embroider and to insist upon: “The old
lady sat motionless save for the regularity of her clicking needles, which
seemed as personal to her and as expressive as prolonged fingers.” The sim-
ile here is an odd one, for the suggestion that the woman’s tools seem “as
personal to her” as her fingers logically reduces to the statement that her
tools seem as personal to her as her person. In other words, the difference
that the trope of simile entails wavers even as, the sentence also suggests,
the animate body is “motionless” and the inanimate tools are animated. In
between the opening faulty parallel and the sentence on needles appears an
image of fluidity, of the London fog “ooz[ing]” into the room, which is
“full of dusky massive valuable things”; like the adjectives that in James’s
New York Edition revisions habitually swim together unimpeded by punc-
tuation, the whole paragraph takes as its dominant impulse the fluid
exchange between elements.
Ultimately, I will argue that the faulty parallel and the pattern it intro-
duces at the opening of “The Chaperon” constitute a cultural fault line,
that James’s culture defines and locates its anxieties at the point where body
and object become each other’s extensions. As I have begun to suggest, the
culture of the faulty parallel becomes in James a prose effect. The very
evenness of the prose surface—any prose, perhaps, but the long Jamesian
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paragraph in particular—creates a medium in which persons and their
appurtenances flow together, an unbroken expanse that makes no visual
subordination or separation of body and object. In other words, prose
must always blur the boundaries between person and object because there
is no material difference or differentiation between what constitutes the
self and what constitutes the objects that surround it. Unlike verse, which
enforces its line-breaks, which often parcels things out in stanzas, and
which consequently assimilates itself differently to material objects, prose
creates a fluid surface in which the eye can mistake one kind of thing for
another, a slippage the Jamesian syntax heightens and exploits. Prose is
“the rhythm of continuity,” as Northrop Frye defines it in Anatomy of
Criticism; it is also the medium of exchange, enacting on a stylistic level
the fluid transactions, the ceaseless turning, that characterize the Jamesian
body.4 Take for example the opening paragraph of “The Marriages,” a pas-
sage in which nearly every sentence travels from the body to its objects or
from objects to their body, a passage I will quote at length, since part of
my point here is the visual impact of a mass of prose, a mass in which
words for human and inanimate forms flow together:
“Won’t you stay a little longer?” the hostess asked while she held the
girl’s hand and smiled. “It’s too early for every one to go—it’s too
absurd.” Mrs. Churchley inclined her head to one side and looked
gracious; she flourished about her face, in a vaguely protecting shel-
tering way, an enormous fan of red feathers. Everything in her com-
position, for Adela Chart, was enormous. She had big eyes, big teeth,
big shoulders, big hands, big rings and bracelets, big jewels of every
sort and many of them. The train of her crimson dress was longer
than any other; her house was huge; her drawing-room, especially
now that the company had left it, looked vast, and it offered to the
girl’s eyes a collection of the largest sofas and chairs, pictures, mir-
rors, clocks, that she had ever beheld. Was Mrs. Churchley’s fortune
also large, to account for so many immensities? Of this Adela could
know nothing, but it struck her, while she smiled sweetly back at
their entertainer, that she had better try to find out. Mrs. Churchley
had at least a high-hung carriage drawn by the tallest horses, and in
the Row she was to be seen perched on a mighty hunter. She was
high and extensive herself, though not exactly fat; her bones were
big, her limbs were long, and her loud hurrying voice resembled the
bell of a steamboat. (18:257)
The confusion of bodily subject with material artifact in this passage
begins with Mrs. Churchley holding Adela’s hand, drawing this body part
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into her vast domain of matter, and then continues with the dissociative
construction “Mrs. Churchley inclined her head,” a phrase that grammat-
ically turns her head into an object, almost an appurtenance (James applies
that term to his heroine’s beautiful head in “The Patagonia” [18:182]). The
head therefore occupies a parallel position to the fan, mutually balancing
objects in what is consequently understood as a “composition,” a word that
suggests that this body and its habitat have been constructed according to
the dictates of portrait painting. In other words, an artifact that represents
the person as a body situated within a characteristic environment has cir-
cled back, forming the basis for the person’s shaping of herself. This blur-
ring of the difference between the person and the objects that surround
and represent her is carried forward by the syntactic parallels of the “big”
items, which slide from the face to the shoulders and hands to Mrs.
Churchley’s jewelry. The lady herself (although the whole passage renders
problematic that way of terming identity) almost vanishes; the paragraph’s
tendency to mix accessories with the body they accessorize creates prose
that forms the stylistic equivalent of the passage from The Other House
where a character’s view of another is obstructed by an excess of things. By
the time we reach the word “carriage,” it is not even immediately clear
whether this word refers to the way Mrs. Churchley carries her body or to
the way her body is carried, a momentary ambiguity reinforced by the sug-
gestion, in the last sentence quoted, that her voice is like a steamboat bell,
a noise made by another mechanism of conveyance.
The Lady Vanishes effect in this passage is, then, not so much a theme
the passage comments on as it is a technique of representation, a technique
that fosters a particular way of imagining the body. The Jamesian para-
graph carries with it a conception of the body as a continuous surface of
parts; as in the opening paragraph of “The Marriages,” the body and its
objects are both atomized (into “big eyes, big teeth, big shoulders, big
hands, big rings,” for example) and fused into a single unbroken surface
(as the parallel structure of the sentence listing the “big” items also exem-
plifies). In her appurtenances speech, Madame Merle precisely names this
tension as she defines the “‘self ’” both in terms of a “cluster” (“we’re each
of us made up of some cluster of appurtenances”) and of the process of
“flowing” (the self “overflows into everything that belongs to us—and then
it flows back again”). In a sense, what James remarks on through Madame
Merle’s vocabulary of cluster and flow here is a property of writing itself.
On the one hand, writing can only represent the body with specificity by
dismembering it, by breaking it down into its constituent pieces. As Susan
Stewart remarks, “we know our body only in parts,” a partitioning that
writing is especially governed by, since it must unfold details in a tempo-
ral sequence; language can barely touch the body without dismantling it.5
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On the other hand, the atomized bits with which writing reproduces the
body and its habitat never stay atomized; they fuse with each other into
new combinations, are drawn together as they find their places within an
even, undifferentiated block of prose, acquire new and odd associations as
the randomness of typesetting places them in unpredictable juxtaposi-
tions. To glance at the long Jamesian paragraph in the sort of half-reading,
half-seeing mode with which we sometimes do look at novels is to glimpse
a body coming apart as it comes together in new combinations with
objects and accessories. The body and its objects seem never to appear
apart, never to be held to discrete discursive spaces by a paragraph break
but are always “paragraphed” together (the term is James’s own, one meant
in “The Papers” to capture how persons are assimilated into print).6 In The
Golden Bowl, Fanny Assingham is “covered and surrounded with ‘things,’
which were frankly toys and shams,” coverings and surroundings that
materialize the logic of the characteristic Jamesian paragraph (23:34). The
sorts of matter that appear in the space between body and house, things
like hair and its ornaments, fringes, draperies, brocaded sofas—mostly
textiles—become a textual principle as they objectify the work of James’s
own prose, which itemizes and atomizes the objects it also stitches togeth-
er, which makes the body visible by entangling it with alien matter.
I have been discussing the long Jamesian paragraph as if it were a spa-
tial construct (which it always literally is, of course), a concrete place that
houses not so much a body as an indeterminacy; here I want to make
those assumptions more explicit by bringing forward a passage that both
exemplifies and illuminates the kind of paragraph I have been considering,
a passage structured around an image that crystallizes the dimensions of
the Jamesian paragraph itself. The scene is the one in The Golden Bowl
where Amerigo is first reunited with Charlotte Stant; the image is that of
the “cabinet,” a word that first of all suggests a cupboard like the ones in
the Bloomsbury shop where these two characters will soon see and not
purchase the bowl itself. But “cabinet” also carries associations with the
wonder-cabinets of Renaissance royals, collectors, and scientists, men like
the Prince’s fabled ancestors who loom so large in the novel’s early pages.
As Amerigo’s long gaze takes in his former lover, the effect is one of recol-
lecting and re-collecting (the passage is emphatic in its materialist take on
memory) the bits and pieces of her body; her eyes and teeth and lips strike
Amerigo “as a cluster of possessions of his own,” “items in a full list, items
recognised, each of them, as if, for the long interval, they had been
‘stored’—wrapped up, numbered, put away in a cabinet. While she faced
Mrs. Assingham the door of the cabinet had opened of itself; he took the
relics out one by one” (23:46). As the paragraph moves forward, its
progress replicates the structure of the cabinet in several ways, first of all
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because, like the cabinet, it contains the details of Charlotte’s body in sep-
arate compartments, small rhetorical spaces that house her hair, her arms,
her fingernails. And like the rare objects of the Renaissance cabinet, which
were often chosen and arranged so as to blur the division between art and
nature and hence to appeal to a poetics permeated by Ovidian metamor-
phosis, the fragments that compose Charlotte’s body hover on the edge
between nature and culture.7 There is, for example, her hair, brown but
with “a shade of tawny autumn leaf” added to it “for ‘appreciation,’” a tone
the passage identifies neither as natural nor as artificial, and so which hov-
ers in between. There are “the sleeves of her jacket,” parts of her clothing
syntactically parallel to and hence equated with body parts like her hands,
and which almost hide from view “free arms” that have “the polished slim-
ness” of Renaissance Florentine sculptures done in “old silver and old
bronze.” There is “her special beauty of movement and line when she
turned her back, and the perfect working of all her main attachments, that
of some wonderful finished instrument, something intently made for exhi-
bition, for a prize.” Nothing in that last sentence tells the reader whether
“main attachments” refers to the body or its accessories; indeed, the whole
paragraph has rendered that relation undecidable, with arms that take on
the qualities of sculpture and a body with a generally “finished” quality
that suggests a seamlessness between itself and its objects. The passage has
an extraordinarily material specificity, then, but its governing conception
of matter is as something that metamorphoses, that turns.
Given the passage’s obsessive focus on such oscillations and metamor-
phoses, it is no wonder that the paragraph finds its climax and conceptual
center in the center of Charlotte’s body: after a long series of balanced sen-
tences listing the items the Prince “knew,” we read, “He knew above all the
extraordinary fineness of her flexible waist, the stem of an expanded flower,
which gave her a likeness also to some long loose silk purse, well filled with
gold-pieces.” The “flexible waist” is the pivot and driving motor of the pas-
sage because it is here, at the body’s center of gravity and its least fungible
part, that the turning figure of the body and the turning of rhetorical fig-
ures become clearly inseparable. The waist is a body part made to turn, one
defined less by its structure than by its motion. It is also a part, in the
corset-wearing nineteenth century, that is made for shaping; it epitomizes
the malleability of the female body. Its comparison to a flower signals its
alliance with the flowers of rhetoric and, further, with the way in Western
poetics that image serves as figure both for the female body and for lan-
guage itself. Similarly, the purse and gold pieces reflect an economy of
exchange, an endless transaction of metaphors and of matter: money facil-
itates the exchange of material goods, compresses material values into
itself, into something so physically small it can seem almost immaterial, yet
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that also epitomizes the various qualities of matter, whether it be purity, as
in gold, or filthiness, as in paper currency. At the center of Charlotte’s
body lie all the arch-symbols of exchange and transformation, then,
because that body keeps turning into shapes of a different kind; as mal-
leable as language itself, the body is understood as metaphor made literal
and material. As in “Rose-Agathe,” which ends with Sanguinetti holding
the turning figure “round her waist” (140)—which ends, that is, both by
representing the body as firmly grasped and by dramatizing language’s
inability to maintain a firm referential hold on that body—this passage
from The Golden Bowl forces together nearly contradictory claims about
the body, wedges together a claim for a dense materiality with a series of
images for rhetoric.
From this passage I will draw two hypotheses about the Jamesian body,
ones that the rest of this book will test and refine. First, the Jamesian body
is defined by a wavering distinction between center and periphery. In this
passage from The Golden Bowl, the extremities of Charlotte’s body are
characterized by a metamorphosis that the passage also finds operating at
the body’s center; what is central about this body is what happens at its
edges. The Jamesian text overloads the bodily periphery with significance,
making heavy investments in a coiffure or an Andalusian fan, and then
denies the separability of outside and inside. Peripheral matter—which is
to say both things that exist along the body’s edges and things usually held
as marginal in importance—becomes central.
The term “periphery” here carries with it the word “paraphernalia”:
both words contain the root for the verb “to bear,” to carry, transport, or
hold. These terms are not really James’s (in fact, he rarely uses them); I
choose them because together they convey in compact form the way in
which the accessory defines the Jamesian body, marking out its edges, even
as that accessory also recedes to the periphery of readerly attention.
“Paraphernalia” also brings to bear the gender of this formative tension
because it contains the now-obsolete legal meaning of a woman’s person-
al property, the objects of her person, like her jewels and clothing, prop-
erty beyond her dowry, which the law allows her to claim as her own, apart
from her husband, in certain highly circumscribed situations.8 The image
of the periphery in James is a matter of the body, of objects (especially
ones from the realm of women’s fashion), of matter.
This point about peripheral matter is worth making because the struc-
ture composed of center and circumference is so basic to James’s theory of
composition and becomes so influential in subsequent criticism. Few sen-
tences in the New York Edition prefaces have been so overquoted as the
assertion, from the preface to Roderick Hudson, that “Really, universally,
relations stop nowhere, and the exquisite problem of the artist is eternally
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but to draw, by a geometry of his own, the circle within which they shall
happily appear to do so” (LC 2:1041). But while later critics abstract that
sentence into a statement of general aesthetic truth, James does not.9 For
the example that develops this philosophy of “the continuity of things” is
that of the embroidery canvas, with its “vast expanse” of “little holes” to be
covered with the “flowers and figures” produced by the embroiderer’s nee-
dle. James thus construes the problem of peripheries in the terms of
women’s art and labor, in terms of the production of an object of decor or
an article of clothing. In the preface to the New York Edition volume that
contains Daisy Miller, James makes particular this concrete grounding I am
arguing for this recurrent image of the periphery he elsewhere calls “the
sharp black line,” “the neat figure of a circle consisting of a number of
small rounds disposed at equal distance about a central object” (LC
2:1123, 1130). Thinking back to a brief visit to New York early in his
career, James recalls his sense of alienated distance from the “down-town”
world of business, male territory he can only “hov[er]” about “superficial-
ly, circumferentially,” while the “up-town” world of “the music-masters
and French pastry-cooks, the ladies and children” is his native habitat (LC
2:1273–74). Like all metaphors in the prefaces, this image of the circum-
ference slips and slides, but it slips and slides in a specific direction: into
accounts of consciousness itself, as when in the Wings of the Dove preface
James writes of Millie as his “centre” and the secondary characters as her
“circumference” (LC 2:1292). James understands his interest in conscious-
ness, then, in the same language with which he conceives a broader social
world of concrete making; the image of the periphery that defines con-
sciousness carries with it—is in fact inseparable from—a concern for the
body and its passages through a world of matter.10
The center of consciousness thus entails as it displaces a periphery of
matter, which is to say that the center of consciousness is literally incon-
ceivable or at least very hard to conceptualize without a material outline
that hovers at its edges and defines its furthest reaches. This is to say that
the center of consciousness presupposes a materialism without ever speci-
fying the nature of the matter involved. In other words, James’s way of
imagining consciousness both necessitates and effaces a concern for matter
because consciousness is first conceived along the lines of material struc-
tures and processes and then given a name which abstracts it from those
structures, which insinuates for the mind a self-sufficiency, an isolation
only quietly undermined by the suffix (the “con” in “consciousness” means
“with”). But as I have begun to show with The Golden Bowl ’s portrait of
Charlotte and with moments from the prefaces, center and periphery
prove as inseparable in James’s poetics as they are in the geometry James
uses to illustrate this structure in the famous passage from the preface to
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Roderick Hudson. While this book attempts to read James with peripheral
vision—to fix and hold in view matter like old brocades and old
bronzes—it also argues that James and his culture disrupt the routine
economy of significance that weights the center with overwhelming signif-
icance and holds the margin to its marginal status.
The second hypothesis I will draw from Amerigo’s vision of Charlotte
concerns the tension in the passage between an extreme physical specifici-
ty (the parts of Charlotte’s body are itemized, catalogued) and an ostenta-
tiously metaphorical character (Charlotte is compared to a sculpture, a
huntress, a flower, a purse, and in the end of the passage, a muse). The
body parts the passage itemizes turn out to be so endlessly indeterminate
as they swing between the natural and the artificial, between the contained
and the uncontainable and ungraspable, and between the exhibited
(Charlotte’s “special beauty” is “something intently made for exhibition”)
and that which cannot be held in the field of vision (Charlotte’s “turned 
. . . back” is remarked upon at almost the same moment she’s said to be
made for display) that twice in the passage James’s language comments on
its own inadequacy, calling its own terms “clumsy” at the opening and
then, in the middle of the passage, describing Charlotte’s hair as “inde-
scribable.” But while this passage keeps spinning, it does not quite spin in
random directions; rather, its oscillations between the materially specific
and the rhetorically figurative recreate the body as malleable, protean,
made up of parts that may be transformed or exchanged. What the pas-
sage unwraps and displays is the figurative potential of the physical body:
the indecision between metaphor and materiality that characterizes the
passage is anchored in the relation between body and appurtenance.
This argument is, as it stands, highly schematic, and many of the ensu-
ing pages will be devoted to clarifying and nuancing it. Here I would like
to indicate more fully what I mean it to accomplish. My purpose has been
to draw a set of lines between our readerly response to James’s style and the
status of the body in James’s culture, to find an account of matter in the
effacement of reference, to argue that Jamesian ambiguity itself presuppos-
es and advances a set of assumptions about the material world. If we as
readers can’t quite decide where the bodies are in James—and I mean here
both that matters of consciousness and epistemology deflect our attention
away from bodies and that James’s novels (especially the late ones) compli-
cate or frustrate our sense of reference to a world outside the text—then
this is because James and his culture can’t decide where or what bodies are
either, can’t decide where to draw the line between bodies and objects, and
can’t decide whether the point of contact between them is seamless or fis-
sured. “Just look there: is that a person or a thing?” asks the heroine of A
London Life, at the climactic moment of that novel (10:357–58). Jamesian
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syntax and plot represent a culture in which that question becomes ask-
able, a culture in which in the blink of an eye or the progress of a sentence
the difference between persons and things becomes a matter of suspense,
matter held in suspension.11
This moment of suspension in A London Life, like the confusion over
the object of Sanguinetti’s devotion in “Rose-Agathe” or the Vanishing
Lady passages discussed above, recapitulates a fairly particularized conven-
tion of James’s American-Renaissance forebears: instances in which a thing
is mistaken for a person or a person mistaken for a thing, instances in
which a sudden and fleeting visual confusion compresses into a single
moment the larger cultural tensions that make up antebellum culture’s cor-
poreal economy, its understanding of the relation between bodies and
objects. For example, in Rebecca Harding Davis’s Life in the Iron Mills
(1861), “the white figure of a woman” flashes “in bold relief ” out of the
“heavy shadows” of the mill, a woman who seems at first glance “alive” and
then visually resolves into a sculpture made by one of the workers from the
dross left over by the smelting process.12 In Poe’s “The Man That Was Used
Up” (1839), a story set in as leisured a milieu as Davis’s is industrial, the
astoundingly handsome, “truly fine-looking” Brevet Brigadier General
John A. B. C. Smith turns out to be little more than a torso adorned with
exquisite prostheses; as the story’s narrator discovers, Smith has been so
scalped and dismembered in the Indian Wars that without his appurte-
nances he is nothing but an “exceedingly odd looking bundle,” a bundle
that can pass for a whole man only when he has lurched back into his
numerous falsies, which he does before the narrator’s “staring eyes,” dis-
pensing while he does bits of advice on where to get “the best” “cork leg,”
the finest shoulders, and the best wig.13 In Hawthorne’s “Drowne’s
Wooden Image” (1844), the people of Boston “r[ub] their eyes” in confu-
sion as a sculpted figure of a lady, bedecked in lace, jewelry, and a fan,
seems to come to life and take a stroll in the streets, while in his “Mrs.
Bullfrog” (1837), a stage-coach accident momentarily reveals the narrator’s
new wife to be a “fearful apparition,” a “hobgoblin” “of grisly aspect, with
a head almost bald, and sunken cheeks” when deprived of her wig and false
teeth.14 In these examples, the turning figure links the commerce of appur-
tenances with allegories of artistic creation as the figures at these tales’ cen-
ters shift back and forth between artifice and nature in a vision that blurs
the difference between—or rather comprehends the inseparability of—the
body and its objects.15
To appoint these moments as exemplary and to characterize them as I
have done is at once to argue for a specific view of American-Renaissance
romance, to argue for the existence of a specifically American-Renaissance
body, and to argue for a specific relation between that genre and that body.
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In “The Custom-House,” the long essay that introduces The Scarlet Letter,
Hawthorne famously defines romance in terms of objects that oscillate in
the field of vision, that hover in the indeterminate half-lit zone between
“the Actual and the Imaginary.”16 The setting that illustrates this defini-
tion—the setting that materializes this hazy materiality, in other words—
is the chambers of a house glimpsed in moonlight, “the little domestic
scenery of the well-known apartment” with its familiar objects, like books,
chairs, a doll, or a “child’s shoe.” In the glow of moonlight, such objects
simultaneously retain the intimate familiarity of human touch (the chairs
each retain their “separate individuality,” for instance) and appear
estranged from their user: “whatever . . . has been used or played with,
during the day, is now invested with a quality of strangeness and remote-
ness, though still almost as vividly present as by daylight” (35).
This is the scene, then, that Hawthorne employs to generate those
capaciously abstract categories, “the Actual and the Imaginary.” But what
produces those endlessly flexible terms that define the endlessly flexible
genre of romance is something a lot less abstract: romance is epitomized
by the tension that characterizes the body’s objects, a tension between the
feeling that such objects are part of one’s person and the realization that
such objects are wholly alienable.17 The hazy visionary glimmer of
romance—the optical illusions, the shadows and apparitions of the tales
by Hawthorne and Poe and Davis described above—is a vision that
matches and hence perceives the vicissitudes of corporeal identity.
When Hawthorne is practicing instead of theorizing romance, his cate-
gories of the actual and the imaginary become still more materially specific
as they are played out in the bodily ambiguities of accessories, ornaments,
wounds, and prostheses. The Marble Faun (1860), a novel published in
England under the title Transformation, closes on what may seem a very odd
question: “Did Donatello’s ears resemble those of the Faun of Praxiteles?”18
For all of its oddity, the question, which remains emphatically unanswered
and unanswerable, is absolutely characteristic of Hawthorne’s tendency to
construe romance in terms of a wavering tension and a wavering continu-
ity between physiology and artifice, and his tendency to treat that relation
as one that precludes closure. The A that may or may not be revealed on
Dimmesdale’s chest at the conclusion of The Scarlet Letter, the A that may
or may not be the result of self-mutilation or necromantic drugs or the
spontaneous physical manifestation of guilt, works in much the same way
as it literally embodies the textual principle of indeterminacy, turns the
instability of writing (it is a letter, after all) into a matter of physiology. In
The Blithedale Romance, Hawthorne construes in terms of fashion this
sense of ontologically fuzzy embodiment, a fuzziness that in turn con-
tributes to the instability of this notoriously incoherent novel. What the
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novel cannot decide is how deeply fashion permeates the body or how
much of personal identity is lodged within and sustained by the superficial
drape of, say, a veil like the one that covers Priscilla during her mesmerist
performances; at moments, the text entertains the possibility that all of this
woman’s existence is “comprehended within that mysterious veil.”19 In its
portrait of Westervelt, the Veiled Lady’s mesmerizing wizard and manager,
the novel follows the same pattern of thought in a series of fine delin-
eations, moving from his overly elegant clothing—his blindingly white
shirt, his “exquisitely wrought” watch chain—to the barely visible “gold
band around the upper part of his teeth,” which reveals them to be pros-
thetic, to the supposition that there is “nothing genuine about him,” that
“his semblance of a human body [is] only a necromantic, or perhaps a
mechanical contrivance” (86, 88, 174).
In his 1879 book on Hawthorne, James reproduces this wavering
embodiment as an indecision about Hawthorne’s claims to realism.
Commenting on Hawthorne’s notebooks, James writes that “outward
objects play much the larger part in” them; Hawthorne pays an almost rad-
ical allegiance to the “minute” and the “trivial,” to the concrete instead of
“convictions” and “ideas” (LC 1:350). Commenting on The Scarlet Letter,
James writes that the book’s “faults” are “a want of reality and an abuse of
the fanciful element . . . the people strike me not as characters, but as rep-
resentatives, very picturesquely arranged, of a single state of mind” (404).
James knows that these two claims don’t really accord with each other,
knows that the excessively objective cannot also suffer from “a want of real-
ity,” and so in the middle of his commentary on The House of the Seven
Gables, he tries to repair the contradiction. While Hawthorne “had a high
sense of reality,” he “never attempted to render exactly or closely the actu-
al facts of the society that surrounded him”; while Seven Gables has “more
literal actuality than” the other novels, its characters “are all figures rather
than characters—they are all pictures rather than persons” (412, 413).
James comes very, very close here to defining the actual as the figurative—
in large part, I am suggesting, because he finds in Hawthorne both a com-
mitment to representing the body with precision and to representing that
body as continually “embellished” and “disfigured,” to adopt the terms
James will give to this wavering ontology much later in his New York
Edition prefaces (LC 2:1277).
Thus it makes curious sense that the most realistic character for James—
“the nearest approach that Hawthorne has made to the complete creation
of a person”—is Zenobia in Blithedale, a character deeply and heavily iden-
tified with artifice (LC 1:420). James comes to terms with his contrary intu-
itions about Hawthorne’s realism by grounding those opposed claims with-
in one body. Even in the case of Zenobia, James cannot quite manage a
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coherent account, suggesting early on in Hawthorne that her portrait
attains “a greater reality” than those of the other characters in spite of
being “full of alteration and embellishment”; later on he indicates that
Zenobia is “more concrete,” “a more definite image” because she is “pro-
duced by a greater multiplicity of touches” (379, 420). Uneasily, then,
James identifies the continuously refigured body as the real thing. And
what sort of body is it that qualifies as real, as “concrete”? (420). Zenobia
is ample, fleshy, and very much contrived, covered over with layers of arti-
fice. Her clothing, of which so much is made in the text, is perfectly cal-
culated in its effects, even when it is at its simplest, as when Miles
Coverdale first meets her at Blithedale: “She was dressed as simply as pos-
sible, in an American print . . . but with a silken kerchief, between which
and her gown there was one glimpse of a white shoulder. It struck me,”
Coverdale says, “as a great piece of good-fortune that there should be just
that glimpse” (15). When she returns to Boston at the midpoint of the
novel, she changes her couture accordingly, setting off her beauty with a
“redundance of personal ornament” so that she is “transformed” into “a
work of art” (152, 151). Her perpetual, impossibly tropical, flower, which
serves as a chic sort of sartorial trademark, focuses how thoroughly
Zenobia’s body is registered as made for display and identified with the
accessory; and when she exchanges the real flower for a “cold and bright
transfiguration,” “a flower exquisitely imitated in jeweller’s work,” her
body becomes a figure for the metamorphosis of nature into artifice (151).
The epitome of artifice and transformation and accessory, Zenobia also
becomes, as Blithedale’s plot unfolds, a figure for the wounded and dis-
membered body, the body that falls apart. Her death is narrated as the dis-
mantling of her highly elaborated surfaces: she removes her flower first
and then, before finding her body, the Blithedalers find her handkerchief
and then one of her shoes, a French-made shoe of kid (the text is almost
immoderately detailed here) that Coverdale preserves as a keepsake or
fetish. Finally, the body itself is skewered, pierced by the long hooked pole
used to draw her corpse out of the pond in which she has drowned her-
self, as if the illusions that throughout the novel define Zenobia’s physical
presence are finally pierced.
James locates the real in the emphatically vicissitudinous body; he rec-
ognizes, even if at times conflictedly, that the American Renaissance body
that matters to his own poetics is the prosthetic one, the body that clus-
ters accessories around itself and that flows into them in a seemingly
unbroken continuum of physiology and artifice. In midcentury American
literature, appurtenances flesh out the body, serve as extensions of or sub-
stitutions for its corporeal essence, an essence that in turn no longer seems
quite essential. It is just here, at the point where Zenobia’s flower and shoe
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come to seem like body parts, or where Westervelt’s teeth substitute for the
real things, or Poe’s used-up man turns into a cluster of boutique purchas-
es, that the concerns of the philosophy of personal identity and of fashion
become indistinguishable. As readers of Sharon Cameron’s The Corporeal
Self will recognize, the perspective offered here owes much to that book’s
emphasis on the way that American-Renaissance texts investigate identity
by almost literally putting pressure on the body, by dismembering it, deny-
ing it, supplementing it, and confusing its literal fact with its allegorical
significance.20 It is this confusion that fascinates Hawthorne in such char-
acters as Zenobia and that in turn fascinates James, a confusion between
fashion and philosophy, between material accident and metaphysical
essence. This confusion is also what moves Melville to turn a haircut into
a heated philosophical debate on the corporeal basis of possessive individ-
ualism in The Confidence-Man, or to observe, in Moby-Dick, that Ahab
“wears” his whale-bone leg “like a gentleman.”21
Moby-Dick is the full-scale anatomy of anatomy in American-
Renaissance literature; it is also and consequently the text that most thor-
oughly confuses material periphery with conceptual or psychological cen-
ter and the physiologically given with the culturally shaped. As Samuel
Otter has demonstrated, Melville writes so as to generate “material analy-
ses of consciousness”; his prose “give[s] heft to thought” through the “rest-
less dissecting of all kinds of bodies.”22 Much more specifically, Melville
gains purchase on the material world and its economy by envisioning it as
a vast, perpetual, chiastic relation between wound and prosthesis, a bodily
ebb and flow that is the novel’s anatomy and its political economy. The
novel’s obsession with amputation and dismemberment—with amputated
legs and chopped-off toes and unscrewed navels—seamlessly shades into
its description of material making, as butchered whale parts become food,
fuel, coats, fiddle bows, skirt hoops, umbrella handles, and canes. With
Ahab’s leg, the whale heals the wound it causes, fills in the hole in the
human world that it has made, as the leg is lost to Moby Dick’s jaws and
then replaced with a prosthesis fashioned from another whale’s bone. More
generally, the whale has a “compacted collectedness” that culture undoes,
that culture becomes culture by undoing; the whale is a “monstrous cabi-
net” of “marvels,” one that yields all manner of “specialties,” of human
accessories, whether they be legs, canes, or skirt hoops (284, 302, 285).
One reason for summarizing here the economy of Moby-Dick (a novel
James perhaps never read) is that its image of the prosthesis lies at the emo-
tional core of the James family, serves as a metaphor by which William and
Henry theorize the matter of the body, conceptualize their own physicali-
ty, and negotiate the slippery relation between psychological and corpore-
al accounts of the interior of persons. One of the better-known pieces of
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Jamesian minutiae is that Henry, Sr., burned his left leg in a fire, probably
at the age of 13, a wound so serious that the leg was amputated, probably
several years later, and replaced with a wooden one, which was itself
replaced periodically throughout the philosopher’s life.23 Henry James, Sr.,
embodied the American-Renaissance body, which is to say his physique
follows the contours of and replicates the problems posed by the fictional
bodies of Captain Ahab, General John A. B. C. Smith, and Zenobia. It is
as if Henry, Jr., were named after and bred by a trope that took on flesh,
by a metaphor that forged an imperfect link between that flesh and the
sort of sculpted matter that figures so prominently in the fictions of
Hawthorne, Melville, and Poe. As several moments from his children’s
lives and writings will suggest, Henry, Sr., was a walking object lesson in
the nuances of corporeal and personal identity. While my emphasis here
may occasion the worry that I am relying too much on something that is
literally accidental, my argument is that this physical detail reflects and
fosters a disruption of the difference between essence and accident, sus-
pends the distinction between what is central and what is superficial.
In an Atlantic Monthly essay on the physiology of walking and the
evolving technology of shoes and prostheses, Oliver Wendell Holmes clar-
ifies some of the assumptions that hovered about the body part at issue
here. Published in 1863, when the Civil War had made healthy, efficient
walking—or marching—a matter of political urgency and the replace-
ment of lost limbs seem like a matter of national healing, the essay takes
improvements in artificial-limb technology as “one of the signs of our
advancing American civilization,” an advance that might repair the bodies
that civilization has torn apart: “War unmakes legs, and human skill must
supply their places.”24 The essay thus understands the human body as
wide-open to fabrication and the technological and the physiological as
almost indistinguishable. Indeed, while watching recent amputees learn to
use the newly improved prostheses made by B. Franklin Palmer, Holmes
professes that he was so wholly uncertain “which was Nature’s leg and
which was Mr. Palmer’s” that he “selected the wrong leg. No victim of the
thimble-rigger’s trickery was ever more completely taken in than we were
by the contrivance of the ingenious Surgeon-Artist” (577). As in the
moments of confusion in Poe, Hawthorne, and Davis, and as in the
Jamesian passages where persons disappear into a welter of things, the
body wavers in the field of vision in a trompe l’oeil effect, which reproduces
in a glance the continuity between person and appurtenance. (A thimble-
rig is a shell game, a reference with which Holmes suggests that the “trick-
ery” and disguise formerly assigned to the midcentury confidence-man
now style the body at large.) Holmes understands this continuity as more
than just a visual illusion, however, for in his explanation of how amputees
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adjust to their new legs, the connection between person and thing is fig-
ured as a matter of neurology: “gradually the wooden limb seems to
become, as it were, penetrated by the nerves, and the intelligence to run
downwards until it reaches the last joint of the member.” Similarly, “the leg
is stupid until practice has taught it just what is expected from its various
parts,” a remark that suggests that intelligence and consciousness are
lodged within this appurtenance, “the half-reasoning willow” wood from
which the best legs are made (576–77, 578). The finest wooden leg is
“shaped very much as a sculptor finishes marble, with an eye to artistic
effect,” and its wearer is “solaced with the consciousness that he carries so
much beauty and symmetry about with him” (577).
Holmes’s sense of the prosthesis as a luxuriously refined extension of the
body that also renders ambiguous the matter of bodily integrity is one
William and Henry James share; it is an image that focuses their contra-
dictory intuitions about the physicality of selves and the relation between
that physicality and the world of objects. Hence a famous passage in The
Spoils of Poynton imagines the loss of a house and its furnishings as an
“amputation” and the new house as a “lovely wooden substitute” (10:69).
And as in Holmes’s account of the wooden leg as “half-reasoning,” James
figures the “chopped limbs” as seemingly conscious, as having the ability
to “suffer”; in both texts, the prosthesis leads to a blurring of the difference
between the objects of consciousness and consciousness itself (10:78). In
his essay on “The Consciousness of Lost Limbs” (1887), William James
blurs this same difference—even after one reads the essay, it remains ques-
tionable whether the title means that limbs have or rather are the objects
of consciousness—while also grounding this metaphorical substitution in
the psychology of neuroanatomy.25 While sensation only becomes a matter
of consciousness at the center of the nervous system, the mind locates that
sensation at its physical source, a habit amputees haven’t unlearned. James
explains the psychology of sensation as a confusion between center and
periphery so that what really happens inside is experienced as something
that happens along the edges of the body, even when those edges are no
longer there.
This metonymic confusion of cause and effect is important because
James keeps generalizing it, extending it far past the case of the partially
dismembered body to the psychology of the relation persons with intact
bodies have to the material world. This confusion pertains, first of all, to
the relation between hand and tool as “we project to the extremity of any
instrument with which we are probing, tracing” or “cutting” “the sensa-
tions which the instrument communicates to our hand when it presses the
foreign matter with which it is in contact.”26 That sentence appears within
a footnote to the lost-limbs essay; a few years later, in the Principles of
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Psychology, James places phantom limbs and prostheses in a still wider con-
text, using the axiom that sensations “migrate from their original locality”
to explain how hair, teeth and fingernails, canes, pencils, knives, elbows,
lost and whole and replaced limbs become extensions of and so parts of
the sensing body (685, 682–88). (The fact that James feels the need to
explain how something like an elbow becomes part of—and sometimes
detached from—the sensing body is perhaps evidence enough for the
claim that the subjective body is for James a highly malleable one; that the
elbow is obviously a part of the body is anything but self-evident in the
chapter on sensation, in other words.) For James, considering the psychol-
ogy of the sensing body means considering a body which perpetually shifts
its shape; the Principles’ famously protean conception of consciousness
extends to, and is in large part experienced through, the self ’s material life.
Body parts and objects around the body are hence defined by James as
detachable extensions of consciousness; consequently they are turning fig-
ures, ones that endlessly waver in what James calls “vicissitudes in the me”
(PP, 351). A scene in the Principles’ chapter on the perception of objects
will suggest the extent to which Jamesian psychology takes as its subject
matter the material world of the body’s periphery and the extent to which
Jamesian psychology follows and reworks the material structure of
American-Renaissance romance. Presented by James as an example of
optical illusions, the anecdote takes place on a steamer; it thus associates
visual disorientation with the mobility of transatlantic culture, with a
journey that, in the second half of the nineteenth century, is coded as a
mission in the acquisition of European refinement and its fungible
objects. James is lying on his berth while listening to the sailors work on
deck, when, “on turning [his] eyes” he “perceived with perfect distinctness
that the chief-engineer of the vessel had entered [James’s] state-room, and
was standing looking through the window” at his men scouring the deck.
“Surprised at his intrusion, and also at his intentness and immobility,”
James watches the figure for a time before he eventually sits up in his berth
and discovers that “what [he] had taken for the engineer was [his] own cap
and coat hanging on a peg beside the window” (745–46). The vagaries of
romance, its corporeal oscillations, here become the stuff of psychology as
the shifting shapes of the body in daily life hover and switch back and
forth between constituting the self and becoming physically and percep-
tually alienated from it. In an early and highly Hawthornesque story called
“The Romance of Certain Old Clothes” (1868), a story that holds true to
its title by detailing the accoutrements of female dress on every single
page, Henry James had brought his plot to a close by imagining a collec-
tion of dresses and accessories as haunted by their previous owner. Here in
the Principles, this sense of phantasm constitutes the perceptual pathology
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of everyday life, as the clothing and accessories that William had earlier in
his psychology defined as part of “the material Self ” become detachable in
an economy conceived along the lines of lost limbs and their prosthetic
replacements (PP, 280).
A scene in the Principles’ chapter on association complements this one
by substituting the deep familiarity of the parlor for the jarring estrange-
ments of a stateroom in transit. James designs this scene to show how one
kind of sense impression, like touch, can awaken through association other
types of sensations, like vision; one sense “reproduce[s]” another as the self
travels through an environment full of objects “tinged with the egoistic
interest of possession” (524, 540). In its locale of the parlor, its darkened
lighting, its focus on accessories, and its interest in the tension between the
actual and the imaginary, the scene almost explicitly revisits the scene of
romance as Hawthorne represented it at the beginning of The Scarlet
Letter; the passage uses the tension between the finely detailed concrete
object and the ghostly phantasm, a tension that for Hawthorne defined the
technique of romance, to represent the smallest perceptual acts of daily life.
Perhaps it is because it manages so convincingly to pull together the con-
crete and the phantasmic that the passage is also one of the most beautiful
William James ever wrote:
Let a person enter his room in the dark and grope among the objects
there. The touch of the matches will instantaneously recall their
appearance. If his hand comes in contact with an orange on the table,
the golden yellow of the fruit, its savor and its perfume will forthwith
shoot through his mind. In passing the hand over the sideboard or in
jogging the coal-scuttle with the foot, the large glossy dark shape of
the one and the irregular blackness of the other awaken like a flash
and constitute what we call the recognition of the objects. The voice
of the violin faintly echoes through the mind as the hand is laid upon
it in the dark. . . . (524)
With its fruit and violin, its smoking-implements and sideboard, the
space of this passage is the space of still life; it gathers together the acces-
sories of the genre of painting that takes the most intimate and unre-
marked material layer of everyday life as its subject.27 Perhaps still life is
always the meeting ground of the epistemological and the economic as its
interests in material and cognitive acquisitions coalesce into a single pic-
ture; it is certainly the case that these two become indistinguishable in
James’s shadowy parlor. Perception here becomes an incessant
“reproduc[tion]” of the object, as William James calls it here in the
Principles and as Michel de Certeau characterizes it in The Practice of
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Everyday Life; the acts of consumption that the latter describes as “anoth-
er production,” a “re-use of products” that “insinuates itself everywhere,
silently and almost invisibly,” work in James’s text at the most basic level,
as the sensing body travels through a cluster of things that painting has
coded as the epitome of the consumed object.28 As prosthesis is to stump,
so the matches and orange are to the sensing hand and to the imagina-
tion which guides it and fills out its perceptions: what happens at the
edge of the body is a perpetual act of extension and completion.
If that analogy seems somewhat exaggerated, then there is also some-
thing exaggerated about the Jameses’ tendency to define the body as both
wounded and accessorized, to think of the body as suffering a disorder or
lack that the accessory might heal. In Moby-Dick, Melville lingers over an
anecdote about an English beggar, a sailor whose leg has been torn off by
a whale’s jaws and who now stands by the London docks, “holding a
painted board before him, representing the tragic scene in which he lost
his leg” (231–32). “Ruefully contemplating his own amputation,” the
sailor stands with “downcast eyes” focused on a scene that is both his story
and his portrait, a seascape depicting a whale demolishing the beggar’s
ship. The picture functions as a portrait inasmuch as it captures the ori-
gins of the lack that is the sailor’s identity; it fulfills the role of portraiture
to convey what is most essential, even as it resists the tendency of portrai-
ture to present its subject as freestanding, standing apart from the condi-
tions that have made him what he is. Melville’s image is complex because
the sign (it is literally a sign) of dismemberment, absence, and lack serves
as an appurtenance (something added to the body) at the same time that
it solicits passersby for a donation which would somehow ameliorate the
loss (of the limb) that it depicts.
Something very much like this sense of wounded body and compensat-
ing paraphernalia lies at the center of Henry James’s conception of him-
self, while it also emerges, in passages like the ones I have earlier canvassed
from his fiction, as James’s model for imagining the structure of culture.
One of the more notorious facts of James’s biography—a fact James him-
self made notorious in Notes of a Son and Brother, the volume of autobiog-
raphy he published in 1914—is what he called the “horrid even if . . .
obscure hurt” he suffered while helping to put out a fire, an injury that
coincided with the outbreak of the Civil War, an injury which James gen-
erally phrased in terms that manage to maintain a stubborn sense of phys-
icality even as they avoid a sense of physical particularity, avoid giving the
injury a specific bodily location.29 The story of the actual mishap in Notes,
for example, has an almost clinical detachment as James described himself
“jammed into the acute angle between two high fences, where the rhyth-
mic play of [his] arms, in tune with that of several other pairs” coaxed an
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old fire engine to do its work, but this detailedness is suspended at the very
point where James is left with an unspecified injury, a wound that will not
heal (415). Many critics have noted that James gives schematic pattern to
his life by reworking the story of his father’s injury, working the trauma of
an incurable burn into his own autobiography; what goes unnoticed in
such accounts is how James shapes his life around the ambiguities of bod-
ily shape, around an image that blurs the difference between physique and
artifice.30 My interest in this well-worn image—more or less a cliché of
Jamesian commentary—is not in whether this is part of a reliable narra-
tive, and it is not in what the never-quite-specified hurt really is (most
readers have assumed a bad back, the classic unverifiable symptom).
Rather, my interest is in what has allowed this cliché to become so notori-
ous and so over-cited, in what makes it seem, to James in 1914 and to
many critics since, a resonant and convincing summation of both James’s
art and his subjective life. My purpose is to limn in the conceptions and
predispositions this image brings with it yet never clarifies. Giving in to the
force of this cliché citation for a moment while also seeking to gain some
critical distance on it, I will sum up the argument of this chapter by con-
sidering three nuances of James’s career as a body, three strands of his com-
plex corporeal biography.
In the first place, James defines the “obscure hurt” as a matter of neither
psyche nor soma but as something that hovers in between. The “catastro-
phe” is “private,” “physical” but “extraordinarily intimate”; it is an “injury,”
an “interest,” and a “bewilderment” (414–16). As it describes his wound,
James’s language shifts back and forth between the association of pain with
the visible reality of the mutilated body and the contrary recognition that
pain must ultimately be experienced in (and as) overwhelming solitude.
Indeed, the narrative in Notes of a Son and Brother exaggerates to an
extreme that paradox that governs the epistemology of injury, its associa-
tion with both the violently visible and the wholly unshareable, because as
the story unfolds, it intertwines, in “queer fusion or confusion,” with the
outbreak of the Civil War (414). As James makes explicit, his “huge com-
prehensive ache” locates itself neither in his “own poor organism” nor in
“the enclosing social body,” but instead in some place between. Hence the
narrative of consciousness becomes indistinguishable from a tale of
maimed bodies, of a national “body rent with a thousand wounds,” in this
very late Jamesian fiction that implicitly claims to sum up and contain all
the rest (415). Inasmuch as the narrative of consciousness and the tale of
the body do take their shapes from each other, Jamesian criticism is in turn
generated and molded by a body it never reads.
Second, the hurt is continually reworked as James incessantly re-pro-
duces his bodily complaints, and third (it will be part of my point that
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these two points are inseparable), the body is continually retrofitted,
appurtenanced, accessorized, and supplemented. At key points in his life,
James focuses a moment as a crucial instance by centering it in a bodily
disorder or change, constituting his own biography as a matter of disor-
dered digestion (there are many letters to William in the 1860s about con-
stipation), or chewing (both the adoption of Fletcherizing and its aban-
donment are conceived as turning points), or obesity, or having his teeth
pulled, or shaving his beard. As this range of disparate-seeming examples
suggests, the discourse of illness for James blends into that of fashion and
accessories as the styling of the body’s surfaces and the cure of deeper mat-
ter are conceptualized by means of each others’ terms. Writing to a pro-
foundly depressed William in 1870, James recommends a therapy of
weight-lifting, an experience that is “worth” “the trouble” “for the joy of
hugging to your heart that deep & solid conviction which you wring from
those iron weights.”31 What is striking here is how a medical treatment
blurs into something like a fashionable trend—the weights were part of
the slightly gimmicky program of one Dr. Butler—and how the weights
outside the body strengthen the body’s insides, a strengthening that in
turn is registered as the psychological state of “conviction.” The same kind
of economy governs a letter of a year earlier from William to Henry, a let-
ter that begins with specific instructions for preparing a home remedy for
constipation, goes on to suggest Henry see the London doctor Thomas
King Chambers (“a first rate man for the digestive canal, but also rather
fashionable & busy”), mentions that Alice James is trying the “lifting
cure,” and ends by reporting that “Father is gone off to [New York] this
m[or]n[in]g . . . to get a new leg.”32 As a composition, the letter might be
said to pivot on this leg, to be grounded in the prosthesis. Like virtually
every other passage I have surveyed in this chapter, this letter doesn’t even
maintain a notion of bodily wholeness as something lost and perhaps recov-
erable; rather, it so generalizes the relation between artificial part and incom-
plete whole that the body is in perpetual question, ceaselessly turning.
The concerns of William’s letter are completely quotidian; it portrays
the James family going about the business of daily life. Alice “goes . . . to
the lifting cure 3 times a week, and walks & pays evening visits” “on the off
nights.” William’s own bad “back remains in status quo—or if anything,
better”; he is “going to start galvanism this week.” In the meantime, he
writes, “the days . . . pass easily and rapidly, altho’ I do exceedingly little
work of any sort.”33 It is just here, with this quiet sketch of ordinary life in
Cambridge in 1869, a life in which the leisurely work of self-maintenance
has replaced other kinds of work, that we can mark the difference between
the Jamesian body and the American-Renaissance bodies that prefigure it.
For it is not quite true, as I have come close to implying above, that the
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American-Renaissance body is a perpetually turning figure like these later
ones are; the prosthetic bodies of Ahab and Zenobia and General Smith
are fatally wounded, and their supplements of ornament and artifice can
forestall death only for a time before they are rent into pieces (like Ahab
and General Smith), or before they stop turning and assume the hard
immobility of sculpture (like Zenobia). American-Renaissance writers are
uncomfortable with the compensations of prosthetics, a discomfort evi-
dent in the frequency with which they deny their efficacy, their compen-
satory powers, in the end. Zenobia’s attractions are many, but because they
are so many and her body is so overly elaborated, it is equated with a false-
ness for which she must die; and her drowning herself in the pond recapit-
ulates the fact that she has earlier drowned herself in ornament. Early
James still appreciates this principle of death by fashion; Daisy Miller’s
death, by miasma, is figured over and over in that story by images of how
fluid and mobile her accoutrements are: she shares her clothes with her
mother, she’s defined by her shawl, she became the name of a sartorial style
in addition to becoming the name of a behavioral type.
But in The Europeans, published the same year as Daisy Miller (1878),
James begins to move away from associating prosthesis and ornament with
death and to think of daily life as itself a process of perpetual bodily refig-
uration. While the novel equates Eugenia’s malleable view of the truth with
her flair for draperies and accessories that obscure true vision, and while
she is banished from the novel because of them, she leaves behind her a
taste for the supplemental appurtenance. “What is life, indeed, without
curtains,” Gertrude, the newly fashion-conscious heroine, asks as she real-
izes she has been leading an existence of harsh light, a life “totally devoid
of festoons.”34 The consequences of redefining “life” as a matter of “fes-
toons” are what the present study seeks to trace.
That redefinition can be further demonstrated by considering how the
representation of race and slavery shifts from the time of some classic texts
of the American Renaissance to some moments in James’s own writings of
the late 1870s and 1880s. I have delayed bringing up this context—one of
the real and current controversies in James studies—because considering it
will bring my own argument to completion by demonstrating how much
meaning, how much history, James compresses within the supplemental
ornament. Underlying the American-Renaissance symbolic economy of
the transformation of persons into things and things into persons is a spe-
cific political economy, that of chattel slavery; indeed, it would be possible
to revisit virtually all of the examples discussed above and find in them
moments where the slave supports the remade white body (as in the
moment where Pip implores Ahab to “use poor me for your one lost leg”
in Moby-Dick) or where the slave’s body fuses with the material goods that
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constitute white privilege (as in the moment where Life in the Iron-Mills
details the appearance of a “mulatto girl,” following her mistress, carrying
a basket of fruit and flowers on her head).35 To choose one further—and
unusually clear—example: while it is true that Poe’s General John A. B. C.
Smith has purchased his prostheses with a connoisseur’s care, it is also true
that he is powerless to keep himself together on his own. Rather, he relies
on his slave, “the black rascal” Pompey, to reassemble him each morning:
the wholly commodified body, which is never more than momentarily fin-
ished, relies on another kind of human property for its incessant manufac-
ture.36 Even when, as in Hawthorne’s images of the disassembled and
remade body, the work slaves do is ostensibly absent, one senses that it is
underwriting the material and bodily transformations at work in the liter-
ary texts of mid-nineteenth-century America. For it is hard to imagine
nineteenth-century Americans finding those metamorphoses so easy to
imagine if slavery had not conditioned their conceptions of persons and
property.
Hence it follows that the baldest statement of the reversible identities
of persons and things is not any formulation of Melville’s or Hawthorne’s
or Davis’s or Poe’s; rather, it is Frederick Douglass’s statement to his read-
er, at the midpoint of his 1845 autobiography, “You have seen how a man
was made a slave; you shall see how a slave was made a man.”37 When
Douglass’s owner, Mrs. Lucretia, dies, Douglass observes that “all the
property of my old master, slaves included, was in the hands of
strangers,—strangers who had had nothing to do with accumulating it”
(91). Human beings thus take on the characteristic of alienability, the
characteristic definitive of property. At the same time, slaves lack the
insensate nature that makes property an object easy to control, that makes
it subject to its owner’s projected desires. Much of the conflict of
Douglass’s narrative is generated by his anomalous status as property that
is self-conscious: “Any thing, no matter what, to get rid of thinking!” he
exclaims shortly after he learns to read and thus to reflect on his own feel-
ings by finding them mirrored in his reading (84). This tension between
property and persons is what drives much abolitionist writing, as two of
Harriet Beecher Stowe’s chapter titles in Uncle Tom’s Cabin suggest:
“Showing the Feelings of Living Property on Changing Owners” and “In
Which Property Gets into an Improper State of Mind.”38
Take it as an axiom of our current conception of the American
Renaissance, then, that the relation between persons and property is cru-
cially entangled with the political and symbolic economies of slavery, as
important studies by Walter Benn Michaels, Mark Seltzer, and Lori
Merish have demonstrated.39 But how do these economies work when they
work their way into the fictions of Henry James? Answers have been vari-
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ous and contradictory: that James identifies with the segregation of Jim
Crow America (Kenneth Warren), that he doesn’t (Walter Michaels), that
he replicates racist stereotypes even as he also makes his racial representa-
tions suggestive of a modern and mobile conception of identity (John
Carlos Rowe).40 None of these arguments mentions one of the few (the
only?) African American characters in James’s fiction to receive a proper
name, however. When Eugenia takes possession of the little house the
Wentworths loan her in The Europeans, she relieves its severity with
“anomalous draperies,” “pink silk blinds,” “India shawls”—all pieces of the
“copious provision of the element of costume” she has “brought with her
to the New World” (79). One element of this decor, however, is not
imported, but native, an element Eugenia asks the Wentworths to supply:
“I must have a cook! . . .  An old negress in a yellow turban. I have set my
heart upon that. I want to look out of my window and see her sitting there
on the grass, against the background of those crooked, dusky little apple
trees, pulling the husks off a lapful of Indian corn. That will be local
colour, you know” (83–84). In the next chapter, a page later, the narrator
notes that Eugenia is indeed “enjoy[ing] . . . whatever satisfaction was to
be derived from the spectacle of an old negress in a crimson turban shelling
peas under the apple trees” (85). Still later, we learn the name of this
woman in the turban: Azarina (151).
Far from the segregationist, revulsed, and openly racist perspective
Kenneth Warren discovers in James’s story “The Point of View,” the vision
of racial difference James develops here is emphatically Orientalist.
Azarina’s “polished ebony,” which “contrast[s]” so effectively with her
crimson turban, links her to the other objects in the novel which have been
given a wonderful sheen—like the “highly-polished brass knocker” on the
Wentworth’s front door—and to the objects that bespeak “Eastern
trade”—like the “green and blue porcelain” stools of the Wentworths’ and
the “most delightful chinoiseries” of Robert Acton’s, such as his “pagodas of
ebony” (151, 47, 46, 107). Writing in 1878 about a free black woman in
the antebellum North, James encapsulates the national trauma of race
within one of the tropes of aestheticism, capturing both the issue of eman-
cipation and his own artistic principles within this person who functions
for Eugenia as an element of landscape, an outdoor appurtenance. For
while Azarina is indeed pressed into serving as an element of composition
that meets Eugenia’s expectation of “local colour,” she also resists fulfilling
Eugenia’s fantasies, remaining “dry and prim” whereas Eugenia had hoped
for “a savoury wildness in her talk,” something that would sound distinc-
tively “African” (151). The last appurtenance the present chapter considers
is a human being, then, one who maintains a stubborn independence even
as she is also made to serve the ends of a specific artistic program.
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Considered as such, Eugenia’s manipulation of Azarina is neither wholly
scouted by The Europeans nor wholly adopted; that manipulation ulti-
mately fails, but it also resembles the new and pleasurable power the
novel’s heroine, Gertrude, finds in “mak[ing]” other characters conform to
her own desires (125). 
This chapter has begun its work with a most superficial reading of the
Jamesian text, considering the physical appearance of a long paragraph of
descriptive prose; it has ended with a heroine whose growth can be meas-
ured by her ability to manipulate accessories (at the start of The Europeans,
Gertrude becomes confused when she tries to explain how to wear a scarf;
by the novel’s midpoint, she is adept at mixing and matching other peo-
ple as she works with Felix to wed her sister to her own unwanted suitor,
Mr. Brand [48, 125]). In between has come consciousness with its accom-
panying poetics of point of view, a disembodied shape that, this chapter
has argued, emerges from historically specific patterns of consumption
and reproduction, from a set of material practices, from a lifestyle that cul-
tivates the body. Those patterns, practices, and lifestyles are what Part II
of this book will detail.
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c h a p t e r  t h re e
The Properties 
of Touch
In taking up The Spoils of Poynton (1897), my purpose is to get at some
meanings in Henry James that criticism’s obsession with vision has made
hard to see. Rather than gazing at a spectacle or diagramming a system of
surveillance, this chapter seeks to dwell within the most intimate spaces of
the material world—spaces in which the distance that vision inevitably
implies narrows and the sense of touch takes over. Only through what we
might think of as a tactile reading of this novel can we begin to uncover
the meanings it holds for a history of the body and the body’s objects.
At first glance, it seems The Spoils would more profitably be discussed
in terms of vision; whether we think of it as point of view or display or sur-
veillance or voyeurism, that’s the sense we talk about when we talk about
Henry James. Then, too, the objects the novel’s title names—the Limoges
and Wedgewood, the cabinets and tapestries—may seem to fulfill in a
straightforward way the code of conspicuous consumption. In Thorstein
Veblen’s Theory of the Leisure Class, commodities are primarily visual: the
purpose of acquisition is to produce a “spectacular effect,” a “studious exhi-
bition of expensiveness” that demonstrates to others one’s exemption from
useful activity.1 And so it is a matter of some interest that The Spoils repeat-
edly focuses on the sense of touch, rather than vision, and that while the
habits of the eye are not exactly slighted, they figure most frequently in
their coordination with the hand. The movements most characteristic of
the novel are ones like fingering, handling, fondling, arranging, gathering,
rubbing one’s hands together (as Mrs. Gereth continually does, sometimes
in delight and sometimes in nervous agitation); with The Spoils, James’s
famously “grasping imagination” turns to the literal act of grasping.
Indeed, Mrs. Gereth specifically privileges touch over vision, casting in 
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tactile terms the intimate knowledge she has of her objects: “Blindfold, in
the dark, with the brush of a finger, I could tell one from another”
(10:31). Likewise, when Fleda Vetch becomes reacquainted with the
objects after their translation to Ricks, the site of Mrs. Gereth’s widowed
banishment, her recognition seems wholly a matter of touch: “[T]he very
fingers of her glove, resting on the seat of the sofa, had thrilled at the touch
of an old velvet brocade, a wondrous texture she could recognise, would
have recognised among a thousand, without dropping her eyes on it”
(10:71). As these quotations suggest, the novel has a great interest in the
point of contact between the human hand and the objects that lie imme-
diately adjacent to it; it zooms in on some of the hand’s most ordinary
movements, raising them to a surprisingly high level of significance, or at
least of narratability. The Spoils is full of characters stalling for time by fid-
dling with their hats or busying themselves with the tea things; testing the
quality of china by giving it a few “raps” with their knuckles; leaning on
objects and, often, each other, for support in times of stress; grabbing each
others’ hands and wrists to demonstrate loyalty or affirm affection; even
smearing varnish, as, Fleda imagines, the tasteless Brigstocks do with
“their own hands” as a pastime on rainy days (10:35, 7).
In The Spoils, then, James is committed to making visible a moment in
which vision is largely subordinated. The novel takes upon itself the proj-
ect of seeing how finely detailed an account it can render of the tactile rela-
tionships between persons and things; it is as if James wants to see how
intimate his portrayal of what The Portrait of a Lady’s Madame Merle calls
the “flow” between the self and the objects that lie outside it can become
(3:287). My general purpose here is to offer an analysis that keeps faith
with James’s own particularity: I want to stay inside acts of acquiring and
using objects, and so to avoid the distancing effects that must result when
we consider nineteenth-century culture in terms of display and the
abstracting effects that must result when we consider it in terms of “com-
modity culture.” Employed as shorthand for a vast world of objects, the
latter term operates in critical discourse in much the same way that Marx
argued exchange-value does in political economy: it deprives objects of
their “coarsely sensuous” properties, casting them not as “objects of utili-
ty” but instead as “bearers of value.” I seek in this chapter, then, to con-
serve the “coarsely sensuous” properties of the spoils, and to identify the
larger political and social structures of thought that are embedded within
and sustained by those objects’ very grains and textures.2
The particular social structure delineated here will be class, along with
some of its cognates, like taste and refinement and property. In a recent
essay, Mary Poovey focuses the seemingly endless and slightly stale debate
over the concept of class by observing that this debate centers on whether
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class describes “an objective set of material conditions” or constitutes
instead a mode of self-understanding, a way of “articulating one’s place in
a social hierarchy.”3 Poovey seeks not to take a position within this debate
but instead to show how it reflects a certain foundational incoherence
within what she calls “classificatory thinking”: a tension between descrip-
tion and theory that makes class both a perpetually unstable concept and
a deeply powerful one. In other words, while class will always be open to
question because there will always be an “interpretive element” to what it
presents as “pure description,” it can never be thoroughly dismantled or
summarily dismissed because its empirical contents give it the shading of
a stubborn reality.4 While Poovey seeks to show how this epistemology
established itself in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English state pol-
itics and economic theory, my own contribution comes almost at the end
of the process she describes, for I seek to show how this tension between
theory and description plays out in the lived experience of class the
Jamesian novel represents. In this chapter, I will argue that out of the
smallest touches and gestures emerges a double conception of class: at once
a set of standards that can be articulated and rationalized, promoted, even
shared, and a bodily truth that is indisputably real but absolutely
unsharable. Further, I will argue that through this double account, the lan-
guage of class becomes inseparable from the language of identity. And I
will close by showing how both the touch of class and the concern for the
specifics of the material world it implies persist in the final, seemingly
renunciatory gesture with which the Jamesian plot typically draws to a
close. As the moments I have already glanced at suggest, I begin with the
sensing hand.
One reason the hand figures so prominently in The Spoils is that the
objects at its center reflect the hand; they anticipate and invite its touch.
They are things with handles, like teacups and cabinets, or with contours
that reflect the shape of the whole body, like sofas and chairs, or things
that, like vases and figurines, are scaled to be arranged by hand, fondled,
toyed with. Significantly, there are “not many pictures” at Poynton; the
valuables are mostly decorative arts like brasses and china, enamels and
cabinets (10:22). These objects are a material record of the details of the
body; they anticipate and objectify bodily needs and characteristics. In an
extraordinary essay, Philip Fisher argues that “every instance of imagina-
tion or making installs the conditions of the body into material separable
from the body and detachable from the self.”5 The human body’s attributes
are thus embedded within objects. A coffee cup, Fisher suggests, has a han-
dle that reflects the shape and movements of the thumb and fingers, and a
rim that fits against the mouth. Its size, dimensions, and materials reflect
facts about the human appetite, its tastes, even body temperature. Thus,
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Fisher concludes, “the features of the cup can only be understood by pre-
serving a hovering human image nearby”; “the cup is adjacent to the body
even when seen alone.”6
Fisher’s view of objects as things that imply the close presence of the
human body matches exactly the interests of The Spoils and the ways in
which this novel typically arranges its materials. While Poynton is some-
times referred to as a museum—and so a place where objects are seen
rather than used—it is really the use of objects and the narrowness of the
distance between person and thing that the novel repeatedly emphasizes
(10:147, 214). Indeed, to take the objects wholly as objects of vision is to
take them in the wrong way. While from the start Fleda values the experi-
ence of “living with them, touching them, using them,” Mona’s initial
response to the spoils is strictly visual; she spends her first visit to Poynton
“sitting there like a bored tourist in fine scenery” (10:156, 25). And while
the novel draws numerous contrasts between Waterbath—the tacky home
of the Brigstocks—and the splendors of Poynton, in both cases it stresses
the nearness of people and objects; thus to be at Waterbath is to be sub-
jected to an “intimate ugliness,” while to be at Poynton is to be in “warm
closeness with the beautiful” (10:6, 12). Similarly, when Mrs. Gereth
invites Fleda to Ricks, she writes that she “shall have warmed the place a
little by simply being [there] for a week” (10:61). Underlying the empha-
sis on the differences in the decor of the three houses is James’s fascination
with the close proximity of—the narrowness of the space between—per-
sons and their environments.
But touch is also emphasized in The Spoils because the spoils have the
sense of touch built into them, instilled in them at the moment of their
creation. They are all works of the hand: “wrought substances,” like “old
golds and brasses”; carved objects, like ivories and cabinets; hand-decorat-
ed, like china; or woven, like tapestries (10:58). The objects are “figured,”
“chastened” and refined to a high degree of intricacy; Poynton is thus said
to be “written in great syllables of colour and form” by “the hands of rare
artists”—as if it possesses not only the individuality of literary style but
also the idiosyncrasies of handwriting (10:78, 22). And it is precisely
because the objects possess both the refinement and the idiosyncrasies of
the handmade that Fleda can “kn[ow] them each by every inch of their
surface and every charm of their character” (10:73). Only the worked sur-
face that reflects an individual touch contains the swirls and nubs and
nuances, the improvisations and irregularities, that allow for intimate
acquaintance; the “maddening relics” of Waterbath, largely purchased at
department stores and bazaars, are too uniform, too mass produced, to
possess a “character” that one can really “know” (10:19).
Thus, the handmade object simultaneously embodies the physical
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actions of its maker and the physical characteristics of its user; it reaches
backward and forward, forming a physical link between the hand of the
artisan and the hand of the connoisseur.7 In understanding objects in this
way, and in adopting the handmade as a crucial test of worth, The Spoils
follows the emphases typical of the commentary on craftsmanship that
proliferates at the century’s end. In The Decoration of Houses, published the
same year The Spoils first appeared in book form, Edith Wharton and
Ogden Codman conclude their survey of the principles of interior design
with a chapter on bric-à-brac that matches this strand of James’s novel both
in its disparagement of the mass-produced (“that worst curse of modern
civilization—cheap copies of costly horrors,” as Wharton and Codman put
it) and in its tendency to evaluate objects in terms of touch.8 Fine objects
reveal “the master-artist’s hand”; they have “the distinction,” “the personal
quality,” that comes only from what Wharton and Codman repeatedly call
the “touch” of the “virtuoso” (195, 191, 185). What’s wrong with
machine-made reproductions is that they lack the artist’s “individual
stamp,” the “skilful handling” and improvisation that is the work of the all-
important “finger-tips” (192–94).
Like James’s novel, The Decoration of Houses reflects a moment of inten-
sified interest and a distinct shift in the aesthetics of interior design.
Emphasizing the careful discrimination of household artifacts and the
need for shaping the interior according to the rules of architectural propor-
tion, Wharton and Codman’s manual seeks to sweep away mid-Victorian
clutter by stressing unified designs based on a new appreciation for the
architectural lines of a room and for surfaces unbroken by the “piling up
of heterogeneous ornament” into a “multiplication of incongruous effects”
(xx). The Decoration of Houses thus styles itself as something of a con-
sumer’s guide for the Gilded Age (one that actually does at one point dis-
tinguish between tasteful and vulgar uses of gilt [192–93]). Such an
attempt to guide acts of acquisition and display suggests that the end of the
century is not so much an era of unbridled appetites nor even a time
defined by a tension between processes of commodification and their
Veblenesque critique, but instead a time of growing self-consciousness over
the consumption and accumulation of goods—a time when acts of acqui-
sition were precisely coded, differentiated, assigned varying values. Like
the body that generates and uses them, the elements of decor are itemized
by a highly detailed system of thought, one that forms modern tastes and
delineates modern styles of consumption. In these respects, The Theory of
the Leisure Class does not differ significantly from The Decoration of Houses:
both treatises seek to diagram a system of taste that governs acquisition and
use; both texts mark out the aesthetic, social, and economic patterns that
underlie a welter of objects.9
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Given this tendency toward thinking of domestic space in terms of
carefully delineated patterns and this newly heightened consciousness of
accumulation, it is not surprising that the debut issue of one decorating
magazine begins by telling readers not what they need but what they need
to get rid of. The lead article in the premiere issue of House Beautiful,
which appeared in 1896, defines the “successful house” as one “where it is
evident that thought has been used everywhere,” and so “the sundry bits
of poor furniture or bad pictures which survive from an earlier period, or
are the gifts of well-meaning but misguided friends” must be relegated to
the attic. Objects that have been unthinkingly accumulated must give way
to objects that together reflect a high degree of expertise so that nothing
will “break the effect.”10 The Spoils, which James had for a time thought to
call The House Beautiful, begins by teaching essentially the same lessons,
portraying the Brigstock home as an example of a house “smothered” with
“abominations” and then shifting to Poynton, the ultimate example of the
house artfully arrayed (10:7, 19). Like the magazine’s publishers, James
had probably hoped to capture interest by invoking what had become a
catch phrase for the aesthetically inclined, a phrase that Walter Pater had
used in The Renaissance, that had given an American decorating manual
its title, and that Oscar Wilde had used as the title for one of the lectures
he gave in America in 1882.11 Likewise, The Old Things, the title under
which the novel appeared when it was serialized in the Atlantic Monthly,
gestures toward the vogue for antiques and so connects the novel to the
handbooks and magazine articles that offered advice for collectors.12
Perhaps there is not much distance, then, between James’s novel and
the “female magazine” that the clueless Mrs. Brigstock buys in the train
station on her way to Poynton and enthusiastically offers to share with the
extremely unenthusiastic Mrs. Gereth (10:36). Like Wharton and
Codman, James took a critical view of what the former call the “fads” and
“affectations” of the culture of decor; the magazine that to Mrs. Brigstock
seems “so clever,” with its patterns for vulgar innovations like antimacas-
sars, has just made its debut, and so it appeals by its very novelty to an
audience which, like Mrs. Brigstock, “tr[ies] to pass off a gross avidity as a
sense of the beautiful,” an audience on which the new lessons of restraint
and proportion have been lost (10:27). Yet there are other strands of inte-
rior-decorating discourse toward which James seems far less skeptical. In
fact, to one House Beautiful contributor he seemed a most sympathetic
voice. An article on the Grueby Company, a Boston pottery workshop,
begins not in Boston but in Blois, with a long quotation that exhorts the
traveler to pay a visit to M. Ulysse, a potter whose work comes as a relief
from what “we all know” to be “an age of prose, of machinery, of whole-
sale production, of coarse and hasty processes.” In the ceramics of M.
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Ulysse’s shop, one appreciates the “family likeness and wide variations” that
allow one to escape from mass-produced uniformity even as they bear tes-
tament to “a greater search for perfection.”13 This vignette, House
Beautiful ’s writer reveals, is the work of Henry James—the concluding pas-
sage of a chapter in his A Little Tour in France (1884). The article’s author
continues in the same register, praising the Boston-made pottery both for
its simplicity—its avoidance of “tortured outlines” and “unnatural fantas-
tic shapes”—and for the variation of each piece—its avoidance of “the
monotony of machine-made wares.” Each piece is thus an “individual
effort” possessing “the wonderful charm of personality”; each bears the
“stamp of individuality.”14
That House Beautiful ’s writer quotes James as an arbiter of taste makes
the essay remarkable (it suggests, among other things, that “Henry James”
had already become a proper name for a certain sort of refined discrimina-
tion), but in other respects the article could not be more ordinary; hun-
dreds of essays like it appeared at the end of the century. In these little
essays on pewter, garden ornaments, wrought leather, and Tiffany glass, a
deeply formative set of associations takes shape: it is not just that good
objects reflect their makers’ touch, but that in touch’s presence or absence
the whole matter of individuality is at stake. As a House and Garden article
on beaten metalwork puts it, fine objects reveal “the marks of the man, his
skill, his idea of form and design, his originality”; “in fact one almost feels
that a glimpse of his character and temperament is revealed in his work.”15
Or, as an article on garden pottery in the same magazine explains, “one
always feels the life-giving personal touch” in the object made by hand, the
“visible mark” of “the human eye and brain and hand.”16
This alignment of touch and its traces with individuality pervades late-
nineteenth-century writing about interior decorating and objets d’art; it
links the tastes of House Beautiful and House and Garden writers, which
tend toward the Arts and Crafts movement, with those of Wharton and
Codman, who adopt more formal Continental models. Similarly, in his
American lectures Oscar Wilde associates a “sense of individualism” with
craftsmanship that reveals a “delicacy of hand.”17 Joined in their advocacy
of the handmade and the values they locate within it, aestheticism, classi-
cal styles, and Arts and Crafts are further joined in seeing the handmade
object as a living thing. Praising the integration of Grueby pottery’s styl-
ized floral ornament with its form, House Beautiful ’s essayist notes, “so
cunning has been the hand that the vases often seem to be emerging from
their own foliage, like living things.”18 Likewise, The Decoration of Houses
develops a whole vocabulary that links the “expressiveness” of objects with
the artisan’s hand; the language used to talk about home furnishings thus
becomes a language of animation. Or, as Mrs. Gereth puts it, the spoils are
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“living things to me; they know me, they return the touch of my hand”
(10:31).
It is precisely because objects are thought capable of “returning” one’s
“touch”—of acting upon one, in other words—that the handmade comes
to seem such an urgent matter. For in an era in which machine-made
goods multiply so rapidly, the worry is that their users will become mech-
anized as well. More exactly, it is the extreme regularity of factory-made
furnishings—their uniform lines and unvaried surfaces—that troubles
commentators on home decorating. “The life-giving personal touch” is
lost in “the machine-made accuracy of to-day,” as one writer puts it; a
“purely mechanical process” cannot “transmit . . . the idiom, the enthusi-
asm, of the creator’s hand.”19 Commenting on this difference between
crafted and manufactured goods, a House and Garden editor clarifies the
assumptions that lie behind criticisms of the machine-made: the straight
line of the machine-made object “wearies” us because it “beats on the same
nerves with the same monotonous and inevitable touch.” “Dispiriting”
and “dreary,” the “monotony of an unchanging line” frustrates our “natu-
ral craving for stimulus and rest, for variety and variation.”20
Perhaps all this explains why Mrs. Gereth speaks of her reactions to
design as if they were not matters of taste but matters of what she calls her
“nerve[s]” (10:3). In representing her painful “sensibility” to ugly decor,
the novel moves into the realm of the somatic, construing taste not as a
matter of mere preference but instead as a matter of physiological reac-
tions (10:4). So refined is her aesthetic sense that Mrs. Gereth can’t “leave
her own house without peril of exposure” (as if bad design were one of
those diseases you catch from the lower classes); the “depressing” effects of
Waterbath cause “her face to burn,” while the wallpaper in her bedroom
ruins her sleep (10:12, 6, 7). These constructions could be dismissed as
melodramatic overstatement were it not that they capture fairly precisely
some common nineteenth-century ways of understanding the relation
between houses and their inhabitants: just as figuring the loss of her
objects as an “amputation” reflects the idea that decor is a bodily extension
of its inhabitants, so too do Mrs. Gereth’s references to her own nervous
system reflect a typical way of explaining how houses become such exten-
sions, of how the details of design shape the details of the body (10:69).
Indeed, for Catharine Beecher and Harriet Beecher Stowe, understanding
the one requires understanding the other, and so they include in their
domestic manual The American Woman’s Home (1869) an explanation of
the nervous system, complete with a diagram of the brain and spinal
cord.21 For writers of the second half of the century, the physiological
effects of the house seem so strong that sometimes the difference between
body and house simply drops out, as when Poe’s Roderick Usher attributes
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the quality of “sentience” to the house that has “moulded” him, or when a
character in Stowe’s 1871 novel Pink and White Tyranny suggests that
women “have nerves all over their house[s],” or when the narrator of
Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s “The Yellow Wall-Paper” (who, like Mrs.
Gereth, is kept awake by ugly wallpaper) imagines a body like her own
behind the “sprawling flamboyant patterns committing every artistic sin”
that “confuse the eye” and “irritate” the nerves with their “optic horror.”22
Among other things, such formulations suggest the primacy of touch in
thinking about design; even strictly visual impressions begin to sound like
tactile ones because they cause changes in the body’s reactions, the organ-
ization of its nervous system. This emphasis on the shaping power of inte-
riors is all the more emphatic when actual touch is at work. In their chap-
ter on children’s rooms in The Decoration of Houses, Wharton and Codman
propose that such rooms serve as scenes of the child’s aesthetic initiation;
they should teach “daily lessons in beauty,” “communicating to the child’s
brain a sense of repose which diminishes mental and physical restlessness”
(175, 180). Objets d’art further advance this goal of controlling the child’s
bodily motions: “The possession of something valuable, that may not be
knocked about, but must be handled with care and restored to its place
after being looked at, will . . . cultivate in the child that habit of careful-
ness and order which may be defined as good manners toward inanimate
objects” (177). Likewise, “a well-designed bookcase with glass doors is a
valuable factor in the training of children”; it teaches that books must be
handled with “respect” and aids in developing the love of good bindings,
which is the sort of refinement that must be instilled early on (181, 177).
In emphasizing the training of the hand, The Decoration of Houses falls
in line with the turn toward manual training in late-nineteenth-century
pedagogy; indeed, the neural paths running from the brain to the finger-
tips became the favored physiological locale of educators of the time. In
the theories of Friedrich Froebel, the inventor of the kindergarten, simple
sense perceptions are the beginning of all learning; abstract thinking devel-
ops itself out of the child’s intimate contact with blocks, beads, and sticks,
which Froebel thought of as objectified properties of mind. Grasping and
holding are thus the child’s very first lessons.23 At the turn of the century,
John Dewey and Maria Montessori each combined this emphasis on man-
ual training (or “object-teaching,” as it was sometimes called) with an
emphasis on the instructional possibilities of the home; the life and objects
of the house—activities like sewing, baking, decorating, and gardening—
are the first lessons in arts and sciences. Montessori in particular stressed
the tactile aspects of education, urging her readers to “teach the child how
to touch” through exercises designed “to develop co-ordinated movements
of the fingers”; like Wharton and Codman, she emphasized the need to
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discipline the hand by “educating youth in gentleness towards their sur-
roundings—that is, in respect for objects [and] buildings.”24 As William
James explained in his Talks to Teachers on Psychology (1899), “all those
methods of concrete object teaching which are the glory of our contem-
porary schools” “confer precision” on the child’s movements; they train the
hand to adapt itself to the characteristics of a given object by fostering
“acquaintance with the properties of material things” and, by absorbing
the child’s attention, “reduce the teacher’s disciplinary functions.”25
Objects don’t just imply a body, then; rather, they imply a specific
body, one that has been trained to match itself to their own specifications
and attributes. When the touch of the artisan comes together with the
touch of the user, the user replicates the precision and delicacy of the
motions that went into the making of the object. In other words, one
doesn’t lift a teacup the same way one grasps a tumbler, a calibration that
Mona’s mother, whose “big knuckles” are a threat to the Poynton china, is
incapable of making (10:35). In this respect, Mona is her mother’s daugh-
ter; the “massive maiden” of Waterbath is nearly impervious to the sort of
shaping pressure that interiors such as those at Poynton exert: “She was a
person whom pressure at a given point infallibly caused to expand in the
wrong place instead of . . . the right one” (10:199, 27). As “a product of
Waterbath,” Mona has been raised among objects that are durable or
expendable and so has acquired not only the wrong set of habits but also
the wrong physique (10:15). “Tall” and “long-limbed,” her body is both
too large and too athletic; when the “force of habit” takes over, it’s the
“reflex action of the custom of sport” that’s at work, not the finely tuned,
appreciative touches that characterize “little” Fleda (10:9, 36).
Significantly, when Mrs. Gereth imagines what Mona will do when
Poynton is hers, she assumes that the objects that must “be handled with
perfect love” will be replaced by ones answering to “some vulgar modern
notion of the ‘handy,’” ones that obviate the need for precise movements
(10:19).
That Fleda Vetch is Mona’s bodily and behavioral opposite is signaled
by her name alone: a vetch is a plant that takes its form from another
plant, adapting its structure to something outside itself. Fleda’s is the sort
of figure that the interiors of Poynton figure forth; as James puts it in the
New York Edition preface, a character “like Fleda Vetch had surely been
latent in one’s first apprehension of the theme” of the precious, intricate
objects (LC 2:1144). When she is in the house, Fleda’s smallest physical
motions replicate the contours and properties of the objects around her;
on her first visit, she spends her time “finger[ing] fondly the brasses” and
“sit[ting] with Venetian velvets just held in a loving palm” (10:22). When
she designs a piece of embroidery after the pattern of an old Spanish altar-
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cloth at Poynton, the details of the house pattern her behavior in the most
literal of ways; her hands imitate the motions of the hand that created the
original artifact (10:60–61).
As these contrasting attributes of Fleda and Mona suggest, what is at
stake in the design of the house is the design of the bodies that live in it.
Indeed, decorating handbooks of the time often hone in on the body as
they progress; typically, they begin with public spaces like entrance halls,
move to parlors and bedrooms, and end with the objects that exist closest
to the body, like bric-à-brac (as does The Decoration of Houses) or clothing
and utensils (as does Charles Eastlake’s Hints on Household Taste [1868]).
As their comments on children and design especially show, such writers
assume a malleable body, one that lends itself to the shaping influence of
artifacts, one that can be made to conform to the ideal type in its manner-
isms and habits.
This would seem to be a fundamentally different account of the body and
its objects than the one that sees decor as a matter of individual self-expres-
sion. In design manuals and decorating guides at the end of the century, an
emphasis on adhering to newly demarcated standards competes with an
emphasis on the individuality of one’s choices. As one House Beautiful writer
puts it, “uniformity is the last thing on earth to be sought for in different
homes, either outwardly or inwardly, just as it is in persons.”26 Yet this hom-
age to the uniqueness of the individual appears between a model floor plan
and a guide to china marks—between articles construing design as a matter
of expertise and the shaping of behavior to accord with an ideal type: it is
thus tinged with the irony that colors any mass-market discourse of individ-
uality. A masterfully self-deconstructing paragraph in The Decoration of
Houses addresses this tension almost directly:
Before beginning to decorate a room it is essential to consider for what
purpose the room is to be used. It is not enough to ticket it with some
such general designation as “library,” “drawing-room,” or “den.” The
individual tastes and habits of the people who are to occupy it must
be taken into account; it must be not “a library,” or “a drawing-room,”
but the library or the drawing-room best suited to the master or mis-
tress of the house which is being decorated. Individuality in house-fur-
nishing has seldom been more harped upon than at the present time.
That cheap originality which finds expression in putting things to uses
for which they were not intended is often confounded with individu-
ality; whereas the latter consists not in an attempt to be different from
other people at the cost of comfort, but in the desire to be comfort-
able in one’s own way, even though it be the way of a monotonously
large majority. It seems easier to most people to arrange a room like
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some one else’s than to analyze and express their own needs. Men, in
these matters, are less exacting than women, because their demands,
besides being simpler, are uncomplicated by the feminine tendency to
want things because other people have them, rather than to have
things because they are wanted. (17)
Individuality slides here from being construed as a matter of uniqueness
to a matter of being like other people who are individuals; you give your
rooms the individual touch by giving in to the formulae followed by “a
monotonously large majority,” by the class of individuals.27 Within this
contradictory logic, women inevitably play a special part; since they’re
thought more inclined to imitation, they epitomize both the hazards of
indiscriminate duplication of other people’s things and the potential for
more disciplined, more carefully studied imitation to yield an “individu-
alized” decor. While women clutter rooms with bad needlepoint and “dec-
orations of the cotillon-favor type,” they also, in many turn-of-the-centu-
ry accounts, possess the more highly refined sensory capacities; Havelock
Ellis wrote in Man and Woman: A Study of Human Secondary Sexual
Characters that “there can be little doubt that as regards tactile sensibility
women are superior to men.”28 Women thus have the higher powers in
making the “exacting” discriminations that good decorating entails.
In the transformation of individuality into the class of individuals, the
properties of touch—especially women’s touch—come into elaborate play.
We have seen that objects mark their users, that they confer upon the hand
their own physical characteristics. They figure forth an ideal body and
conform the hand and its motions to that body’s standards. But this
emphasis on living up to a standard operates alongside—or, rather, oper-
ates indistinguishably from—an emphasis on personal uniqueness.
Wharton and Codman’s almost oxymoronic phrase the “individual stamp”
captures this perfectly, forcing a link between the stereotyped and its
opposite (192). As it handles handmade objects, the hand is stamped with
their idiosyncrasies; their signs of uniqueness rub off on it until the human
body comes to seem as artfully crafted as the things that surround it. Thus
we find Mrs. Gereth described as if she were herself an object: Poynton
contains “no ornament so effective as its . . . mistress,” who is always “the
great piece in the gallery” (10:47, 73).
But this is not the only way the discourse of decor accounts for the
individualizing touch. The hand that is marked by objects also marks
them; as one House Beautiful writer explains, achieving “individuality in
homes” means “staying in [one’s house] as much as possible; living things
into shape, as it were, and making them adapt themselves to look like
one.”29 As the individually owned object is handled, its edges wear down;
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the boundary between the body and its property dissolves. The loss of Mrs.
Gereth’s things can be figured as an “amputation” because the edges of her
body and her objects have melded together (10:69). Conversely, the
Brigstocks’ bad habit of varnishing their house makes their things durably
impervious to the effects of touch, of use, of the passage of time; as
Eastlake explains in Hints on Household Taste, varnish is “destructive of all
artistic effect” because “the surface of wood thus lacquered can never
change its colour, or acquire that rich hue which is one of the chief charms
of old cabinet-work.”30 Far from serving as a material register of one’s per-
sonal touch, varnished wood perpetually retains the slightly alien feeling
that invests any new object.
But just as making one’s own “individual” choices turns out to be a mat-
ter of making the choices other individuals make, so too does giving
objects one’s personal stamp turn out to be an act that conforms to an
established pattern. Objects of desire in The Spoils bear the marks of their
previous owners; around the “relics” of Mrs. Gereth’s aunt hovers “a pres-
ence, a perfume, a touch . . . a soul, a story, a life” (10:55, 249). To “fin-
ger fondly the brasses that Louis Quinze might have thumbed” is literally
to attach oneself to a tradition by means of the sense of touch; indeed,
these brasses epitomize the individualizing function of objects in The Spoils
inasmuch as they transmit the absolute uniqueness embodied in the
monarch (10:22). That the royal touch is the subject of a long tradition
that endows it with healing power—and thus the power to effect change
in the body of another—reinforces this suggestion, perhaps.31 But one
might also note here that objects figure significantly in late-century
accounts of psychic phenomena; ghosts and poltergeists manifest them-
selves by clattering crockery, moving furniture, and bringing objects to the
séance table (one discriminating spirit produced a pair of Sèvres salad
tongs).32 As Fleda and Mrs. Gereth find when they move to Ricks, where
the “little worn bleached stuffs” and “melancholy tender tell-tale things” of
the maiden-aunt figure forth a ghostly aura, ownership leaves a residue, a
trace, a pattern for the hand to follow (10:248). Or, as Fleda puts it, the
objects at Ricks speak to Mrs. Gereth with a “voice” that she “listen[s] to 
. . . unawares” as it guides her “infallible hand” (10:249).
The appeal to the supernatural here in The Spoils’s penultimate chapter
is a curious moment; whereas earlier stretches of the novel diagram the for-
mation of touch and hence of class with some real clarity, here the novel
suggests that the touch of class is something shadowy, ghostly, even unreal.
It’s as if class can’t quite be located in anything apprehensible to the sens-
es, but instead operates in a mysteriously extrasensory way; you recognize
good things, as Fleda does, “by direct inspiration,” and if you have to ask
(or to consult magazines like the ones Mrs. Brigstock reads), you’ll never
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know (10:138). As Flaubert’s Bouvard and Pécuchet discover, “What it
comes to is that taste is taste,” and nothing “tells you how you get it.”33
But if this late chapter in The Spoils repeats the mystification Flaubert
identified—by suggesting that class distinctions are based on something
that resists identification—then it also and simultaneously anchors class
distinctions firmly within reality by means of the hand. Mrs. Gereth’s dec-
oration of Ricks has been as hurried and unconsidered as her decoration
of Poynton was calculated, but this difference turns out to make no differ-
ence because, as Fleda tells her, she “make[s] things ‘compose’ in spite of
[her]self ”; Mrs. Gereth needs “only to be a day or two in a place with four
sticks for something to come of it”—for her “admirable,” “infallible hand”
to leave its individual stamp (10:249). Her class is so much a part of her
that it has little to do with conscious action but instead emerges most fully
in those “unwitting” moments when her hand operates as if by rote; class
thus becomes something buried deep within the body, located in the
nerves and the hand they govern (10:248). Class seems real because it
“borrow[s] the appearance of reality from the realm that from the very
start has compelling reality to the human mind, the physical body itself,”
to adopt a precept of Elaine Scarry’s.34
Something constructed and contingent like class can assume the
appearance of something incontestable and inevitable if it can be
redescribed as physiology, then. This strategy of redescription is given a
stark rendition in the chapter on habit in William James’s Principles of
Psychology. On this account, class becomes part of the body because repeat-
ed actions wear a groove in the nervous system just as water does a river
bed; a “path once traversed by a nerve-current” is “scooped out and made
more permeable than before,” so that the next time we face similar cir-
cumstances, the nerves follow that path until the action finally becomes a
matter of reflex.35 The principle underlying this adaptation is the “plastic-
ity” of matter which, “in the wide sense of the word, means the possession
of a structure weak enough to yield to an influence, but strong enough not
to yield all at once” (110). This is a wide definition indeed; it could just
as easily describe a social order as it does bodies. In fact, it turns out to be
the structuring principle of both. Habits are actions that have “become
embodied in the . . . nervous system” until we don’t think about them any-
more; you “cannot tell ” how you perform certain actions, but your “hand
never makes a mistake” (125, 120). But once they are set, habits are hard
to modify; plasticity means a semi-rigid structure, one that is malleable
but hardly fluid. Thus a social-climber can’t acquire the correct vocal tone
because he can’t unlearn the “nasality” of his early training. He can’t dress
like a gentleman, even though “the merchants offer their wares as eagerly
to him as to the veriest ‘swell,’” because an “invisible law, as strong as grav-
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itation, keeps him within his orbit, arrayed this year as he was the last; and
how his better-bred acquaintances contrive to get the things they wear will
be for him a mystery till his dying day” (126). Habit, James concludes, is
“the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious conservative agent.”
It is what “saves the children of fortune from the envious uprisings of the
poor”; it is what “keeps different social strata from mixing” (125).
Class structure is habit, and habit is written “down among” “the mole-
cules” of the “nerve-cells” (131). Because it is such a thoroughly bodily
matter class is incontestable. But because it is such a thoroughly bodily
matter, it is also mysteriously inexplicable to others whose bodies don’t
already “know.” In other words, the body ensures that class will be seen as
indisputably real even as it also ensures its mystification. Perhaps it is
because of this amorphous aspect that the Principles occasionally refers to
more visible sorts of bodily marks like scars and brands: “Every smallest
stroke . . . leaves its never so little scar”; habits “endure to the end of life,
like the scar of a wound”; “what is early ‘learned by heart’ becomes brand-
ed-in (as it were) upon the Cerebrum” (131, 117). Passages like these con-
ceive the formation of habits in terms of the visible marks of individual
identity; such comparisons suggest that outer marks are extruded from an
inner core, a suggestion that The Spoils also makes when Fleda considers
Mrs. Brigstock in similar terms:
Fleda had not yet been confronted with the question of the sort of
person Mrs. Brigstock was. . . . She was really somehow no sort of
person at all. . . . She had a face of which it was impossible to say any-
thing but that it was pink, and a mind it would be possible to
describe only had one been able to mark it in a similar fashion. As
nature had made this organ neither green nor blue nor yellow there
was nothing to know it by: it strayed and bleated like an unbranded
sheep. (10:172)
This passage, a small mass of collapsed distinctions, puts the matter of
social distinction on nearly incontestable grounds. The “individual stamp”
that forms the basis for evaluating objects here becomes a psychological
and physiological attribute and so a basis for describing persons; the figure
of the brand, since it’s usually applied to living flesh and since it marks
something as property, expresses exactly this equivocation between persons
and things. Further, in reshaping the language used to describe persons
after the language used to describe objects, the logic of this passage ensures
that persons will be more or less unimaginable apart from class—apart
from the traces of material things that serve as an index of distinction; class
and identity are so enmeshed (or confused) with each other that not to be
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a member of the class of individuals is to be “somehow no sort of person
at all.” In Wai Chee Dimock’s words, class thinking depends on
metonymy, on “a kind of cross-mapping, a cognitive traffic between” dif-
ferent “ontological orders”—a claim that perfectly characterizes this pas-
sage’s braiding together of skin, mind, marks, objects, social class, and per-
sonal identity.36
One more example will help to show how touch, bodily marks, and
habits work together to collapse the distinction between identity and class.
In his Finger Prints (1892), Francis Galton famously proposes the ridges
on the tips of the fingers as the infallible mark of personal identity. What
is less often noticed in this text is that Galton’s account links these marks
both with the sense of touch and with the marks of class. The fine discrim-
inations so crucial to the discourse of decor are made possible, in Galton’s
account, by the physiological fact that the tactile nerves congregate in the
ridges and so are projected forward into close contact with the outer
world; further, the ridges “engage themselves with the roughness” of dif-
ferent surfaces, and so assist us in distinguishing one material from anoth-
er.37 Because the ridges also form the fingerprints that serve as an incon-
testable, unchanging “criterion of identity,” the notion of the individual
touch comes to rest on a physiologically verifiable ground (2).
Because he conceived of them as indices of identity, Galton expected
that fingerprints would correlate with such broad ways of categorizing per-
sons as class. But here his results were richly mixed. In one sense, finger-
prints bear no relation to class; no pattern, so far as Galton could discov-
er, is more typical of a farm worker or a gentleman or an idiot. Galton
considers this conclusion somewhat preliminary, and so leaves open the
possibilities that more data will reveal the mark of class (19) and that the
“general shape of the hand” will also prove revealing (197). Yet even while
he draws this tentative conclusion of noncorrelation, he finds that finger-
prints reveal class anyway. Because it is not, strictly speaking, true that the
prints don’t change: over the passage of time they come to reflect the work
one does—or doesn’t do. On the hands of laborers, the prints are “obliter-
ated” by the calluses that form through the “constant pressure of their
peculiar tools”; on the hands of tailors and seamstresses, for example, the
ridges of the left forefinger are “often temporarily destroyed by the nee-
dle.” But since moderate manual activity serves to heighten the ridges, the
prints on the usually gloved and often idle hands of ladies are only “faint-
ly developed” (59). Like novelistic bodies—which so often reveal their
class through the shape, size, and color of their hands—Galton’s bodies are
whatever they are all the way down to their fingertips; Galton cannot
imagine a hand that does not reflect its class, even when his evidence
would seem to suggest otherwise.
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Given this tendency to think of the hand as both a class indicator and
as possessing an incontestably individual mark, it is no wonder that Galton
envisioned a time when class could be regulated and stabilized through fin-
gerprints. Outlining the practical applications of his work, Galton recom-
mends that travelers and emigrants to the colonies leave
their finger-prints behind them as a token of their identity. For in a
large population like ours, whose members migrate to all quarters of
the earth, the instances are numerous of men who, having left their
homes in youth, find a difficulty on their return after many years, in
proving claims to kinship and property. Or some alien scoundrel
from foreign parts may assert himself to be the long-lost rightful
claimant to an estate held in previous security by others on the sup-
position of his decease.38
The hand can provide the physical basis for class because it persists
throughout the vagaries of economic, social, and physical mobility. It is the
point at which one’s training, the shaping of one’s habits, can be referred
to some inherent attribute, can be referred to a natural mark and so linked
with something unchanging (even though Galton elsewhere allows that it
does change). As in The Spoils, class becomes built into the structure, the
tissue, of the body; it becomes a category that aligns habitual actions with
bodily shape with material objects, discovering in each an adequate
metonym for the other.
But if Galton throws into sharp relief the metonymic construction of
class, then he also reflects the considerable strain class thinking undergoes
at the end of the nineteenth century. For there are really two accounts of
class at work in Finger Prints. On the one hand, class is conceived as a rela-
tion among a cluster of objects and attributes, a relation among elements
that belong to different orders and so can never quite fit together, can
never be bound together into a stable entity. On this account, class relies
on a chain of metonymic displacements; it is something of an endless shell
game, since it is never identical to any one of the elements it correlates.
Class thus partakes of the substance of bodies and objects while never
being reducible to any of them. While this irreducibility makes class diffi-
cult to critique, it also makes it difficult to verify: class proves largely
unsusceptible to the kinds of unwavering correlations Galton seeks, as
bodies and their origins, objects, and customary environments never prove
to be in stable relation to each other.
Because class inevitably splinters into its constitutive elements, Galton
evolves his second way of treating class, which is to reduce it to a matter of
tautology: your fingerprints confirm your class because they prove you are
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who you are. In a world of “alien scoundrels” and contested heirs, class
thinking needs to construe identity in terms that cannot be pried apart;
when class thinking becomes confused and threatened, it takes refuge in
the simplest of equations. Thus Galton’s text moves from a rich evocation
of the material world and its contingencies—touches, traces, scars, abra-
sions—to an unambiguous, inalienable mark.
The Spoils of Poynton follows this same movement, and for some of the
same reasons; like Finger Prints, it worries that class is coming apart, and
so it reduces the equivocal and the multiplicitous to the inalienable and
the singular. What is most threatening in The Spoils is registered as being
threatening largely because it is so numerous; as Mrs. Gereth puts it, the
“world is full of cheap gimcracks in this awful age, and they’re thrust in at
one at every turn” (10:31). Epitomized by the department-store wares of
the Brigstocks and figured as the invasion of a “foreign army,” it is the very
multiplicity of mass culture that threatens to undermine claims to class
distinction (10:116). Similarly, at the furthermost edges of this text we see
portrayed the efficient management of the economic lower classes along
with the worry that they won’t prove manageable enough. When Mrs.
Gereth transports the spoils from Poynton to Ricks, part of her triumph
lies in the way she has manipulated—“t[aken] hold of”—servants loyal to
Owen, just as Owen has earlier returned to Poynton “to tackle a tenant on
the property whose course with” the Gereths “had not been straight”
(10:76, 50–51). These anxieties over multiplicity and the unmanageabili-
ty of class snap into sharp focus in one of the novel’s smallest scenes or,
more precisely, in some of the smallest details of one of the novel’s more
compelling scenes. Uncertain whether they’ve lost Owen to Mona or deci-
sively separated him from her, Fleda and Mrs. Gereth part at a London
railway station and the chapter closes with Mrs. Gereth suggesting that if
they have indeed lost Owen and the old things, then at least “We can
always, as time goes on, talk of them together.”
“Of the spoils—?” Fleda had selected a third-class compartment: she
stood a moment looking into it and at a fat woman with a basket
who had already taken possession. “Always?” she said, turning again
to her friend. “Never!” she exclaimed. She got into the carriage and
two men with bags and boxes immediately followed, blocking up
door and window so long that when she was able to look out again
Mrs. Gereth had gone. (10:233)
The aesthetic and social “horrors” that Mrs. Gereth continually invokes
become real here for a moment, as the novel’s deep background pushes its
way into the foreground. If this passage lightly presages the outcome of the
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contest over the spoils—Fleda’s place is occupied by a large woman with
common objects—then it also registers much more emphatically the inco-
herence of class, as Fleda’s physical refinement and sense of aesthetic dis-
crimination prove to be awkwardly matched (or mismatched) by her eco-
nomic status, her “third-class” carriage. As Anthony Giddens has argued,
class is a mode of “structuration,” a process by which economic relation-
ships are translated into ostensibly noneconomic social forms. Hence, class
always fits together elements that never fit together exactly, as class mark-
ers like refinement float away from their economic referents.39
This small scene at the railway station suggests both some of the larger
strategies that shape The Spoils and some of the anxieties that lie behind the
novel’s obsessive references to social distinctions—anxieties that its larger
strategies are meant to manage. The novel keeps pointing toward realms of
culture that escape its management, that lie just beyond the reach of its abil-
ity to render them coherent: unruly tenants, crowded railway stations,
“smelly cottages” and “smellier shops” (10:180). With these moments, the
novel represents class as bounded into an entity and simultaneously reveals
class as an entity that keeps falling apart. In other words, these moments in
which the novel wanders outside the drawing room give class an edge, so to
speak: they allow class to be conceived as spatial, as something with recog-
nizable borders. Indeed, these moments might be said to sketch class along
the lines of some of this novel’s characteristic objects: vessels like cabinets or
teacups that materialize the social properties of control and containment.40
But The Spoils also makes it clear that edges fray, meld, wear down, unrav-
el—and when this material property finds its narrative analogue, class
becomes hard to maintain as a bounded entity. When Fleda moves beyond
Mrs. Gereth’s drawing room she gets mixed up in—and so insufficiently
distinguished from—a world that is materially confusing, as at the Oxford
Street bazaar or at the train station, and in need of regulation, as at her sis-
ter’s house, where her brother-in-law the curate diagrams “with a fork on
too soiled a tablecloth” the “scandalous drains” of the local convalescent
home (10:180).
Conceiving class as an entity with certain boundaries leads to acknowl-
edging how porous those boundaries are; if certain moments in The Spoils
succeed in giving class edges and a shape, of sorts, then those moments also
reveal that such margins are points of traffic, susceptible to blurring.
Perhaps this is why the novel chooses, as a sort of compensatory move, to
devote most of its energies to making discriminations within a class, stay-
ing inside the boundaries that are never drawn very finally. In other words,
having uncovered classes that escape its expertise, the novel takes refuge in
the activity of making discriminations within a single class, developing its
elaborate distinctions between Fleda and Mona and between Mrs. Gereth
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and Mrs. Brigstock as compensation for the confusions it encounters else-
where. But this sustaining principle of the novel is also a conceptually con-
fusing one: it is hard to imagine a class that takes in both the ideal and her
opposite. If the distinction between Fleda and Mona makes class legible—
by dramatizing their different qualities—then it also makes class seem an
inadequate description, since membership in a given class turns out not to
guarantee any specific attributes at all. Here once again we see that class
acquires its social force through its descriptive inadequacy, its incoherence:
consisting of no particular attribute, class on James’s account is always
open to question and so always needs to be reasserted.
But even as The Spoils exposes and relies upon the incoherences of class,
it ultimately renders class as something unquestionable. Like Galton’s
account, James’s novel ends by centripetally gathering together the dis-
parate stuff of class into a single inalienable bodily fact. And like Galton’s
account and like its own earlier accounts of class, the novel ends by appeal-
ing to the indisputable reality of touch, albeit in a rather different register.
Shortly before she learns that Owen and Mona have indeed married, Fleda
returns to her sister’s house, where she imagines from afar the “reconstitut-
ed splendour of Poynton”: “Thus again she lived with [the spoils],” the
memory of which instills in her a kind of “equilibrium.” The motions
fine-tuned by manual training here become wholly internalized: “Her
excitement was composed of pulses as swift and fine as the revolutions of
a spinning top: she supposed she was going round, but went round so fast
that she couldn’t even feel herself move” (10:234–35). James’s language
here partakes of the vocabulary of fin-de-siècle aesthetic theory, particular-
ly that of Bernard Berenson, Vernon Lee, and other theorists of empathy
who held that the sensations of the perceiving body pattern themselves
after the contours of a work of art. As Lee put it in an 1897 essay on
“Beauty and Ugliness,” a work of art makes its beholder “realise a whole
organism of active and opposing movements” as her breathing, sense of
balance, and muscular contractions pattern themselves after the vase or
painting or cathedral she sees.41 In his theory of what he called “tactile val-
ues,” Berenson argued that painting’s appeal lies in its ability to intensify
our grasp of the third dimension. Relying upon the theory of “ideated sen-
sations” developed by Wilhelm Wundt and Hermann von Helmholtz,
which held that the sense of touch is stimulated when we look at physical
objects, Berenson theorized that looking at paintings involves our whole
bodies: “our palms and fingers accompany our eyes”; as I gaze at painted
figures, “my retinal impressions are immediately translated into images of
strain and pressure in my muscles, of resistance to my weight, of touch all
over my body.”42 And because art accelerates our processes of perception,
it endows us with the “further pleasures of self-consciousness”; it height-
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ens our awareness of the sensations pulsing through us as we attend to the
outside world, bringing about an “exhilarating sense of increased capacity
in the observer.”43
In explaining how material objects can be transformed into a mode of
consciousness, Berenson’s theory replicates the contours of James’s plot,
which moves from intimate contact with the material world to the refined
bodily state that both James and theorists of empathy call “equilibrium.”
Like The Ambassadors’ Lambert Strether, who feels a change “deep down”
“in his own organism” after his brush with Parisian culture, Fleda at the
end of The Spoils possesses an enriched consciousness of her own percep-
tual powers, is “conscious of an advantage in being able to feel” (22:75, 79;
10:248). Hence, at the novel’s end the objects of class are rendered as
inalienable property: property in the sense of an attribute, instead of an
object that must be subject to the hazards of everyday life like clumsy
movers or unjust inheritance law or even the fire that guts Poynton in The
Spoils’s last scene. In other words, a sense of one’s own bodily processes
must be the ultimate private property.44 If, at the end of my argument, I
have returned us to the deeply familiar conception of the Jamesian plot as
the growth of consciousness, then I hope it is with a strengthened grasp of
that plot’s bodily and material interests.
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c h a p t e r  f o u r
The Reproduction
of Painting
n opening day of the Royal Academy Exhibition in the spring ofO1914, a woman whom the London Times would the next day
describe as “elderly” and “of distinctly peaceable aspect,” dressed in “a loose
purple overcloak” with “ample folds” was among the visitors.1 She seems to
have attracted no notice until she produced from beneath her cloak a meat
chopper and used this utensil to attack John Singer Sargent’s recently com-
pleted portrait of Henry James (figure 1). Striking the painting three times,
she broke the glass, cutting the painting on the left side of the head, the
right side of the mouth, and below the right shoulder, leaving jagged slash-
es that in some places stripped away the paint from the canvas. This is
viewership with a vengeance.
After a “scuffle,” the slasher, Mary Wood, was restrained and arrested
and taken to the Marlborough Street Police Court. At some point along
the way, she revealed herself as a suffragist, stating that “If they only gave
women the vote, this would never have happened.” In a letter to the
Women’s Social and Political Union, she similarly stated that “I have tried
to destroy a valuable picture because I wish to show the public that they
have no security for their property nor for their art treasures until women
are given the political freedom.” Likewise, in court, when the value of the
painting was reported to be 700 pounds, Mary Wood shot back that if the
picture had been painted by a woman, it would not have been worth so
much.
While it may be an alluring possibility to regard this incident as the
founding moment of feminist critique of Henry James’s fiction—and of
Sargent’s paintings, which have to many readers often seemed continuous
with that fiction—the historical record makes this approach hard to devel-
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op because that record leaves Mary Wood’s motives for choosing this por-
trait curiously underexplained. So far as one is able to tell, Wood never
referred to either James or Sargent in her statements; there is no evidence
either that she was a frustrated reader of James’s novels, irritated by the ten-
dency of James’s heroines to capitulate and renounce, or that she found in
Sargent a confinement of women to the realm of the decorative. Indeed,
Jamesian scholarship has never quite found a use for this incident and so
has consigned it to the realm of the bizarre, the meaningless coincidence.2
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Figure 1
John Singer Sargent, Henry James (1913). Courtesy of the National Portrait
Gallery, London.
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I think this moment is worth dwelling on, then, not because it critiques
James’s poetics—although it may do so—but because it exaggerates and
thus makes more clearly visible some assumptions about paintings and
their viewers that have wide currency at the century’s turn, and that shape
James’s fiction and Sargent’s paintings in some important ways. My point
is not merely that slashing a painting is a scenario James himself had rep-
resented in his fiction (although that’s true, and I’ll return to it later). Nor
is my point quite that in his novel The Tragic Muse, James had, like Mary
Wood, understood painterly and political representations in terms of each
other (although that’s also true, and I’ll return to it later, as well). Rather,
my argument is that both James and Wood work from a conviction that a
painting makes its viewers, that viewing a painting is a physically intimate,
almost immediate process that shapes and forms and frames the body of
the viewing subject. The work of painting, then—shaping bodies on a
canvas—is understood as continuing in front of the finished canvas in the
body of the person viewing it. To consume a painting is to be produced
by it.
Understood in this light, Mary Wood’s motives become far more com-
prehensible: she attacks James’s portrait because she sees in it a set of social
and economic circumstances that have defined her life as a woman. Her
statement that the painting would not have been worth so much money
if it had been the product of a woman’s labor implies that the painting’s
exchange value in turn calculates the value of her own labor: this painting
makes her what she is and holds her in the role it has created for her. In
proclaiming that she wished “to show the public that they have no securi-
ty for their property nor for their art treasures until women are given the
political freedom,” Wood draws an implicit connection between the pic-
torial frame and the political framework: for her, violating the one and
redrawing the other go hand in hand. As David Freedberg has shown in
his study of iconoclasm, to deface an image is to attest to that image’s
power.3 To put this in another way, to slash a painting is to argue that
painting has material consequences for its viewers.
Considered as such, Mary Wood’s knife-work constitutes a critical
argument about painting, one that corrects some persistent scholarly mis-
understandings of how paintings function in the Jamesian text and its cul-
ture. It corrects, first of all, the assumption that painting is construed in
James as an overwhelmingly ocular and dematerializing practice, one in
which the Jamesian text abstracts itself from history into the relatively
atemporal realm that painting offers. I wish to argue quite the opposite by
saying that when the Jamesian text imagines painting, it imagines it either
under production, as a matter of paint and brushwork, as an act of labor
in a studio, or as in turn producing something else, as remaking its view-
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er or as exemplifying and so upholding a social order. More particularly, I
want to argue that when the materiality of painting comes forward—when
painting is described in terms of what it is rather than what it represents—
it’s the social force of painting that’s being revealed. The very matter of
painting—brushwork, paint, canvas, and frame—gives James purchase on
the social and the political. To put this point in terms of Mary Wood’s van-
dalism, we can say that reducing Sargent’s portrait to jagged canvas and
chips of paint and protesting the political shaping of women in England
are one and the same action. While I don’t quite mean to restore to James
a mastery that Mary Wood left in tatters, I do want to claim that the con-
ception of painting Wood holds is one that James had developed in his
own acts of figuration.4
Before going on to develop these claims and to support my reading of
Mary Wood, I want to state clearly that my argument is about how paint-
ing is understood in a particular time and a fairly specific locale: set most-
ly in London, it concerns moments from the early 1880s to the 1910s.
There is no claim here, then, toward a general aesthetic, no attempt to
offer a transhistorical theory of what painting is. The work of the present
chapter is opposed to arguments like that made by Norman Bryson at the
end of his Vision and Painting: The Logic of the Gaze. There, Bryson argues
that Western paintings “negate” the “space of the studio, of the body of
labor”; what is invisible in painting, except as a trace, is the body that pro-
duced the artifact.5 In a very general sense, that claim must be literally true,
yet adopting it as a precept makes one a most imprecise historian; in the
period under discussion here, the labor of painting is understood as reap-
pearing in the body of the viewer. Painting is understood as a shaping of
the body on canvas that in turn shapes the bodies that stand before it. To
make that claim specific, I want to consider in some detail first radical suf-
fragism and its strategy of violently attacking the objects of high culture
and then the veneration of high art by aestheticism, which would seem in
this regard to be suffragism’s opposite.
Mary Wood was not the first suffragist to slash a painting; indeed,
attacks on works of art became almost stereotypically associated with such
activists at the time. Hence Mary Wood’s attack on the Sargent had a suc-
cessor: nine days later a woman described in the Times as “a well-known
militant” eluded the Royal Academy’s heightened security, produced an ax
from her muff, and dealt three blows to Sir Hubert von Herkomer’s por-
trait of the Duke of Wellington.6 Wood also had a highly notorious pre-
cursor: two months before, a suffragist named Mary Richardson attacked
with a meat chopper the Rokeby Venus of Velázquez (also known as The
Toilet of Venus) in the National Gallery (figure 2). Like the acts of making
that they reverse, destructions of works of art come in series; as the use of
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the meat chopper suggests, this destruction of a model of femininity—of
a Venus, no less—must itself have served as a model for Mary Wood’s sub-
sequent attack. Mary Richardson’s vandalism of the Rokeby Venus estab-
lishes the conventions of the genre of suffragist picture slashing, as we shall
see.
In an interview forty years later, Richardson explained her attack on the
Rokeby Venus this way: “I didn’t like the way men visitors gaped at it all day
long.”7 Significantly after the fact, Richardson thus accounts for her
motives along the lines of what late-twentieth-century critics think of as
the politics of the gaze: the equation of looking, especially by men, with
the sexual violation and objectification of what is looked at, especially
women. But Richardson’s earlier explanations of her actions and the way
the event itself unfolded in 1914 were considerably more nuanced than
the later comment about “gap[ing]” suggests. According to the London
Times’s report the day after the vandalism, “Slasher Mary” (as she imme-
diately became known) said as she was led away from the Gallery, “Yes, I
am a suffragette. You can get another picture, but you cannot get a life, as
they are killing Mrs. [Emmeline] Pankhurst,” the woman widely regarded
as the mother of the Suffragist movement, who was then imprisoned and
on a hunger strike. In a prepared statement, also published in the Times,
Richardson wrote, “I have tried to destroy the picture of the most beauti-
ful woman in mythological history as a protest against the Government
for destroying Mrs. Pankhurst, who is the most beautiful character in
modern history. Justice is an element of beauty as much as colour and out-
line on canvas.”8
As Richardson’s comments suggest, the theme of representation is at
issue at every level of both the Rokeby Venus and the act that violates that
painting; mirrored reflection runs as a connecting motif from the paint-
ing’s provenance to the politics of suffragism to the little mirror in the
painting’s center by which Velázquez’s woman looks at herself—or her
viewer. There is, to begin, the fact that the painting had been purchased
for the Gallery by a much-publicized subscription of donors eight years
prior to this attack: this painting may have seemed to Richardson a fitting
target because it became national property through the accumulation of
individual acts of expression, almost like the voting process from which
women were excluded.9 Moving inward, from the painting’s economic
frame to the structure of the painting itself, we can see how Richardson’s
attack on this painting is a faithful reversal of the painting’s principle of
composition: the act of slashing this painting, in other words, critiques the
female role the painting produces, even as that act also mimetically follows
the painting’s own logic. In slashing this portrait and so violating the
boundaries of its frame, Richardson does not so much contradict or negate
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the painting as she reverses and rereads its dramatization of the themes of
representation and framing; her work with the meat-chopper uncovers the
political nonrepresentation of women that results when women are
reduced to embodying an aesthetic ideal. At the same time, Richardson
implicitly relies on the painting’s highly elaborated metaphor of the frame
to make manifest the tightly constricted space women occupy within the
social framework: the female personality, epitomized by the face, requires
a frame within a frame, a boundary within a boundary, in Velázquez’s
painting. Similarly, Richardson adopts the painting’s theme of doubling, of
mirroring, in order to connect the fate of this physically beautiful, painted
body with the fate of the morally beautiful, real body of Emmeline
Pankhurst; indeed, the meat-chopper, because it’s meant to cut flesh, serves
as a metonym that links the two, so Richardson’s choice of implement is
imagistically consistent with her conception of the politics of painterly
realism. In slashing the painting, Richardson turns it into an image that
mirrors the violation of Pankhurst, a violation that this painting has itself,
in some sense, produced. As an unnamed woman at a meeting of the
Women’s Social and Political Union in Bayswater put it a few days later,
Mary Richardson’s attack on the Velázquez was a “stroke of genius,” so deft
is its touch in handling a cultural poetics of extraordinary density.10
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Figure 2
Diego Velázquez, The Toilet of Venus (The Rokeby Venus) (1647–51). © National
Gallery Picture Library, London.
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In describing the slashing of the Velázquez in such self-reflexive terms,
I am implicitly suggesting a link between this incident and its cultural
poetics and the poetics of that most self-reflexive artistic movement, aes-
theticism. This sense of endless mirroring and this practice of categorizing
experience and artifacts into “life” and “art” only so that those categories
may swap attributes are what aestheticism depends on. This implicit link
between suffragist and aestheticist conceptions of portrayal becomes espe-
cially evident if we turn to the most famous portrait stabbing in British lit-
erature, which occurs in the final moments of Oscar Wilde’s The Picture
of Dorian Gray (1891). Having come to believe that the hideously decrepit
portrait is what keeps his tormented conscience alive, Dorian seizes a knife
and “stab[s] the picture with it.”11 But in the few paragraphs that come
between that sentence and the novel’s close, Wilde blurs this scenario so
that portrayed and portrayal, agent and object, become wholly confused
with each other in a condensed series of symmetries so excessively
reversible they seem impossible to sort out or stabilize. Actually, the con-
fusion between real and painted bodies begins even before the stabbing
takes place as Dorian uses the same knife to stab the picture he earlier used
to stab Basil Hallward, the picture’s painter, concluding that “as it had
killed the painter,” whose incinerated corpse has left “no trace,” “so it
would kill the painter’s work, and all that that meant” (223, 222). Further,
since the first knife one sees in Dorian is not this dagger but a palette-knife
instead—a palette-knife with which Basil, the painter, threatens to stab his
own creation—the acts of destroying a painting and making one are imag-
istically referred to each other (27). At the novel’s end, the confusion
between the painting and its subject becomes one of agency: the painting,
which had physically recorded Dorian’s moral decay and which the novel
says he stabs, returns to its pristine, ravishingly beautiful state, while
before it lies Dorian’s now “withered” and “loathsome” corpse with the
“knife in his heart” (224). The novel leaves the action of its closing scene
suggestively murky (cloaked in gray, as it were), but the suggestion is that
the painting somehow stabs Dorian even as the painting returns to him
the physical signs of degeneration that it had assumed in his stead.
This not-quite-rational understanding of the novel’s ending makes a
good deal of sense given how emphatically the text has imagined that the
painting makes Dorian’s identity, sustains his beauty by mysteriously
assuming the symptoms of aging and endowing him with the perma-
nence, the atemporality, traditionally associated with portraiture. By stab-
bing the painting, Dorian attempts to destroy the artifact that has pro-
duced him, then; conversely, the implication at the close that the painting
stabs Dorian reinforces the argument about painting the novel has been
making all along. Here it will be useful to think about how Wilde echoes
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and redirects the imagery of the foundational myth of Western pictorial
realism. In Pliny’s story of the competition between the painters Zeuxis
and Parrhasius, Zeuxis produces a painting of grapes so lifelike that the
birds fly down and peck at it with their beaks. Assured of winning the
palm, Zeuxis asks Parrhasius to pull back the curtain concealing his own
picture, only to discover that it is actually a painting of a curtain and that
while he has tricked the birds, his rival has fooled another artist.12 The story
hinges on the kind of multiple reversals of the represented and the real
which we have come to think of as characteristic of aestheticism in gener-
al and of Wilde in particular. Understood in this light, Parrhasius’s paint-
ing becomes a triumph of realism because it so successfully maintains the
illusion that it covers up the real; realism turns out to be a matter of sur-
faces, of ornament, an inversion central to Wilde’s decentering poetics.13
Perhaps Wilde means us to hear, then, and to hear as distinctively and tran-
sumptively Wildean, Pliny’s story, first behind the episode in which
Dorian unveils his own portrait for Basil, and then again at the end, where
painting’s force is dramatized by the violation of a canvas. In the former of
these moments, Basil, who has “put too much of [him]self ” in the paint-
ing, and Dorian, who sees “his own soul” mirrored in the canvas, stand in
front of the picture, which is covered by “a large purple satin coverlet heav-
ily embroidered with gold, a splendid piece of late seventeenth-century
Venetian work” (115, 119, 118). The scene is like a hall of mirrors, a mise
en abîme of representation and desire: in Wilde’s version of Pliny’s story,
the curtain, a work of art in its own right, really does cover a painting, but
this painting is one that has taken over a basic attribute of the human body,
leaving its subject a figure more artificial than itself. Everything and every-
one in this scene are changing places, being exchanged, projecting them-
selves into other substances, other artifacts, other persons; the relation of
artist, model, objet d’art, and painting is one of endless circulation. If we
pull this moment into relation with the other half of Wilde’s revision of the
Plinean myth—the last scene, in which the attempt to violate the canvas
turns into a demonstration of painting’s agency—then we can say both
that painting makes its viewers and that the way that it does so character-
izes within Dorian a far more general economy.
For even as the novel places tremendous emphasis on Dorian’s efforts to
hide the painting from others’ eyes, the work of the painting proves
throughout the novel to be uncontainable; what the novel construes as
painting’s endlessly circulatory nature is reproduced in the smallest corners
of the text and what the novel construes as painting’s work of producing its
viewers is generalized into an economic model. Wilde dramatizes this circu-
latory and reproductive nature of painting through Dorian’s attempt to
keep the painting secret and contained. When he realizes that the painting
Chapter 4: The Reproduction of Painting 67
Otten_CH4_2nd.qxp  4/19/2006  1:38 PM  Page 67
is recording and displaying his moral degeneration, Dorian places a screen
in front of it and then, deciding that keeping it downstairs is too risky,
moves it, in its ornate frame and covered by the tapestry, to his attic, which
is kept locked. To move the painting upstairs, Dorian sends for some men
from the frame-maker’s shop and is surprised when Mr. Hubbard, “the cel-
ebrated frame-maker of South Audley Street,” appears in person (120). The
passage is one of those in Dorian in which Wilde seems deflected from the
real business of his novel; there is too much detail about the frame-maker,
about moving the painting, about the labor involved in going up the stairs,
about the need to use the front stairs since the picture is too bulky for the
narrower ones in back. Wilde seems to overinvest in the peripheral here,
except that the whole episode is devoted to keeping representation centered
and to showing how impossible it is to do so, hence showing the distinc-
tion between center and periphery to be an unstable one. The frame-maker
appears at this moment because he is in the business of containing repre-
sentation; his profession is one of preventing paintings from leaking out
into the world. In an essay on the picture frame, Georg Simmel writes that
the frame’s purpose is to keep the viewer’s gaze “flow[ing] back into itself ”;
the frame “must never offer a gap or a bridge through which . . . the world
could get in or from which the picture could get out.”14 Moving the paint-
ing upstairs is a hugely laborious and messy task because it strains against
the tendency paintings have to get out—to seep into other representation-
al spaces—when they appear in narrative.15
This seepage becomes apparent when we consider for a moment the
characteristic objects and activities of its social world that Dorian Gray
accentuates. In no particular order (indeed, they are unorderable because
they are how Wilde disrupts a hierarchy of significance), these include cos-
metics, costumes, dyed hair, love affairs, orders to the florist, and the pur-
suit of the “exquisite,” a category that keeps on changing its contents
(164). All of these activities and appurtenances have an element of self-
maintenance; they all perform the work of maintaining the self ’s newness
and its youth (which in Wilde is to say its artistry, so thoroughly does his
novel equate freshness with the artifactual). More specifically, the mainte-
nance of the self and of its materializations in Dorian tends to be a matter
of conservation, of keeping things (like hair, or love) from fading, or oth-
erwise disintegrating or decaying. When Dorian occupies himself with
obsessive collecting, many of the objects on which he focuses, like antique
musical instruments and old tapestries, are ones that present curatorial
challenges, which challenge the conservator’s art to deflect “the ruin that
Time brought on beautiful and wonderful things” (137). When he first
sees his painting in its degenerated state, Basil suspects that the painting
has been improperly cared for, that “mildew has got into the canvas,” a
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momentary suggestion that reinforces the way in which the materials and
principles of painting come to be associated with the maintenance of the
self (156).
Looking at Dorian’s portrait in light of this economy that generalizes on
the painting’s work, we can say that the portrait epitomizes the novel’s
characteristic economy because it takes over for Dorian the work of daily
life; it assumes the labor of living by maintaining Dorian as he is, as an age-
lessly beautiful young man. As in the episodes from the history of suffrag-
ism with which I began, portraiture is understood here as a genre that
makes its viewers, that holds them in place, holds them perpetually with-
in a compositional and social frame.
There is a more specific set of cultural assumptions at work in these nar-
ratives of slashed portraits, a code or style to which Henry James is highly
attuned, and one which he submits to its most searching analysis in his
own tale of a stabbed painting, “The Liar” (1888). James’s story is set in
motion when a painter, named Oliver Lyon, encounters among the visitors
at a great country house a woman he once loved and tried to marry. Her
husband, Colonel Capadose, is a vivid personality, “handsome and clever
and entertaining,” an “odd” “mixture of the correct and the extravagant: as
if he were an adventurer imitating a gentleman with rare perfection, or a
gentleman who had taken a fancy to go about with hidden arms. He might
have been a dethroned prince or the war-correspondent of a newspaper: he
represented both enterprise and tradition, good manners and bad taste”
(12:331, 317–318). He is also a tremendous liar, who will invent mar-
velous stories about adventure in India—or lie about the time of day or the
name of his hatter. As one of the other characters explains, “It’s quite dis-
interested,” not at all malicious, a kind of “natural peculiarity” (12:344).
It’s almost, Oliver Lyon the painter concludes, like a “love for beauty,” “art
for art” (12:350).
When Lyon comes to paint the portrait of the liar (the pun is one James
obviously means us to hear), he determines to convey this duplicity in the
painting itself. “How he did it he couldn’t have told you,” but he insinu-
ates falsehood in his representation of “every line of the face and every fact
of the attitude, in the indentation of the chin, in the way the hair was
planted, the mustache was twisted, the smile came and went” (12:361).
The painting is so successful in this regard that when Colonel Capadose
and his wife are alone with the portrait, she breaks down completely and
he impulsively reaches for a dagger and “plunge[s] it into the canvas . . .
dash[ing] it again several times into the face of the likeness, exactly as if he
were stabbing a human victim” (12:375–76).16
I want to argue that the texts and episodes I examined earlier unpack
the significance of this story and its climactic moment, and this will
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become clearer if we look at two passages, two ekphrastic companion-
pieces, each of which describes a husband and wife, each of which simul-
taneously portrays the couple and assesses their potential to serve as the
subjects of striking portraits. The first is a description of the Ashmores, the
couple who host the country-house party at the story’s opening:
Arthur Ashmore was a fresh-coloured thick-necked English gentle-
man, but he was just not a subject; he might have been a farmer and
he might have been a banker; you could scarcely paint him in char-
acter. His wife didn’t make up the amount; she was a large bright
negative woman who had the same air as her husband of being some-
how tremendously new; an appearance as of fresh varnish—Lyon
could scarcely tell whether it came from her complexion or from her
clothes—so that one felt she ought to sit in a gilt frame and be dealt
with by reference to a catalogue or a price-list. It was as if she were
already rather a bad though expensive portrait, knocked off by an
eminent hand, and Lyon had no wish to copy that work. (12:316)
The passage comes very close to saying that Arthur Ashmore is not a sub-
ject because he’s a subject: the passage describes him in pictorial terms
that, it then goes on to insist, make him unfit to serve as the subject of a
picture. This description relies on its reader’s ability to recognize this type
of English masculinity and then transforms that type’s characteristics into
a lack of distinguishing attributes. The gap between the passage’s tech-
niques of portraiture and its claims about portraiture widens when the
paragraph moves to Mrs. Ashmore, who is somehow both “bright” and
“negative,” vivid and bland. To paint her would be like copying the work
of another painter because Mrs. Ashmore has styled herself along the dic-
tates of the genre of portraiture; her air of newness conveys a sense of the
high degree of recognizability, of immediacy, upon which portraiture so
often depends, just as that newness stems from either her complexion or
her clothes and so replicates the shifting and ambiguous relation between
figure and ground that is characteristic of painting. Similarly, her var-
nished look suggests that the finishing touch of the painting process that
accentuates the polish of a portrait has now looped back and is being
applied to the real thing. When the ancient family patriarch, Sir David
Ashmore, sits for his portrait, Lyon finds him “a beautiful subject” because
the hand of time has done the work of “crystallisation”; his face shows “the
sum of his experience” without any “leakage,” by which the passage pre-
sumably means the kind of blurring into accessories by which portraiture
so often identifies its subjects (12:342). The metaphor of “crystallisation”
makes only the bare minimum of sense in the text because it conjures up
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the properties of shininess, of “bright[ness],” which, the description of the
Ashmore son and daughter-in-law indicates, make persons poor subjects,
not good ones like Sir David.
“The Liar,” then, becomes a logically confusing text when it tries to rep-
resent and to sort out its characters according to their potential for portrai-
ture; underneath the distinctions it draws lies a strong sense of common
ground as the sense of characters as somehow already painted turns out to
blur such discriminations. The later description of the Capadoses opposes
this one of the Ashmores because it values this couple quite oppositely, but
in spite of this different valuation, it, too, describes the couple as looking
like portraits even before they are painted:
He [Colonel Capadose] appeared ten minutes later in the smoking-
room, brilliantly equipped in a suit of crimson foulard covered with
little white spots. He gratified Lyon’s eye, made him feel that the
modern age has its splendour too and its opportunities for costume.
If his wife was an antique he was a fine specimen of the period of
colour: he might have passed for a Venetian of the sixteenth century.
They were a remarkable couple, Lyon thought . . . as he looked at the
Colonel standing in bright erectness before the chimney-piece and
emitting great smoke-puffs. . . . (12:335)
The Colonel is already a portrait because he wears a “costume,” because he
is a “specimen” of a period of art history, because he conveys the “splen-
dor” of a portrait, because with his “great smoke-puffs” he creates an
atmospheric effect for himself, because his “bright erectness” mimics the
immobility of the painted figure, and because he places himself “before the
chimney-piece” and so in the space always furnished with a picture. When
he stabs the painting of himself later in the story, the Colonel stabs the
genre that has produced him. For as his colorful self-presentation and his
penchant for colorful lies both make clear, the Colonel has been produced
by a culture of portraiture, a culture structured around the ideal, which it
finds epitomized in painting, of an engagingly distinctive yet adequately
conventionalized portrayal of one’s self. This presentation of one’s self is
portraiture’s “social product,” to use a term from The Tragic Muse, the
novel James published two years after “The Liar,” the novel in which James
interweaves the modes of painterly and political representation (7:191). A
particularly clear example of this kind of product comes in a famous pas-
sage in The Portrait of a Lady in which Ned Rosier catches his first sight of
Isabel in the role of Mrs. Osmond at one of the couple’s weekly receptions
in Rome: “framed in the gilded doorway, she struck our young man as the
picture of a gracious lady,” a picture designed to appeal to a culture with
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an “eye for decorative character” (4:105). In this understanding of culture,
every person carries with him or her the air of appearing in a tableau
vivant, the air of reproducing in dress and posture the codifications of a
genre of painting. What becomes accentuated in persons is that which is
visible when figures are seen in a relatively formal situation, against a
ground of material things, from a distance of four to eight feet away.17
The implication of this argument is that “the real thing” is always arti-
ficial, which is exactly what James argues in the tale of 1892 that bears that
catch-phrase as its title. Major and Mrs. Monarch are the products of
drawing-room and club culture; “twenty years of country-house visiting”
have “given them pleasant intonations” along with an impervious “blank-
ness,” an imperturbably “deep intellectual repose” (18:316). Their bodies
have been refashioned into the stereotypes of perfect gentlepeople right
down to the “orthodox crook” of Mrs. Major’s elbow; they carry portrai-
ture in their very postures (18:313). Because they are suited for nothing
but making appearances, when they become financially strapped they
apply for work as artist’s models—work they are completely unsuited for
because their statuesque rigidity defies the ability of the painter’s brush to
make them look natural (in her youth, Mrs. Monarch was “known as the
Beautiful Statue” [18:314]). By comparison, the artist’s usual model, Miss
Churm, is “only a freckled cockney,” but she can “represent everything,
from a fine lady to a shepherdess”; since her physical self is not “already
made,” like Mrs. Major’s, she can lend herself to any artistic genre
(18:321, 322). Because they really are upper-class, the Majors are too arti-
ficial to serve as models for a realist aesthetic, while the lower-class woman
lacks all aesthetic polish and so can mold herself into a convincing sem-
blance of the real thing.
This chiastic patterning of the tale’s plot carries with it a view of por-
traiture as endless reflection and reproduction. Almost every element of
“The Real Thing,” and of “The Liar” as well, is self-reflexive in one way
or another; every element has its matched opposite. The tale’s title itself
matches opposed elements because while “real” suggests the absence of
artifice or ornament, “things” in Jamesian idiom carries the implication of
objets d’art (The Spoils of Poynton was serialized under the title The Old
Things; The Portrait’s Madame Merle has “a great respect for things”;
Balzac, James writes, had a “mighty passion for things”).18 Persons and por-
traits in these tales trade attributes just as narrative and portraiture do (the
artist’s current project in “The Real Thing” is making woodcuts for the
collected works of Philip Vincent, a once-neglected novelist who has been
reappraised with the dawn of aestheticism). Husbands and wives are
matched pairs like vases or figurines on a mantel-piece; when the
Monarchs first appear in his studio, the narrator wonders at their silence
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(they are embarrassed at their impoverished circumstances), and muses
that “the gentleman might have said ‘I should like a portrait of my wife,’
and the lady might have said ‘I should like a portrait of my husband,’” a
grammatical reversal that captures in small the pattern governing these sto-
ries (18:308). When the liar slashes his portrait, he “literally” “hack[s] him-
self to death”: the work of the knife undoes the work of the brush even as
it attests to the brush’s success, a compelling mimesis that the reflexive pro-
noun underlines (12:376). The playful-seeming doubles of James’s stories
of portraiture together form his account of how such artifacts reproduce
themselves in the living bodies of their viewers.
But just as a chiasmus is always both a reproduction and a reversal, so
too are the productions of portraiture both mimetic and antithetical: faith-
ful reproductions and endlessly reproductive illustrations of an ideal, yet
modeled on and so generated by that ideal’s opposite. This is so first of all
because James’s artist in “The Real Thing” does not actually make enough
money painting portraits to support himself; he needs to supplement that
income by making “‘illustrations’” “for magazines, for storybooks, for
sketches of contemporary life” (18:310, 309). These works, which he sees
as “pot-boilers” and which call for the service of a model as endlessly adapt-
able as Miss Churm, are what underwrite his career as a portrait-painter
(18:310). Further, since Miss Churm also models for the plates of the édi-
tion de luxe of the works of Philip Vincent, the labor of the lower-class
woman produces an object that epitomizes refined aesthetic sensibility,
that attests to the discrimination of those who have come to treasure this
“rarest of the novelists,” newly reissued by “a publisher of taste” (18:318).
In “The Liar,” this sense that portraiture does not stand free of the class-
es that support the leisured person so depicted is more pronounced, even
lurid. During one of the Colonel’s sittings in Lyon’s studio, a “soiled and tar-
nished” woman wanders in, a woman with “something about her” that
“savour[s] of a precarious profession, perhaps even of a blighted career”
(12:365). Vaguely described as a prostitute, the woman is also described as
a particularly bad portrait, with “a face that was rosy, yet that failed to sug-
gest freshness,” and dressed in an overabundance of cheap versions of the
accessories indispensable to portraits of the upper class, “a hat with many
feathers, a dress with many bugles, [and] long black gloves encircled with
silver bracelets.” She is also an artists’ model, come to Lyon’s studio looking
for work. When Lyon turns her away, saying that he is “so busy with por-
traits,” Geraldine, the would-be model, responds, “Yes; I see you are. I wish
I was in the gentleman’s place. . . . I do hate them portraits . . . It’s so much
bread out of our mouths” (12:366). Geraldine conceptualizes the situation
of portraiture here as one in which the upper-class man’s occupation of the
position in front of the canvas economically deprives lower-class women
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and keeps them “in place.” Even so, the leisured class’s position depends on
the labors of women like Geraldine, as she herself implies: “many” painters,
she insists, “couldn’t do anything without me” (12:366). Further, with her
artificially rosy complexion and her superabundance of appurtenances,
Geraldine is the antithetical mirror image of the upper-class woman, a neg-
ative model by which that woman and her class know themselves. Finally,
she contributes to the maintenance of London’s social order in another way
because she is potentially a painted woman in both senses; when Lyon tells
her he doesn’t need her, she turns to Colonel Capadose and says, “If you
should require me, sir—” (12:366). Colonel Capadose would need her for
sex, not modeling, of course, and the verb “require” suggests that fulfilling
such a need would be a matter of maintenance; modeling and prostitution
are interchangeable for Geraldine because both endow the social order with
the stasis of a fine portrait.
At the end of “The Liar,” when Colonel Capadose and Lyon meet once
more, it becomes necessary for the Colonel to account for the damage the
painting sustained in the painter’s absence so as to cast suspicion away
from himself. Almost needless to say, he pins the vandalism on Geraldine,
spinning a lie supported by a chain of circumstances (a woman lurking in
the road as he and his wife visited the studio, a door left unbolted, the
unemployed model’s resentment). Actually, the Colonel invents two lies
about Geraldine. The first, concocted after her first appearance in the stu-
dio, is a long and lugubrious tale, a completely fictitious story about sav-
ing a family friend, “a young jackanapes,” from Geraldine’s clutches before
she “plucked” him of his fortune (12:368). The second lie about the
slashed portrait compresses this narrative—a story about the preservation
of class structure—into the much tighter space defined by the painting’s
frame. The elaborate tale about keeping her in her place by separating her
from the vulnerable upper-class young man is recast into the second lie,
which is centered on the painting in which, Geraldine has said, the
Colonel takes her “place.” This painting, then, definitively frames the
model it does not portray even as the Colonel’s lie frames Geraldine for
the painting’s destruction.19
This moment in “The Liar” may seem uncannily prescient, even
prophetic. James imagines in 1888 a scenario in which a woman blames
her economic deprivation on the production of portraiture, which leads
one of the tale’s characters to allege that she slashes a painting; in 1914, a
woman slashes a painting of James in order to dramatize the political dis-
enfranchisement of women. This odd similarity between the two incidents
seems to me significant not because either mimetically produces the
other—suffragists would not begin to slash paintings until 25 years after
James wrote his story, and there is no evidence that when they did begin
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damaging works of art they were inspired to do so by reading James—but
because taken together, the two moments focus some of the ways in which
painting is understood at the turn of the century. Specifically, painting is
regarded as an image that is itself part of a larger economy; its material
making and subsequent exhibition shape the socioeconomics of the world
beyond its frame. Further, painting’s images exert a social force because
they have the capacity to make themselves real, the capacity to do some-
thing to their viewers, to bridge the distance that observation entails.
Consequently, the motifs that dominate and structure thinking about
painting in this time are those of loops and matter. With the term “mat-
ter,” I mean to emphasize the way in which paint, bodily matter, and cloth-
ing and ornament mix with each other, forming the fin de siècle’s political
economy of portraiture. With the term “loop,” I mean to emphasize the
way in which making a painting, posing for one, and viewing one are
understood as circuitous and reflexive, as routes of endless exchange. To
make these figures more particular, I want first to dwell on a series of small
moments in the careers of James and Sargent, including those moments in
their careers where they represent each other (and find their own represen-
tations in each other), before turning to Bernard Berenson (the aestheti-
cian who gives these motifs their most minutely-rendered delineation) and
then to The Tragic Muse (the novel in which James most emphatically
interweaves the painterly shaping of bodily matter with the matter of polit-
ical representation).
When James sat for his portrait by Sargent in 1912, he was sitting for
an artist he had had a hand in making: James’s 1887 essay on Sargent not
only helped to establish Sargent’s reputation but also established some of
the terms in which Sargent’s paintings would be understood, the language
that would come to seem an effective and compelling reflection of these
nonlinguistic surfaces. In other words, James forms a vocabulary that facil-
itates the linguistic circulation of Sargent’s art, an idiom that allows the
paintings to come down off the walls and be passed around, replicated in
journals and magazines and salon gossip. The idiom James forms for writ-
ing and talking about Sargent’s paintings itself represents a flowing econo-
my because that terminology centers on Sargent’s precocious fluency and
his free and fluid handling of the figure, especially the female figure. For
James, Sargent’s talent lies in his “facility,” the speed with which he per-
ceives and conveys the human figure.20 Sargent works so quickly and
assuredly that “perception with him is already by itself a kind of execu-
tion”; “it is as if painting were pure tact of vision” (217). This rapid grasp
is how Sargent’s paintings “arous[e] even in the profane spectator some-
thing of the painter’s sense, the joy of engaging also, by sympathy, in the
solution of the artistic problem” (219). What James limns in, then, is a
Chapter 4: The Reproduction of Painting 75
Otten_CH4_2nd.qxp  4/19/2006  1:38 PM  Page 75
series of exchanges by which the painter apprehends his subject in an act
of the eye so readily translated to the painting’s surface that this visual act
seems itself tactile, and then a reproduction of this experience in the expe-
rience of the painting’s viewer. This sense of exchange is further substan-
tiated in James’s essay by an emphasis on the shimmering, “glow[ing]”
quality of Sargent’s paint and by the way in which objects, clothes, and
bodies “shine together” and so mix their properties, as in the complex
reflections between the children and their aprons, the mirror, and the
porcelain jars in The Daughters of Edward D. Boit (219, 222). Implicitly,
then, James’s essay draws a parallel between the relation of painting and
viewer and that of the painting’s figure and the objects that surround her.
Roughly half of James’s account of Sargent is wrong, but his error is a
revealing one. James confuses the process of making paintings with the
experience of looking at them, assuming that what a painting’s viewer can
grasp instantaneously must have been for the painter a matter of rapid
apprehension as well. As even a glance at the pencil studies for a painting
like Madame X indicates, Sargent’s portraits are produced by a series of
tentative experiments, not by a glance so rapid that it works like a grasp-
ing hand.21 What is revealing about the error is that it highlights James’s
strong tendency to understand the production of painting as repeating
itself in the viewer’s experience, his assumption that the labor of the stu-
dio replicates itself in the space of the gallery.
When he is painted by Sargent in 1912, James realizes that he has been
misperceiving Sargent’s working methods all along, but he maintains his
understanding of the reshaping power of artifacts by moving that assump-
tion to another locale. Writing to Edith Wharton, who had led the proj-
ect to commemorate James’s 70th birthday with a portrait by Sargent,
James reports,
I have already sat twice to the great man, & am as soon as possible to
sit again—to sit in fact till the thing rightly shapes. It proved, the 1st
time, not to be a matter of the famous “one” impressionistic sitting
at all—& he finds me difficult, perverse, obscure—quite as if I were
a mere facial Awkward Age or Sacred Fount. The end of the 2nd
séance left us rather off & away—& if the next one doesn’t bring us
back & more into line again I think he will make a new start—on a
clean slate.22
The scene of portraiture here is one of almost dizzying circulation; what
makes the passage hard to keep still or lock in place is that its different
loops of exchange are themselves crossed and exchanged with each other.
The productions of James’s art rub off on—bestow their qualities upon—
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his body so that the verbal medium of the novel reshapes the visual appear-
ance of the texts’ author; the characteristics of the notoriously “obscure”
prose of The Awkward Age and The Sacred Fount become a matter of
embodiment. James’s novels almost function like appurtenances here, not
because they are adornments but because they recast his bodily shape. The
comparison of the situation of portraiture to that of a séance reflects with-
out resolving the confusing quality of this embodiment, because it implies
both a sense of contact between or even a melding of consciousnesses but
also a sense of disembodiment; it is very nearly the wrong metaphor in this
case, because you need to have a body in order to be painted, but you need
to be disembodied in order to be the subject of a séance. In this sense, the
séance metaphor does not so much disembody the scene as it reflects the
way in which physical identity becomes problematic in the passage because
that physicality shifts around so much, doesn’t stay grounded in a stable
ontology. In The Portrait of a Lady, when Isabel encounters Madame Merle
for the last time, the effect of seeing this woman at a moment when she is
“so present” to Isabel’s mental “vision” is “like suddenly, and rather awful-
ly, seeing a painted picture move” (4:375), but here in this very late text,
the construct of portraiture is so much in flux that it doesn’t even resolve
itself into a definite image, cannot be brought “into line,” as James’s letter
puts it.
Here it will be useful to abstract this analysis of James’s letter into a sim-
pler set of points. What portraiture portrays at the century’s turn is a body
in process; portraiture’s interplay between figure and ground, subject and
setting, body and object, becomes a way of representing the production of
persons, of getting a handle on the political economy of the human body
at its minutest level. Further, this interchange depicted on canvas between
figure and ground becomes a model for understanding the interchange
between paintings and their viewers; the material wavering represented in
paintings is understood as repeating itself in the vicissitudes of the viewer’s
own body.
To make these points more specific, we can turn to a painting in which
Sargent submits them to sustained analysis, a portrait of his sister from
about 1883, The Breakfast Table (figure 3). The painting is also known as
Violet Sargent, and this wavering between the two titles, one of which names
an interior environment and the other of which names that environment’s
inhabitant, reflects the way the painting’s own focus oscillates between fig-
ure and ground. This oscillation happens within the painting itself in sev-
eral different ways. It happens, first of all, in the way the viewer’s eye trav-
els between figure and ground as it pulls together the pink of the hair rib-
bon with the pink of the roses on the table, the glint of the knife in Violet’s
hand with the glint of the table-settings and the mantelpiece silver, the
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black dress with the black recess behind the figure. The viewer’s eye works
in loops of production and consumption as it discovers pathways between
figure and objects, pathways that replicate the acts of reading, eating, and
carving, because like those acts, they stitch together figure and objects. Part
of the reason these oscillations stay in motion has to do with the small size
of the figure as contrasted with the expansive and finely delineated setting:
the figure is a little too small to hold the eye’s focus for long, while the sur-
faces that frame her become of central interest. The figure’s material frame
here almost is the painting’s central commitment. In keeping with this
skewed scale of values is the way in which the interior of this flat both fore-
grounds the woman and threatens to swallow her, both delineates and
attenuates her physical identity. Half of the figure dressed in black appears
against a white wall and is thus highlighted by the contrast; the other half
blurs into the black recess of the hallway behind her. This turning config-
uration itself forms the backdrop, the context, for the oscillation the paint-
ing puts at its visual center, the play between hand and eye, between read-
ing a book and carving an apple.
For the carving knife is central to the viewer’s involvement with this
painting, and while this is a rather different sort of knife than those of the
suffragists or Dorian or Colonel Capadose, and while it is used for a rather
different task, it is like those knives because it is at the center of an account
of painting and of production. The act of looking in this painting is
referred to and counterpoised with the act of cutting both because the cut-
ting hand is the first thing the painting’s viewer lights on and because
reading and cutting are the two things the figure in this painting is doing.
In other words, The Breakfast Table equates the tactile and the visual, and
involves the viewer in this equation by implying that when we see (or
read), something tactile is happening to our bodies.
This oscillation between eye and hand is at the center of the dominant
theories of aesthetic response in turn-of-the-century intellectual circles in
England and America, theories that often lie adjacent to James’s novels in
the pages of the Atlantic Monthly and that were developed by two members
of James’s social circle, Vernon Lee and Bernard Berenson. In the develop-
ing practice of connoisseurship and in the merging of sensation psychology
and aesthetics into the theory of empathy, painting comes to be understood
as an object that forms its viewers, that bestows its attributes upon those
who look at it, that exerts a material force upon its audience.
We can begin here by considering one famous attempt to educate the
sense of vision. In Giovanni Morelli’s method of connoisseurship, looking
at paintings becomes a matter of detecting the individual touch of a
Renaissance master—of determining which paintings are the work of a
master’s assistants or early copies or forgeries and which reflect the work
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of the master’s own hand. Morelli theorized that while such large and con-
ventionalized aspects of paintings as faces and overall composition are
often indistinguishable from one artist to another, in a painting’s tiny
details the pressure of convention relaxes and the painter’s individual habits
take over. Like Francis Galton’s Finger Prints (1892) and like James’s The
Spoils of Poynton (1897), Morelli’s work assimilates the habits of the hand
with marks of identity.23 Hence in such small regions of a painting as a sub-
ject’s ears and especially hands (which Morelli regards as “one of the most
expressive and characteristic parts of the human body”) appear the master’s
own characteristic gestures, which escape the notice of a copyist or an assis-
tant. We can identify a genuine Raphael if we have learned to recognize
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Figure 3
John Singer Sargent (Florence, Italy, 1856–1925, London, England), The Breakfast
Table (1883–84). Courtesy of the Fogg Art Museum, Harvard University Art
Museums, Bequest of Grenville L. Winthrop, 1943.150. Photo by Rick Stafford. 
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bodily details like “the broad metacarpus and somewhat stiff fingers” with
“the nails extending to the tips” that characterize the hands of his noble-
men and Madonnas.24
What one sees in the painted hand, then, is the hand that painted it.
This is true not only because Morelli follows Leonardo’s suggestion that
painters reproduce their own physical attributes in the bodies of their sub-
jects; it is also true because in the morphology of the painted body we
glimpse “the habitual modes of expression,” the gestures and “flourishes”
that distinguish one Renaissance master from another.25 As Richard
Wollheim suggests, drawing is conceived by Morellian connoisseurship as
“the residue or traces” of movement; it is a trail the hand leaves behind as
it glides across canvas or panel.26 For Morelli, these traces of movements
governed by habit are the marks of identity; they are the painter’s true sig-
natures since, unlike actual signatures, they cannot be forged.
These motions are ones that, in studying paintings, we learn to follow
and to reproduce. As Berenson, Morelli’s most famous Anglo-American
disciple puts it, becoming a connoisseur means “living one’s self sympa-
thetically into the situation” of the artist; to be an expert on paintings
requires the “careful training of [one’s] eye” so as to recognize a painter’s
“habits of visualization and execution.”27 Following his Harvard teacher
William James’s account, Berenson characterizes habits as impulses that
“tend by the inevitable necessity of mechanical laws to dig deeper and eas-
ier channels for themselves,” and so they are the only reliable signs of
“identity.”28 Berenson’s conception of the connoisseur’s project holds,
then, that the painter’s identity shapes and customizes the viewer’s own;
the habits that form paintings also form those paintings’ viewers.
When Berenson comes to formulate his general theory of aesthetic expe-
rience, he makes this argument in an extraordinarily literal way, developing
much further the psychological and physiological bonds between the art
object and its viewer. Attempting to identify the source of pleasure in the act
of viewing paintings, Berenson proposes that paintings quicken and height-
en our perception of the material world by giving us an intensified and
immediate grasp of the third dimension. Berenson bases this account on the
interrelation between vision and touch developed by nineteenth-century
sensation psychology, which hypothesized that our recognition of form,
space, and motion not only depends on linking our visual perceptions with
our memories of tactile sensations (we must feel with our fingers that a ball
is round before we can recognize its roundness through sight alone) but also
somehow activates the tactile nerves. In looking at or even just thinking of
a manual object like a pencil, we experience “a weak feeling of innervation
of the hand as if touching the pencil’s surface.”29 This is why Berenson
believes that looking at paintings involves our whole bodies as its figures set
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in motion the sense of touch; painting makes us “realise the material signif-
icance of things,” makes us make real in our bodily sensations the depicted
objects we see before us.30 The material exchanges between body and canvas
that James, Wilde, and the suffragists in different ways dramatized here form
the basis of a theory of aesthetic response.
Underlying Berenson’s argument is the idea, developed by German the-
orists of empathy, that with our bodies we imitate the forms we see. As
Robert Vischer put it, when I observe an object, I “place myself within its
inner structure. . . . I can think my way into it, mediate its size with my
own, stretch and expand, bend and confine myself to it.”31 Just as I follow
a melody by tracing it in the air with my finger, so too I reproduce the con-
tours of a visual form by tracing it with my eyes. But I also alter my breath-
ing, shift my weight, and contract my muscles to accord with the form’s
shape and size. In their 1897 essay advancing a psychophysiological defi-
nition of beauty, Vernon Lee and her companion, Clementine Anstruther-
Thomson, outline the bodily changes apart from “chemical or muscular
change in the eye” that occur when we study a form.32 When we look at a
jar, we feel in our feet the weight at the object’s base, and then we feel lift-
ed up as our eyes travel toward the jar’s top. The jar’s symmetrical sides
“bring both lungs into equal play”; “we seem to be breathing according to
the proportion of” the object.33 On this model, vision is not solely visual;
it affects and shapes the whole body, and the whole body aids us in realiz-
ing the objects we see. As Berenson phrases it, “we more than half become
the things we admire” as our bodies emulate the objects we look at.34
In The Tragic Muse, James uncovers the ways in which this aesthetic the-
ory grounded in the body is also a political technique. By interweaving
plots about painting and the theatre, James structures this novel as an
economy of vision and gesture; by setting this economy within a plot
involving parliamentary politics, James draws lines between the minute
material things and tiny physical motions of daily life—the world of still
life, of Sargent’s Breakfast Table—and the maintenance of a macropolitical
order. For while James’s hero, Nick Dormer, must choose between a career
in politics and a career in painting, this choice is one the novel keeps
encouraging its readers to deconstruct as its puns create a resemblance
between these different sorts of “representation,” playing on the painterly
resonance of terms such as “canvass” and finding a grammatical similarity
between “standing” for Parliament and “sitting” for a portrait (7:80, 300).
Inasmuch as the world of state politics in The Tragic Muse is one of almost
total stasis while the world of painting is one of motion and exchange, of
“ocular commerce,” politics in this novel somehow seem more painterly
than painting does, even as painting’s productive capacity becomes a way
for James to represent the political (7:26).
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To begin diagramming these reciprocities, we might examine the chias-
tic relations between vision and gesture as they appear in a small and
revealing moment in which Peter Sherringham, the novel’s diplomat, vis-
its the Louvre with The Tragic Muses’s heroine, the aspiring actress Miriam
Rooth. Here in the museum, Miriam finds a new source of what the novel
elsewhere will call her “mimetic capital” (7:337):
. . . in the long summer days, when he had leisure, [Peter] took her
to the Louvre to admire the great works of painting and sculpture.
Here, as on all occasions, he was struck with the queer jumble of her
taste, her mixture of intelligence and puerility. He saw she never read
what he gave her, though she sometimes would shamelessly have
liked him to suppose so; but in the presence of famous pictures and
statues she had remarkable flashes of perception. She felt these
things, she liked them, though it was always because she had an idea
she could use them. The belief was often presumptuous, but it
showed what an eye she had to her business. “I could look just like
that if I tried.” “That’s the dress I mean to wear when I do Portia.”
Such were the observations apt to drop from her under the sugges-
tion of antique marbles or when she stood before a Titian or a
Bronzino. (7: 225–26)
Here painting gives rise to gesture, costume, and performance as Miriam
consciously plans to model her stage appearances after the examples of old
masters. Behind the passage’s statement that Miriam “felt these things” lies
the aesthetics of empathy, with its assumption that the viewing body real-
izes the figures it sees as it maps their contours onto its own self, a mak-
ing-real that, Berenson theorized, yields a “quickened sense of” physical
“capacity,” a heightened awareness of one’s own body and consequently of
that body’s malleability.35 In The Wings of the Dove, James would similarly
associate Bronzino with the mutual pliability of painted figure and view-
ing body as Millie’s tears return the painting to its liquid state; here, in The
Tragic Muse, the artistic shaping of the painted body merges with and
remodels the “elastic substance” of Miriam’s own (7:190).
Miriam is “constructed to revolve like the terraqueous globe”; like all of
James’s worldly, self-dramatizing women, she is a perpetually turning fig-
ure (8:195). This “flexibility” is a textual and economic motor in The
Tragic Muse as the actress’s molding of her body and the shaping of bod-
ies on canvas recreate and reproduce each other, keep each other in a state
of fluid suspension (7:190). Acting and painting form an economy in the
text: painting reproduces the gestures and shapes of bodies that then give
rise to bodily performances that are themselves recaptured within paint-
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ing; Miriam models her acting on painting and then becomes a painter’s
model when Nick portrays her later in the novel. Once Miriam becomes
famous, the process requires the speed and mass-replicability of photogra-
phy in order to meet demand: “she made almost an income out of the pho-
tographers—their appreciation of her as a subject knew no bounds”
(8:385). As the novel progresses, the scale of its economy of images keeps
expanding; the images the novel traffics in become more and more a mat-
ter of advertisement, of newspapers, of representations that appeal to “the
eye of the public” (8:386). But even after Miriam becomes a celebrity, she
is “still accommodating enough . . . from time to time, to find an hour to
come and sit to Nick Dormer,” who paints two portraits that Miriam’s
impresario, Basil Dashwood, means to hang facing each other in the the-
atre’s vestibule, supplemented by photographs arranged around them. This
relatively massive economy of endless reproduction is founded in the
moment in which a woman looks at portraits, founded in moments like
the one in the Louvre, where Miriam borrows from Titian and Bronzino
the bodily styles that she will expertly manipulate in climbing the “steps in
the ladder of fame” (8:385–36). As the suffragist slashers would later,
James locates the conceptual core and basic unit of political economy in
the scenario of a woman gazing at a painting. As the arrangement of the
photographs around Miriam’s portraits makes especially graphic, portrai-
ture is understood as endlessly generative, endlessly productive.
Given this extraordinary generativity, it makes a kind of intuitive sense
that all economic activity in The Tragic Muse is represented in terms of
painting and that not to be portrayed is, in the world of this novel, some-
how not to exist, not to be real. Early in the novel, Nick meets up with the
arch-aesthete Gabriel Nash at a Parisian cafe, a setting that Nash finds
repugnant as he sits down with Nick, and then
at the end of five minutes uttered a protest against the crush and con-
fusion, the publicity and vulgarity of the place, the shuffling proces-
sion of the crowd, the jostle of fellow customers, the perpetual brush
of waiters. “Come away; I want to talk to you and I can’t talk here. I
don’t care where we go. It will be pleasant to walk; we’ll stroll away to
the quartiers sérieux. Each time I come to Paris I at the end of three
days take the Boulevard, with its conventional grimace, into greater
aversion. I hate even to cross it—I go half a mile round to avoid it.”
(7:165)
The terms that leap out here as parts of an instantly recognizable idiom are
“vulgarity,” “conventional” and “aversion”; together they signal the presence
of the aesthete’s pose of exaggeratedly shrinking from a world of commerce
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into a wholly artistic realm. But another set of terms in the passage under-
cuts that flight into the more picturesque streets of Paris: “crush” and
“brush” together cast in artistic terms the economy Nash opposes to the
realm of art.36 This rhymed pair of words implicitly compares the work of
self-maintenance to the work of making a portrait; “brush” and “crush” sug-
gest a process of embellishment and disfiguration, of the disfiguring of the
body as its outlines are lost in a crowd, and of the compensating remaking
of the body as its needs and desires are fulfilled by the waiters. To appear in
public is to “shade off into other people”—there is a great deal of “jostling
and shuffling and shoving” in this novel—and to appear against a ground
necessary for making one’s own figure stand out (7:81, 8:244).
Because he attempts to remove himself from this economy of portrai-
ture, Nash eventually disappears from the novel. All along, other charac-
ters have remarked on Nash’s seeming lack of reality in precisely the terms
of graphic representation of the person; Nick says that Nash is “too sim-
ple to give an account of. Most people have a lot of attributes and
appendages that dress them up and superscribe them, and what I like
Gabriel for is that he hasn’t any at all.” Nash is “as neat as an outline cut
out of paper with scissors” (7:80, 81). Without appurtenances or circum-
stances, there’s nothing for the realist novel to know him by, and so by
the end of The Tragic Muse he has vaporized, “melted back into the ele-
ments” (8:419). Having removed himself from any scenario that would
compromise the neatness of his cut-out figure, Nash also removes himself
from any scenario that would identify it: like the “crush” of the social,
“appendages” and appurtenances highlight the identities they also threat-
en to compromise. Hence when Nash offers a definition of portraiture,
he defines it wrongly, at least on the novel’s own terms. When Miriam
matures her acting style and tones down the histrionic displays of her
apprenticeship, Nash congratulates her by commenting that she is now
“just the visible image, the picture on the wall” (8:54). Nash understands
acting as portraiture here and portraiture as static, a set of misunder-
standings that go against the grain of every other layer of The Tragic Muse
and against the ways in which portraiture was conceived at the end of the
century.
For even maintaining persons within an undeviating order requires a
great deal of economic activity, requires the sustaining work of painting,
as all the texts represented in this chapter suggest. The strand of The Tragic
Muse devoted to Parliamentary politics never actually depicts the House of
Commons at all; the work of status-quo politics is instead conducted in
and by great houses, private homes that are picture-perfect representations
of the idealized English town and countryside, houses “where an
immutable order appear[s] to slant through the polished windows”
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(8:153). Julia Dallow, the politically ambitious young widow engaged to
Nick, appears as “a composed picture” in the grounds of her estate; her
house, with its “tiresome insistence on harmony,” holds its occupants with-
in a social frame, narrows their frame of reference, ceaselessly iterates a
political order (7:264, 238). In the Philosophical Investigations,
Wittgenstein writes of the intellectual trap of thinking that one has traced
a phenomenon’s true outlines, when really all one has done is to reproduce
a conventionalized view: “A picture held us captive. And we could not get
outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us
inexorably.”37 The objects and paintings of Julia’s house keep a political
order continuously present to its subjects, make them the “incarnation of
politics,” make them figures both in “perpetual motion” and figures who
are “perpetual sitter[s],” a contradiction that makes sense because such sub-
jects in The Tragic Muse constantly labor to portray the order they embody
(8:75, 11, 15).
This equation between motion and stasis helps us to see why for James
portraiture is sometimes equivalent with a lie. For the static appearance of
a portrait bestows a sense of permanence, of unchangingness, on the cul-
ture that its endless reproductive quality must nevertheless keep generat-
ing. Political stability turns out to have a wholly fictive basis, turns out to
be based on the endless cultivation of convention, the perpetual shaping
power that late-century aesthetics finds exemplified in the act of viewing a
painting. For ultimately the aesthetics of empathy in The Tragic Muse are
James’s way of explaining and representing the way that paintings and
objets d’art produce a political order. In one of the novel’s most complex
moments, Mrs. Gresham, who functions in the novel as a sort of campaign
manager, remarks to Nick that she’s “almost part of the house, you know—
I’m one of the chairs or tables” (7:257). And then she remarks, rather puz-
zlingly, “It’s a wonderful constitution.” Nick thinks for a moment she
means the British constitution, “the great unwritten instrument by which
they were all governed,” before Mrs. Gresham’s elaboration makes it clear
she means Julia: “The surface so delicate, the action so easy, yet the frame
of steel” (7:257). Constitutional law becomes bodily constitution here,
and the delicate surfaces of portraiture, along with the frame that rigidly
keeps those surfaces in place, are adopted by the citizens that law portrays.
Like the suffragists, with whom he otherwise differs so markedly, James
finds in the language of painting an account of how a political order real-
izes itself in the minds and bodies of its subjects.
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c h a p t e r  f i ve
Bodies, Papers, and
Persons
t certain points in the Principles of Psychology, the self seems to exist inA the marks it makes, in the writing of its own hand. An “extensive
work in manuscript,” for example, is so “intimately” part of one’s self that
“few men . . . would not feel personally annihilated” if it were “suddenly
swept away” (281). But at other points, persons feel themselves somehow
present not just in papers they have written, but also in papers they have
read or owned or even just touched. Characterizing secretiveness, which he
classifies as an instinct, James notes that
some persons will never leave anything with their name written on it,
where others may pick it up—even in the woods, an old envelope
must not be thrown on the ground. Many cut all the leaves of a book
of which they may be reading a single chapter, so that no one shall
know which one they have singled out, and all this with no definite
notion of harm.
Even when such “habit[s] of concealment” seem the product of conscious
calculation, James suggests, their “motive is far less often definite prudence
than a vague aversion to have one’s sanctity invaded and one’s personal
concerns fingered and turned over by other people” (1049–50). And in
these cases, at least, to have one’s personal books and papers “fingered” by
others is to suffer a physical intrusion of sorts: the physical motions
involved in the acts of reading a person’s papers and of intruding upon a
person’s body cannot quite be kept discrete here. Indeed, so tightly does
the passage bind together persons with their papers that it isn’t even imme-
diately clear if the reason the envelope must not be discarded in the woods
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is that it is somehow a part of one’s self, as if writing’s ability to betray bod-
ily presence somehow makes writing part of the body. Perhaps the point
where the hand grasps the page, then, is a point at which the edges of the
body shade into other objects, raveling out into what is adjacent to them.
Acts of reading and writing tend to happen close to the body; perhaps that
is why it seems possible to imagine here that bodies and papers can lend
each other their qualities or attributes, compromising each other’s physical
integrity as they do so. Are our bodies “simply ours, or are they us?” James
asked earlier in the Principles; here this equivocal status of the body seems
to transfer itself to the objects lying alongside that body, which passes
along its ambiguities to anything it touches (279).
Inasmuch as it can be linked with other passages in the Principles that
treat of reading and writing—which attempt to diagram the relations
between the psyche that composes, the body that writes, and the language
that materializes itself in writing—this meditation on secretiveness is fairly
typical of James’s concerns. Yet what makes the passage worthy of note is
not so much the role it plays in any of the Principles’ major arguments, but
the extent to which it reflects a preoccupation characteristic of late-nine-
teenth-century English and American culture. Indeed, the possibility I want
to explore is that in the last two decades of the century, strands of that cul-
ture are committed to the metonyms, the displacements, the curiously fluid
logic—the curiously fluid materiality—with which this passage treats the
relationships between bodies and papers, persons and texts, selves and writ-
ing: committed, that is, both to the difficult work of stabilizing these dis-
placements and to ordering large segments of experience by means of them.
These commitments become clearer when we move from the psycho-
logical analysis of secretiveness to the concurrent legal analysis of privacy.
Published in the Harvard Law Review in 1890—the same year the
Principles appeared—Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s “The Right to
Privacy” argues that embedded within the common law is the right “to be
let alone,” a phrase Warren and Brandeis take from a standard text on tort
law and subsequently reinterpret as “the immunity of the person.”1 This
right to one’s own person is fundamental, but how the law defines the per-
son to be protected changes over time. Protections afforded by law once
stopped with the body, “serv[ing] only to protect the subject from battery.”
Then “came a recognition of man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings and his
intellect,” and with it the development of those areas of law designed to
protect a person’s reputation—the law of slander and libel—and a person’s
feelings—laws governing threats, nuisances, and interferences with the
family. Thus, Warren and Brandeis conclude, “regard for human emotions
soon extended the scope of personal immunity beyond the body of the
individual” (193–94).
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In articulating the legal right to privacy, Warren and Brandeis would
push this extension further, past the body and past the emotions, to one’s
papers. Reviewing cases in which private papers have been protected,
Warren and Brandeis argue that even when these decisions appeal to copy-
right law or other laws governing ownership of intellectual property or
breach of contract, they are really based on the common-law principle that
upholds the inviolability of the person. One’s papers are private not
because they’re owned by one’s self but because they are legally part of
one’s self. Indeed, the rhetoric of “The Right to Privacy” implies that one’s
papers are as much a part of one’s self as one’s body is, or at least the
thoughts rendered material upon them are: “the protection afforded to
thoughts, sentiments, and emotions, expressed through the medium of
writing . . . is merely an instance of the enforcement of the more general
right of the individual to be let alone. It is like the right not to be assault-
ed or beaten” (205). To be traced in the history of the law, then, is a path
that leads from the law of battery—and the right to one’s own body—to
the law of privacy—and the right to one’s own writing. The growth of the
legal definition of the person thus ends by folding together body, mental
life, and papers.
These formulations are partially dictated by the logic of the law: legal
traditions and precedents account for some of the emphasis on writing
here, and for some of the effort to merge papers and persons. Yet as the
Principles of Psychology suggests, such formulations are not confined to the
realm of law. And as Warren and Brandeis indicate, problems of the
boundaries of the person and of the sanctity of those boundaries had, by
1890, been constituted as a topic of public discussion. Seeking “to protect
the privacy of private life” against a press that is “overstepping in every
direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency” so that it may
satisfy the “prurient taste” of its readers, Warren and Brandeis take it near-
ly for granted not only that protection of the person must be extended,
but also that invasiveness will be recognized as something deeply charac-
teristic of their own time; they assume, in other words, that the matter
that crystallizes in and is epitomized by the relation of person to paper has
already achieved legibility as a matter of wide concern (215, 196).2
In characterizing its time as “the age of newspapers and telegrams and
photographs and interviewers,” Henry James’s The Aspern Papers (1888)
invokes and contributes to this legibility (12:8).3 James’s fascination with
the problems of privacy and publicity is well known and fairly explicit; he
himself recognizes it as crucial to his project, writing in his notebook in
1887 that “one sketches one’s age but imperfectly if one doesn’t touch on
. . . the invasion, the impudence and shamelessness, of the newspaper and
the interviewer, the devouring publicity of life, the extinction of all sense
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between public and private.”4 But what makes The Aspern Papers a most
pertinent text to consider here is the extent to which its concern for priva-
cy entails a concern for papers, and further (and more hyperbolically), the
ways in which it edges toward equating the act of reading with the act of
physical intrusion. Such equations are most obviously rendered in the
story’s broad outlines: the papers of the tale’s title are part of the trail left
behind by an affair between the late poet, Jeffrey Aspern, and the now-
aged Juliana Bordereau, who keeps herself shut up with her niece in a
crumbling Venetian palace. For the Aspern-obsessed man of letters who
narrates the tale, reading these “personal, delicate, intimate” papers neces-
sitates a “horribly intrusive” act of virtual home-invasion, of infiltrating the
house, creeping into the sitting room, and rifling through the cupboards
(12:11, 17). A story of reading, then, is synonymous with a story of priva-
cy’s violation.
This much occurs on the level of plot. But on a less schematic, far more
microscopic level, a whole grammar and vocabulary operate to associate
papers with the body and to define privacy in terms of that association.
Thus committing to paper the details of another’s life is treated as an act
of “pry[ing]” (12:65). Thus to subject someone to close scrutiny is to have
“turned [him] over”—as if he were pages (12:69). Thus it’s not just bodies
that have the capacity to “transmit” the touch, to relay knowledge of other
bodies (though this is odd in itself: it’s as if by touching my body you also
touch the bodies I’ve touched); “esoteric knowledge” of others’ sexuality
also “rub[s] off on” one in the process of handling papers like the love let-
ters of Jeffrey Aspern and Juliana Bordereau (12:8, 44). As in the passage
from William James’s Principles, the tale’s concern with violated privacy,
with “fingering another’s personal concerns,” leads it to literalize the
metaphor embedded in that phrase: the act of the invading eye material-
izes in the act of turning pages. And as in the Principles—and, more
notably, as in Warren and Brandeis—in The Aspern Papers privacy is con-
strued as a problem of the relation, the ontology, even, of bodies and their
papers.
This tendency to associate bodies and papers and to understand in terms
of each other the protections afforded to each is not exactly new at the end
of the nineteenth century; the fourth amendment to the U.S. Constitution
(to think of just one area of the realm of law) guarantees “the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.” But the fact that, with the 1886
Supreme Court case Boyd v. United States, fourth-amendment jurispru-
dence very nearly shares its point of origin with the other narratives of
search and seizure I am considering here indicates that a newly intensified
pressure is being brought to bear upon these associations of bodies and
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papers: in large part the issues that converge in Boyd hinge on whether
compelling a person to produce his papers should be considered just as
much an intrusion as rifling through his drawers; on whether “the eye” can
“be guilty of a trespass”; on whether doctrines protecting “the sanctity” of
the home and “the privacies of life” extend protection to one’s papers.5
Staking out a right to privacy thus entails scrutinizing impulses like the
ones present in the Principles of Psychology, holding steadily visible the elu-
sive—and formative—relation between the materiality of writing and the
physicality of the body.
Insofar as texts like “The Right to Privacy” and The Aspern Papers do
render visible this relation, they offer a somewhat unusual opportunity to
examine quite closely a matter of much interest to contemporary criticism.
The body has emerged as the favored subject of literary thematics as con-
temporary criticism tends to prioritize them; the body is now one of those
things we pay attention to when we read. Likewise, for recent accounts of
the social shaping of the body, the act of writing has become chief
metaphor and model; we tend to think of bodies and their sexualities, sub-
jectivities, desires, classes, and diseases as both malleable within the field
of writing and as decisively formed—subjected to restriction—within that
same field. The body has thus become a cultural and historical index cru-
cial to the way we read now; in the process of writing, “language [is]
inscribed by history on the bodies of living beings,” as Stephen Greenblatt
influentially puts it in Renaissance Self-Fashioning.6
Writing writes bodies just as much as bodies produce writing, then, but
these relationships are not stable and unchanging ones; rather, they shift
and slip and develop over time, sometimes coming to the foreground and
sometimes receding from view. The end of the nineteenth century is one
point at which they come to the fore in fairly decisive ways: in social, legal,
and literary commentary, the “materials of the writer”—and of the read-
er—“come also to be ways of inhabiting and conceptualizing the body,” to
use Jonathan Goldberg’s formulation.7 Further, texts like “The Right to
Privacy” rather consciously invest a good deal of their energies in arrang-
ing this relation, in forming and shaping the range of implications bodies
and writing have for each other. As the interests of contemporary criticism
suggest, these implications are still at work, still forming our conceptions
of the texts we read and the bodies with which we read them. Indeed, one
reason for retracing this episode in the history of the point where the hand
grasps the page is to see something of how that point came to be so form-
ative and generative and interesting in the first place. In an essay on the
use of words within paintings, Meyer Schapiro suggests that by collecting
representations of print, one can uncover and “reconstitute” a culture’s
“beliefs about the senses and language.”8 That is what I aim to do here: to
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uncover a set of associations and assumptions that govern James’s concep-
tion of writing, associations and assumptions that at least in part govern
our own habits of mind.
One fascination The Aspern Papers shares with the texts that surround it
in James’s career is its fascination with writing itself—a fascination not
only with the role of the writer, nor only with the effects of reading, but
also an absolutely concrete interest in writing as a material thing. An
extraordinary passage in The Princess Casamassima (1886) suggests how
intense this concentration can be in James and gives at least a glimpse of
its associations and consequences. At the start of his holiday at Medley
Hall, Hyacinth Robinson experiences a moment of overwhelming desire
while exploring the great house’s library:
It was an old brown room, of great extent—even the ceiling was
brown, though there were figures in it dimly gilt—where row upon
row of finely-lettered backs returned his discriminating professional
gaze . . . there were alcoves with deep window-seats, and arm-chairs
such as he had never seen, luxurious, leather-covered, with an adjust-
ment for holding one’s volume; and a vast writing-table . . . furnished
with a perfect magazine of paper and pens, inkstands and blotters,
seals, stamps, candlesticks, reels of twine, paper-weights, book-
knives. Hyacinth had never imagined so many aids to correspon-
dence, and before he turned away he had written a note . . . in a hand
even more beautiful than usual—his penmanship was very minute,
but at the same time wonderfully free and fair—largely for the pleas-
ure of seeing “Medley Hall” stamped in crimson, heraldic-looking
characters at the top of his paper. In the course of an hour he had rav-
aged the collection, taken down almost every book, wishing he could
keep it a week, and put it back quickly, as his eye caught the next,
which appeared even more desirable. . . . Altogether, his vision of true
happiness, at that moment, was that, for a month or two, he should
be locked into the library at Medley.9
There may not be another passage in all of James that focuses more intent-
ly on the materials of reading and writing, nor one in which the attraction
toward paper things is more sensual, nor one that more thoroughly extends
the processes of reading and writing to everything it details; here even the
ceiling is brown like a calf binding and inscribed like the gilt lettering on
a book’s spine. The language of handcraftedness and its way of folding
together body and object (the subject of chapter 3 above) are here focused
on the matter of reading and writing. Furthermore, there may not be
another passage in James that points more clearly to the ways in which two
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crucial Jamesian preoccupations intertwine. On the one hand, Hyacinth
exemplifies James’s interest in what he would come to call “my usual nar-
rator-observer.”10 As a spectator, Hyacinth is “condemned to see . . . things
only from outside” (as James puts it in the New York Edition preface) and
so develops a voyeuristic, even prurient, relation to a world that excludes
him (LC 2:1087). Thus, the longing he feels toward the paper world of
Medley Hall reflects his exclusion from the class that uses monogrammed
stationery as a matter of course; and his marginal relationship to the
objects in the library follows the same logic as his voyeuristic relation to
the world of lived sexuality in which he spies on scenes of seduction
between Paul Muniment and the Princess and between Captain Sholto
and Millicent.
All this has been a focusing concern for much recent discussion of
James and consequently is fairly well known. What is less often recognized
is what the quoted passage makes nearly inescapable: for James, a concern
for the observer entails a concern for the materials of reading and writing.
This seems obliquely reflected at the start of the passage when “the finely-
lettered backs” of books seem to “return” Hyacinth’s “discriminating pro-
fessional gaze.” Because this line casts the act of reading in the language of
observation, it has the effect of suggesting that the two are equivalent. And
since the books seem to Hyacinth to meet his gaze, they apparently oper-
ate as if they were human faces, their lettering miming a facial reaction to
the observer’s attention.
Then, too, the “professional” quality of Hyacinth’s “discriminating”
gaze, along with his expert appreciation for the library’s amazing array of
writing paraphernalia, implies a close tie between his role as observer and
his occupation as bookbinder, between looking and the materials of writ-
ing. This connection seems all the more important to make when we real-
ize that James’s fictions routinely make it. Not only are there figures like
reporters (in “The Papers” or The Reverberator, for example) and novelists
(“The Lesson of the Master,” “The Middle Years”) whose professions
require that they write what they observe; there are also those observers
with other sorts of “knowledge occupations,” to use a term from econom-
ic theory.11 Lambert Strether of The Ambassadors, who edits the Woollett
Review, and the literary reviewers of “John Delavoy” and “The Figure in
the Carpet” are obvious examples here, but less obviously the category
includes the docent of Shakespeare’s early home in “The Birthplace” (who
at the tale’s beginning is a librarian) and the clerk of “In the Cage,” an
“intense observer” whose relation to paper is as intimate and immediate as
Hyacinth’s, a woman who sells stamps and converts handwritten messages
into telegrams, who weighs envelopes and counts words (11:426).
In emphasizing the Jamesian observer’s involvement with papers, I am
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suggesting that a fascination with bodies and a fascination with writing
coincide, that writing fascinates because it somehow reveals bodies. Yet
regarded from a certain point of view, these are interests which we might
expect to resist becoming intertwined, which might just as easily be kept
separate from each other. Inasmuch as the body is what is absent in—
indeed what absents itself from—writing, it might appear more logical to
argue for an opposition between the two rather than for the sort of simul-
taneity outlined above. In On Longing, her essay on narrative’s relation to
the body and its objects, Susan Stewart clarifies this absence, arguing that
“what disappears in writing is the body and what the body knows—the
visual, tactile, and aural knowledge of lived experience.”12
The body disappears in writing: this principle would lead us to expect
that papers are not revealing enough to serve the purposes of the voyeuris-
tic gaze, the gaze which seeks to know others’ bodies. But as Jamesian
observers seem intuitively to grasp, this principle is open to resistance of
several different kinds. Most obviously, they seek to observe the body
before it has detached itself from writing, as “In the Cage” exemplifies, or
as the observers of “The Private Life” also demonstrate when, acting on
their “insane desire to see the author,” they steal into a playwright’s dark-
ened study to find him hunched over his writing table (17:251). Then,
too, Jamesian observers are drawn to situations in which the authorial
body makes a sudden, thrilling reappearance, as in the several stories in
which novelists are among the guests at parties in great country houses,
and to texts that seem less than thoroughly mediated, that seem to offer
some sort of bodily trace, like the galleys an author has worked over or let-
ters that offer a glimpse of the author’s own hand.
These examples suggest that bodies can be read back into papers, and
that such acts of reading complete the meanings of texts. When the
voyeuristic gaze trains itself on papers, it seeks to discover a secreted body,
seeks to reattach bodies to the papers they’ve all but detached themselves
from, as The Aspern Papers makes clear. Thus, for the editor, close reading
inevitably leads to collating bodies and texts; to see most deeply into
Aspern’s poems necessitates “opening lights into his life,” reconstructing
his life as a body (12:6). In this respect, it makes a certain amount of sense
that the act of reading Aspern’s poetry widens into a fascination with
Aspern’s portrait, with his papers, with the living body of his lover. For by
the logic of The Aspern Papers, the meanings of texts remain incomplete
until the bodies they stem from and refer to can be reattached to them.
This is why Miss Bordereau represents such a rare opportunity for the
editor; whereas his previous sources have been disembodied “phantoms
and dust, the mere echoes of echoes,” she offers the chance not only “to
look into a . . . pair of eyes into which [Aspern’s have] looked,” but also “to
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feel a transmitted contact” in a hand Aspern’s has touched (12:8). Meeting
her for the first time, the editor marvels at finding himself “face to face
with the Juliana of some of Aspern’s most exquisite and most renowned
lyrics,” an experience that not only gives Aspern’s poems a body but also a
voice, an “individual note” that “had been in Jeffrey Aspern’s ear.” All this
comes early on in the tale; much of what follows is taken up with the edi-
tor’s further efforts to see Juliana, who usually keeps herself shut up in her
rooms, and more particularly, his efforts to touch her hand, which she will
not give him, and to see her eyes, which she keeps veiled. Much of what
follows, in other words, details the editor’s efforts to know the secrets of
Miss Bordereau’s body, a body which seems “somehow to contain and
express” Aspern’s own, and which seems to bring the editor “nearer” to the
poet than he has ever been before (12:23–25).
For the editor, the pleasures of reading are the pleasures of knowing the
body, of reading the body back into writing, of restoring the visual, tac-
tile, and aural qualities the body seems to lose when committed to paper.
Indeed, so thoroughly does the tale associate the body with the pleasures
reading offers that when it imagines the act of reading, it imagines it as a
physical—almost a physiological—process. Of course, reading always is a
physical process—a coordination of manual and ocular actions, say—
though we don’t usually dwell on that fact, just as we don’t dwell on the
fact that reading generally necessitates bringing our bodies into contact
with objects that are outside them. The Aspern Papers, on the other hand,
seems as obsessed by this physicality of reading as it is by the reproduction
in writing of the physical body. Thus the editor imagines Miss Bordereau
going through the nightly “solemnities” of “pressing” Aspern’s letters “to
her withered lips,” a ritual which he would give “a good deal” to see
(12:35). Thus, too, he considers Miss Tina a potential source of knowl-
edge not because she might be able to summarize the contents of the
papers, but because she has “seen and handled all mementoes” and so
“some esoteric knowledge” has “rubbed off on her.” As we have already
seen, the editor imagines Miss Bordereau’s body has the ability to “trans-
mit” Aspern’s touch; these further examples suggest that this is an ability
it shares with the papers which (if he could ever get his hands on them)
would make the editor’s life “continuous, in a fashion, with the illustrious
life they had touched at the other end” (12:43–44). (It is here that the
meaning of “Bordereau”—“memorandum, note”—becomes relevant.)
The act of reading papers is thus construed along the lines of touching
bodies—so much so, in fact, that the acts of touching (or reading) bodies
and reading (or touching) papers come to substitute for each other, come
to be confused with each other much as they do in the Principles of
Psychology’s meditation on secretiveness. In this respect, The Aspern Papers
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might be seen as literalizing, and thus exaggerating, the sentiment that the
act of reading makes our lives continuous with those of others; here the
continuity is construed as a material one.
This extraordinary emphasis on the tactility of reading and this insis-
tence that in the process of reading the body is doubly involved (reading is
not only something bodies do, but also something they have done to
them) go more than a little way toward suggesting that reading can be an
act of intrusion. The various analogues the text supplies for reading further
advance this suggestion. As already noted, these analogues align the editor
with the forces of publicity in this “age of newspapers and telegrams and
photographs and interviewers” (12:8). Similarly, when the editor’s search
for information leads him to exploit the ingenuous Miss Tina, he feels
“almost as base as the reporter of a newspaper who forces his way into a
house of mourning” (12:82). Further, when Juliana discovers him testing
the lock on her bureau in the middle of the night, her rebuke—“Ah you
publishing scoundrel!”—aligns an act of physical intrusion with the sort of
violation we associate with the revelation of secrets, of personal informa-
tion (12:118).
Now a bureau is a container: kept in a sort of boudoir, it contains the
secrets of the body, serving as a “model of intimacy,” a “veritable org[an]
of the secret psychological life,” as Gaston Bachelard puts it.13 In this
respect, it resembles a house, which really does contain bodies, and the edi-
tor’s attempt to unlock the bureau’s secrets resembles his attempts to gain
access to Miss Bordereau’s house and then her rooms. When he passes
through the hall that links his own rooms with Juliana’s, the editor custom-
arily lingers there, watching the door that leads to the “treasure.” “A per-
son observing me might have supposed I was trying to cast a spell on it or
attempting some odd experiment in hypnotism,” he remarks—a passing
comment that itself might seem odd, except that hypnotism in the nine-
teenth century epitomizes the threat of visual intrusion, and that, since
hypnotism or mesmerism is sometimes thought to endow with physical
consequences the act of the intruding eye, it repeats The Aspern Papers’
account of reading (12:43). These factors aside, I highlight the remark as
one more alignment of reading with an act of intrusion into a receptacle
that contains the body. This equation begins to reach its fullest and most
literal expression in an edgy conversation between the editor and Juliana.
Questioning the ethics of those who write about the lives of great writers
who “are dead and gone and can’t, poor darlings, speak for themselves,” as
the editor puts it, Juliana asks, “Do you think it’s right to rake up the past?”
To which the editor responds, “How can we get at it unless we dig a lit-
tle?” (12:89–90). The implication of these remarks clarifies itself in an
exchange between the editor and Tina after Juliana’s death. Having given
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up on the papers, he suggests to Tina that what Miss Bordereau really
intended was for Aspern’s “literary remains” (12:12) to be buried with her
own corporeal ones:
Miss Tina appeared to weigh this suggestion; after which she
answered with striking decision, “Oh no, she wouldn’t have thought
that safe!”
“It seems to me nothing could be safer.”
“She had an idea that when people want to publish they’re capa-
ble—!” And she paused, very red.
“Of violating a tomb? Mercy on us, what must she have thought
of me!” (12:133–34)
The last container of the body that reading threatens, then, is the grave,
and if the image seems less than fully developed in The Aspern Papers, we
have only to remember that, like hypnotism, and like the intrusion with-
in a house, the violation of a tomb is in the nineteenth century a fascinat-
ing, repellent, and notorious topos for the invasion of the body’s privacy.14
With these images of the bureau, the house, and the tomb, reading
aligns itself with the act of intruding within the body’s containers and
wrenching it forth. Not only are these acts of invasion propelled by the
experience of reading Aspern’s poetry, but reading itself seems so body-
directed, seems so much to take the body as its object, that it comes to
seem an invasion in its own right, and bodies appear to be contained with-
in papers as surely as they are contained within houses or tombs. Thus, for
at least a moment in The Aspern Papers, the whole point of reading
Aspern’s lyrics is to discover Miss Bordereau’s body within them, to find
their revelation of what she and Aspern once did with each other’s bodies.
Along these lines, Aspern’s poems might well be viewed as containers of
secret knowledge of the body; the body would then be “as concrete there
as a bird in a cage,” “stuck into every volume as your foot is stuck into
your shoe,” to borrow Hugh Vereker’s description of the pattern that
unites his work in “The Figure in the Carpet” (15:233). But if this remark
suggests the body’s presence in writing, it also begins to suggest the diffi-
culty of knowing that body; the figure in the carpet never swims up clear,
just as the outlines of Juliana’s career never become specific. The editor
notes that while “most readers of certain of Aspern’s poems” have “taken it
for granted that Juliana had not always adhered to the steep footway of
renunciation,” one would be hard-pressed “to put one’s finger on the pas-
sage in which her fair fame suffered injury” (12:48). The implication is
that the poems contain a body from which one is excluded; they objecti-
fy knowledge of a world that one cannot infiltrate.
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This construction of reading does not quite tally with ways of thinking
about reading I have identified earlier; more particularly, the implication
that bodies have disappeared from writing—and so one must read bodies
back into it—conflicts with the implication that bodies are inside writ-
ing—and so readers have “to dig a little,” as the editor puts it. But resolv-
ing this logical incoherence may not be as important here as recognizing
how these conceptions together overdetermine the body’s place in reading,
constructing it as a problem and insisting on that problem’s relation to pri-
vacy. Indeed, if we momentarily regard The Aspern Papers as a sort of gloss
to Warren and Brandeis, then it begins to look like the “prurient” readers
they found so plentiful—and so worrisome—in late-nineteenth-century
America are those who, like the editor, read in order to know the secrets of
the body. And though Warren and Brandeis imply that this sort of “pruri-
ent taste” is confined to scandal sheets, The Aspern Papers begins to suggest
that writing is also framed as a bodily problem in the highly literary con-
texts that might otherwise seem to be yellow journalism’s opposite.
This question of the body’s place in writing is pursued within literary
commentary, then, and is pursued within the wider context of a question
of the ethics of seeking the sort of knowledge the editor seeks. One thing
that has always made The Aspern Papers seem a resonant text in James’s
career is its tight focus on the figure of the author and, more particularly,
on the relation between an author’s lived experience and his or her writing.
In James, this relation is always figured as a sort of double question, one in
which the boundaries between epistemology and ethics begin to blur. On
the one hand there is the question: how do the writing life and the rest of
a writer’s life intersect with each other? At the same time James asks: is it
right to try to find out? As early as 1872, in a review of a selection of pas-
sages from Hawthorne’s notebooks, James’s anxieties on this score show
themselves:
These liberal excisions from the privacy of so reserved and shade-
seeking a genius suggest forcibly the general question of the proper
limits of curiosity as to that passive personality of an artist of which
the elements are scattered in portfolios and table-drawers. It is
becoming very plain, however, that whatever the proper limits may
be, the actual limits will be fixed only by a total exhaustion of mat-
ter. (LC 1:307)
The image of ransacking the writing table that these lines suggest is one
The Aspern Papers would develop in full, while the suggestion that the
writer’s “personality” is present in his papers and therefore threatened by
the curious reader seems, at least in this context, to forecast the ways in
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which William James and Warren and Brandeis would write about persons
and papers eighteen years later. As James’s notes and preface reveal, The
Aspern Papers is based, first of all, on the attempts of Edward Silsbee, an
extraordinarily devoted Shelley-obsessive, to get at the papers of Claire
Clairmont, the last surviving member of the Byron-Shelley circle. But as
these early comments on Hawthorne suggest, the tale also has points of
contact with other authors who have, by 1888, come to epitomize for
James questions of privacy and the life of writing.15 Not only is the tale
characteristic of the ways in which James thinks about Hawthorne, but, as
Laurence Holland has argued, it is also formed by James’s fascination with
George Sand and her affair with Alfred de Musset.16 Aspern might, then,
most accurately be seen as a sort of composite figure that epitomizes
James’s characteristic ways of conceiving of authorship.
Although they lurk behind the tale, neither Byron nor Shelley nor
Hawthorne nor Sand is mentioned within it. Indeed, the only explicit
mention of a real author comes as the editor explains to Mrs. Prest, his
confidante in the tale’s beginning, why he finds it so revealing that Juliana
refers to her old lover as “Mr. Aspern”:
It proves familiarity, and familiarity implies the possession of
mementoes, of tangible objects. I can’t tell you how that “Mr.” affects
me—how it bridges over the gulf of time and brings our hero near
to me—nor what an edge it gives to my desire to see Juliana. You
don’t say “Mr.” Shakespeare. (12:12–13)
And later, as the editor ponders what Aspern’s poems reveal about Juliana’s
past, comes the only explicit mention of an actual literary text:
It was incontestable that, whether for right or for wrong, most read-
ers of certain of Aspern’s poems (poems not as ambiguous as the son-
nets—scarcely more divine, I think—of Shakespeare) had taken for
granted that Juliana had not always adhered to the steep footway of
renunciation. (12:48)
These references to Shakespeare seem the most passing of allusions, and
ought not to make much of a difference in the way we read The Aspern
Papers and its obsession with the relation between writing and the body.
Yet when we look for analogues to the metaphors with which The Aspern
Papers characterizes reading, we find them with an odd frequency and
sharpness in the texts that swirl around what came in the late nineteenth
century to be thought of as the Shakespeare “mystery.”
This is not surprising inasmuch as Shakespeare might be said to be the
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period’s exemplary private character, at least in literary contexts, its most
alluringly mysterious, most secret subject, the writer who manages to
efface his own personality from his writing most thoroughly, disappearing
behind his characters. Thus Walter Bagehot takes the occasion of meditat-
ing on “Shakespeare—The Individual” (1853) as the occasion for charac-
terizing privacy itself:
Behind every man’s external life, which he leads in company, there is
another which he leads alone, and which he carries with him apart.
We see but one aspect of our neighbour, as we see but one side of the
moon; in either case there is also a dark half, which is unknown to us.
We all come down to dinner, but each has a room to himself.17
If one accepts this characterization, as many nineteenth-century commen-
tators did, then it seems almost inevitable that reading will take the shape
of a desire to penetrate the author’s secret, to peer into the room
Shakespeare kept to himself. Which may well be what Virginia Woolf ’s
Richard Dalloway is getting at when “seriously and solemnly” he says that
“no decent man ought to read Shakespeare’s sonnets because it was like lis-
tening at keyholes.”18
In banning the sonnets, Richard recycles what must have seemed by the
time Woolf wrote Mrs. Dalloway a cliché of Victorian literary commentary:
that in the sonnets Shakespeare gives voice to his own experience and emo-
tions, for once allowing what Bagehot calls his “dark half” to speak. Not all
critics believed that, as Edward Dowden argued in his 1881 edition of the
sonnets, these poems represent “real feelings and real experiences.”19 But for
personalists and anti-personalists alike, the issue in large part shaped the
nature of debate over Shakespeare, determining its characteristic concerns
and metaphors. As the quotations from Woolf and Bagehot suggest, these
metaphors draw on the language and imagery of privacy, especially imagery
that conceives of privacy in terms of domestic space. Indeed, the dominant
metaphor of nineteenth-century Shakespeare studies in general, and of
studies of the sonnets in particular, may be the one Woolf plays on:
Wordsworth’s characterization of the sonnet-form as the “key” with which
“Shakespeare unlocked his heart,” an image consistent with and amplified
by the comparison of the sonnet to a “narrow room” in “Nuns Fret Not.”
Woolf was not the first to recognize that one possible implication of this
image is that reading the sonnets can be a form of voyeurism. In the poem
“House” (1876), Robert Browning developed this suggestion in terms
peculiarly relevant to The Aspern Papers. One more statement of
Browning’s credo of the objective poet, “House” begins by mockingly toy-
ing with the possibility of writing a self-revealing poem:
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Shall I sonnet-sing you about myself?
Do I live in a house you would like to see?
Is it scant of gear, has it store of pelf?
“Unlock my heart with a sonnet-key?”20
Having invoked the standard Wordsworthian image, the poem turns to
literalizing it, sketching a tableau in which an earthquake has left the inte-
rior of a house open to view. A crowd gathers before it, “feast[ing]” its eyes
on the late occupant’s domestic arrangements and idiosyncrasies—notic-
ing, for example, that he smoked (“no wonder he lost his health!” the
crowd concludes); that he seems not to have bathed before he dressed;
that, as “the neighbours guessed,” “His wife and himself had separate
rooms” (31, 22–28). “House” thus turns a mode of reading into an act of
ocular invasion, an invasion in which the secrets of the body are not only
revealed but are turned into spectacle. Further, the poem turns a poetic
form into a physical space that contains evidence of the body’s activities;
the physical dimensions of the sonnet make it participate in what
Bachelard calls the “homology between the geometry of the small box and
the psychology of secrecy.”21
This homology is relevant to the status of Shakespeare’s sonnets because
two questions that dominate—and sometimes titillate and sometimes
unnerve—readings of the sonnets toward the end of the century are
whether the poems represent actual bodies and whether the actions the
poems represent are the actual experiences of the bodies represented. Not
only does criticism of the time increasingly pursue the identities of the
Dark Lady, the Fair Young Man, and the Rival Poet, but it comes to think
of the poems as somehow containing Shakespeare himself; it’s as if reading
writing so tied up in experiences and representations of the physical body
is equivalent to knowing the body that wrote what one is reading. When
the narrator of Oscar Wilde’s The Portrait of Mr. W. H. (1889) claims that
in reading the sonnets with the Willie Hughes theory in mind he has his
“hand upon Shakespeare’s heart, and [is] counting each separate throb and
pulse of passion,” he expresses feelings that appear in the wholly un-iron-
ic criticism of his real-life predecessors and contemporaries.22 Likewise,
when Samuel Butler, in Shakespeare’s Sonnets Reconsidered (1899), insists
that in the sonnets “we look upon” the poet “face to face” even as we also
look “over [his] shoulder” to read the poems that are actually “a very pri-
vate letter,” he speaks for assumptions present in mainstream criticism
even if his bizarre thesis that Mr. W. H. worked as a cook at sea is any-
thing but.23
The intensity of this emphasis on the authorial body may seem extraor-
dinary in later nineteenth-century writing on Shakespeare’s sonnets, but
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the habits of reading it reflects are not so unusual. Inasmuch as deducing
biographical, lived experience from texts is a main critical project of the
time, Shakespearean studies epitomize the assumptions that govern nine-
teenth-century literary commentary in general. As Marjorie Garber demon-
strates, conceptions of authorship in the nineteenth century are routinely
referred to Shakespeare; the question of what an author is is defined
through Shakespeare even as it gives definition to Shakespeare himself.24
This is true not only of the controversy over who wrote Shakespeare, which
begins to attract attention in the middle of the century. It is also true of
questions about the body’s presence in Shakespeare’s writing, particularly
the sonnets, as the remarks of Wilde and Butler suggest. That the sonnets
themselves conceive of persons living on through writing—and thus, in a
sense, living within it—may have seemed to underwrite this emphasis on
the body in writing. But we should also consider this emphasis as part of
what Foucault identifies as an “intensification” of the body in the nine-
teenth century: a growing tendency to determine meanings and to specify
individuals through recourse to corporeality.25
This discourse surrounding and reconstituting the sonnets is not, of
course, one that merely constructs and worries over a general corporeality,
a universal state of embodiment (indeed, it is one of those episodes that
reveals the emptiness of “the body” considered as an uninflected abstrac-
tion). As Eve Sedgwick observes in Between Men, Shakespeare’s sonnets
“have been a kind of floating decimal in male homosexual discourse,” a
point where gay male critics have sometimes and prominently found the
English literary canon reflecting same-sex desire and a point where critics
with a deep and insistent lack of interest in sexuality have been forced to
confront the issues of embodiment and sexual desire they have worked to
exclude from their projects.26 In Wilde’s Portrait of Mr. W. H., male same-
sex desire is mediated through debate on the sonnets, mediated through
lyric scholarship; in the narrator’s characterization of reading as equivalent
to placing his “hand upon Shakespeare’s heart, and counting each separate
throb and pulse of passion,” contact with the textual artifact substitutes for
direct physical expression with the sonnets’ other readers, Cyril Graham and
Erskine. As William Cohen notes, Wilde “embeds” his theory of the son-
nets “in a nested series of narratives, where it is exchanged through succes-
sive pairs of desiring men.”27 As in The Aspern Papers, where reading is con-
ceived both in terms of a hauntingly spiritual connection and in terms of a
tactile physicality, in Wilde and the discourse around the sonnets more gen-
erally reading is pulled in opposite directions, simultaneously construed as
something that looks a lot like a sexual act and something purely cognitive.
Given both these tensions and this insistently corporeal impulse in the
debates circling around Shakespeare, it is not surprising that the desire to
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see Shakespeare “face to face,” as Samuel Butler put it, received in the mid-
1880s a most literal construction. In 1883, five years before The Aspern
Papers’ publication, a pamphlet by C. M. Ingleby, a life trustee of
Shakespeare’s birthplace at Stratford, ignited a small controversy by renew-
ing earlier calls for a new approach to Shakespeare studies, one best sum-
marized by Ingleby’s long title: Shakespeare’s Bones. The Proposal to Disinter
Them, Considered in Relation to Their Possible Bearing on His Portraiture:
Illustrated by Instances of Visits of the Living to the Dead. As his title sug-
gests, Ingleby calls for exhumation as a means of determining, through an
examination of Shakespeare’s skull, which of the portraits of the poet most
resemble him. Other disinterment advocates hoped as well that an exam-
ination of the skeleton might reveal whether Shakespeare was lame, an
implication many readers saw and took quite literally in Sonnets 37 and
89. As it does in The Aspern Papers, reading here becomes a matter of see-
ing the body and of (very respectfully, Ingleby’s tract emphasizes) touch-
ing it. And as the examples of the portraits and of Shakespeare’s lameness
further imply, one conviction that motivates would-be resurrection men
like Ingleby is that it is the body that resolves not only the ambiguities of
graphic representation, but also those of language itself. Or, rather, the
body resolves such ambiguities because it is itself a superior language: a
bone contains a “message,” “an intelligible language”; a skull requires no
interpreter but rather “sp[eaks] for itself.”28
What eventually quashed Ingleby’s proposal—which did have its sup-
porters, and which was considered in an 1884 meeting of the Shakespeare
Trust—was an international outcry against disturbing the sanctity of the
poet’s grave. Ingleby had anticipated such objections, arguing that since a
respectfully conducted scientific investigation was hardly the same thing
as grave-robbing inspired by “morbid curiosity,” the malediction engraved
upon the tomb (“Blessed be the man that spares these stones, / And cursed
be he that moves my bones”) hardly applied. But the examples—the
“instances of visits of the living to the dead”—Ingleby gathers together to
establish a precedent for exhumation under such circumstances do little to
gain support for his proposal. Ingleby follows the odd rhetorical strategy
of arguing for the exhumation of Shakespeare by devoting a quarter of his
short book to examples of how the job ought not to be done, detailing
oddly harrowing stories of the posthumous careers of the famous:
Swedenborg becomes the target of souvenir-hunters, one of whom carries
away the cartilage of an ear; a skeleton purported to be Milton’s is dis-
played for a small fee; Cromwell’s embalmed head makes such a quixotic
journey that it isn’t quite possible for Ingleby to say where it has finally
come to rest.29
Henry James was hardly unaware of the controversies swirling around
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Shakespeare; indeed, it seems unlikely that any literary person of the time
could escape them. And like Emerson before him and like his contempo-
rary Mark Twain, James was not always immune to the efforts of others to
question Shakespeare’s authorship of Shakespeare. When, in 1877, he
made his second visit to Stratford, James wrote of the “torment” of
Shakespeare’s “unguessed riddle,” as well as of the charms of being on the
spot where “the greatest genius who has represented and ornamented life”
had walked.30 Much later he would happen upon a new book proving that
Bacon wrote Shakespeare; shortly after that he would confess that he was
haunted by the conviction that the divine William is the biggest and
most successful fraud ever practiced on a patient world. . . . I can only
express my general sense by saying that I find it almost as impossible
to conceive that Bacon wrote the plays as to conceive that the man
from Stratford, as we know the man from Stratford, did.31
But if James was not quite immune to the ideas of “maniacs who
embrace some bedlamitical theory of the cryptic character of Shakespeare,”
as “The Figure of the Carpet” calls them, this did not quite keep him from
coming to define himself and his own privacy in Shakespearean terms
(15:244). Especially when he considers that the searching lights and pry-
ing fingers that were taking Shakespeare as their object might eventually be
turned on himself, James takes Shakespeare’s impersonality as exemplary.
When, in 1914, he gives instructions to the nephew who would become
his literary executor, James not only adopts Shakespeare as his model, but
further, he replays the whole association of writing and the body that The
Aspern Papers and the Shakespeare controversy both establish:
My sole wish is to frustrate as utterly as possible the post mortem
exploiter . . . and I have long thought of launching, by a provision in
my will, a curse no less explicit than Shakespeare’s own on any such
as try to move my bones. Your question determines me definitely to
advert to the matter in my will—that is to declare my utter and
absolute abhorrence of any attempted biography or the giving to the
world . . . of any part or parts of my private correspondence.32
The injunction to keep papers private is here conveyed by relating those
papers to the body, by speaking of them as if they were body—whether
hidden in the grave or dismembered and scattered as “parts.” In construct-
ing papers as such by way of reference to Shakespeare, James not only relies
on the general image of Shakespeare that emerged in the nineteenth cen-
tury; he also relies, more particularly, on a relationship that he had worked
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out eleven years before in his study of prurience at Stratford-on-Avon,
“The Birthplace,” a story which revisits The Aspern Papers’ linkage of
intrusion into a house with investigation of the life of the author. The tale
centers on a young couple, Morris and Isabel Gedge, who become the new
caretakers of the national “shrine,” “the early home of the supreme poet,
the Mecca of the English-speaking race.” The poet, obviously Shakespeare
but never named, is simply referred to as “Him”—as if his name were too
venerable to pronounce. The new docents, blessed with a modicum of
taste and discernment, believe that as holders of “the key” of “this trans-
figured world,” their role is to correct and circumvent the assumptions of
“vulgar” tourists (17:134–36). But the vulgar, it turns out, want to hear
not just what Morris regards as the very few known “facts” about the
author; they want, instead, “everything . . . they want to see where He
hung up His hat and where He kept His boots and where His mother
boiled her pot” (17:138, 177). They want, in other words, an embroidered
account of what is most “personal” rather than skeptically revisionist his-
tory. Gedge’s style of presentation does not exactly meet these desires, con-
vinced as he is that Shakespeare “covered His tracks as no other human
being has ever done” (17:165). Indeed, he finds the tourists’ intrusions
upon the Birthplace as akin to “kill[ing]” Shakespeare not just because
such intrusion pries into his life, but also because it substitutes his life for
his works (17:180). As in Browning’s “House,” then, reading
Shakespeare’s body back into his writing is equated not only with intrud-
ing within a house, but also with subjecting its occupant to violence.
When faced with the prospect of being fired by the Birthplace’s govern-
ing committee, however, Gedge manages to “strangle” his own “critical
sense,” and evolves an extraordinarily showy routine that makes him so
celebrated that the committee doubles his stipend (17:189, 188). Whereas
before his conversion he holds that one should “let the author alone,” his
new style of presentation promises that in the Birthplace, “the whole tenor
of existence” is “laid . . . bare”; here one experiences absolute “intimacy”
with “Him” (17:180, 194–95). Whereas before his conversion Gedge
insists that “the play’s the thing,” now the Shakespearean writing that mat-
ters most, that means most fully, is not anything so mediated as the col-
lected works but instead is the mark made directly by the body. As Gedge
informs the breathless tourists: “It is in this old chimney-corner, the
quaint inglenook of our ancestors—just there in the far angle, where His
little stool was placed, and where, I dare say, if we could look close
enough, we should find the hearthstone scraped with His little feet”
(17:180, 195–96).
As this climactic tableau in “The Birthplace” suggests, reading and see-
ing, writing and bodily identity, all give off on each other, becoming fluid
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and protean. The turning matter I have described in previous chapters
comes to be a way of imagining what a text is and how readers interact
with it. These ontological blendings characterize the thinking of both
James’s Shakespearean tourists and of social conservatives, like Warren and
Brandeis, who regard with anxiety the prying masses James’s tourists exem-
plify. For in seeing writing as a bodily function or extension or trace,
James’s Shakespearean tourists assume a relationship that Warren and
Brandeis delineate at length. Relying on the analogue of intellectual and
artistic property, Warren and Brandeis argue that common-law doctrines
of intellectual ownership are themselves but “instances and applications of
a general right to privacy” (198). What allows Warren and Brandeis to put
the matter in this odd way is the assumption that my ownership of, say,
this book is not a matter of my owning the pages on which it is printed;
rather, my ownership is of its intellectual and rhetorical content. My com-
mon-law publication right, then, is a right to decide which of my thoughts
and expressions will become public and which will not. And there’s no sig-
nificant difference, according to Warren and Brandeis, between expressing
my thoughts “in writing” and expressing them through the body “in con-
duct, in conversation, in attitudes, or in facial expression”; from the point
of view of privacy law, these all amount to the same thing (206). In ren-
dering immaterial the material through which ideas and emotions are con-
veyed, then, the right to privacy subsumes the difference between bodies
and papers, understanding in identical terms the protections afforded to
each. To construe writing as body is at once to claim for it a high degree of
protection and to suggest that the boundaries of the body are fluid, unsta-
ble, capable of shading into the objects that exist around and alongside the
body.
This instability is central both to the way Warren and Brandeis try to
protect privacy and to the way they imagine privacy’s invasion. Part of
what makes late-century social conservatives uneasy about the dissolving
boundary between public and private is their conviction that such dissolu-
tions have come to characterize large segments of American society.
Running alongside the strong fear of invasion that shows itself in docu-
ments like “The Right to Privacy” and “The Birthplace” is a fear that many
Americans want to be invaded, that they want to give up their privacy—
and their selves—to the forces of publicity that Warren and Brandeis cri-
tique at the beginning of their article. James’s friend E. L. Godkin, in an
1890 Scribner’s Magazine essay on reputation that partially anticipates
Warren and Brandeis, notes that while it causes some people “exquisite
pain to have their private life laid bare to the world, others rather like it”;
“the passion for notoriety . . . has been fostered to such an extent” by the
“wide diffusion of printed gossip that there is a large number of people
Chapter 5: Bodies, Papers, and Persons 105
Otten_CH5_2nd.qxp  4/19/2006  1:38 PM  Page 105
who . . . put themselves in the way of having their private life explored in
the press.”33
These people who “rather like it” are ones who are “all self-advertise-
ment,” as James puts it in the long 1903 tale “The Papers.”34 They are peo-
ple who so thoroughly define themselves on the basis of being “para-
graphed . . . and . . . published” that, at least in James’s view, they might
be all print, wholly publicity effect (378). This applies most obviously to
figures like the star celebrity of “The Papers,” Sir A. B. C. Beadel-Muffet
K.C.B., M.P. (whose very name underlines his definition as an effect of
the alphabet, of writing), who are “universal and ubiquitous, commemo-
rated . . . on every page of every public print every day in every year”
(317). Here an intertextual connection will indicate more fully the extent
to which James imagines the publicly disseminated self in emphatically
embodied terms. In “The Papers,” Maud Blandy, James’s journalist-hero-
ine, imagines that were the celebrity Beadel-Muffet to attempt a retire-
ment from public life, he would be haunted by the public persona she has,
with Beadel-Muffet’s own cooperation, crafted for him: he would be pur-
sued “by the lurid glare that he has himself so started and kept up, and at
last literally devoured (like Frankenstein, of course!) by the monster he has
created” (324). This image of the outstanding citizen as a dismembered
body with a name full of decorative flourishes (including the initials A. B.
C.) echoes Poe’s “The Man That Was Used Up,” the tale of Brevet
Brigadier General John A. B. C. Smith, a veteran of the Indian wars whose
famously handsome body proves to be nothing but discriminatingly cho-
sen appurtenances.35 This continuity between bodily and scriptive identi-
ty also characterizes figures like the publicity-craving Selah Tarrant of The
Bostonians, who noses his way into newspaper offices,
always trying to find out what was “going in”[to the papers]; he
would have liked to go in himself, bodily, and, failing in this, he
hoped to get advertisements inserted gratis. The wish of his soul was
that he might be interviewed; that made him hover at the editorial
elbow.36
What James saw as the collapse in America of privacy as a value is regis-
tered in examples like these as a crisis in the relationship between bodies
and writing; when persons “go into” print to the extent that they seem to
be physically constituted of writing, privacy ceases to function. This
“scriptively remade body” (the phrase is Jonathan Goldberg’s) typifies not
only celebrated subjects of writing like Beadel-Muffet or would-be celebri-
ties like Selah Tarrant; it also comes to characterize the writer, or at least
those who engage in certain kinds of writing.37 Thus it is not only the con-
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sciousnesses of Maud and of Howard Bight, the journalists of “The
Papers,” which are wholly “furni[shed]” by “the Papers”; this is also true of
their bodies. Maud is “really herself . . . an edition, an ‘extra special’”;
Howard is “papery all through” (313, 314, 340). Likewise The Portrait of
a Lady’s journalist, Henrietta Stackpole, is “as crisp and new and compre-
hensive as a first issue before the folding. From top to toe she had proba-
bly no misprint” (3:117).
Privacy, as we have seen, depends for its definition on a relation between
writing and body. But the metaphor loses its efficacy when it is tugged too
far in either direction: body and writing must become neither too detached
from each other nor too indistinguishable. James’s clearest exemplum of
this uneasy logic comes, of course, in “The Private Life” (1892), a story in
which the private self almost literally dissolves before its subsequent recu-
peration, one that is realized through the body of the writer. Lord
Mellifont is “so essentially, so conspicuously and uniformly the public
character” that he is “all public” and has “no corresponding private life”
(17:246). Celebrated simply for the “tone” he imparts to any event, he is
all “style” and no substance—so much so that, in the tale’s extraordinary
literalization of the proverb, he disappears when he has no audience
(17:227).
In contrast to Lord Mellifont, who “isn’t even [one] whole” person,
Clare Vawdrey, a celebrated playwright, has not one self but two (17:245).
One is a “bourgeois”-about-town who has all the usual unremarkable
foibles; he has “his hours and his habits, his tailor and his hatter, his
hygiene and his particular wine” (17:244, 220). The other self, from whom
the bourgeois is wholly cut off, is “the genius” who “stays at home”
(17:244). So separated are these two lives that they go on simultaneously;
at the same time “the bourgeois” socializes in the parlor, “the genius”
hunches over a writing table in his darkened room. This conceit carries to
a fantastic extreme the division of the self into one half that comes down
to dinner and another half that has a room to itself—the division which
Bagehot and other nineteenth-century commentators saw as so eminently
Shakespearean. It also follows the conception of the artistic personality
that Browning outlined in “House,” among other poems—a connection
all the more compelling in that James’s remarks about the tale in the New
York Edition reveal that Vawdrey is modeled on Browning himself (LC
2:1255).38
The self—or the part of Vawdrey’s self—that writes is an ambivalent fig-
ure. At one point it is suggested that the man who can only be seen in the
darkened room is someone Vawdrey gets to do his writing for him; he is
thus doubly a ghost writer. Inasmuch as a ghost is neither wholly substan-
tial nor so wholly disembodied that it cannot be recognized as the trace or
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outline of a body—inasmuch as it is body and not body—it figures exact-
ly the equivocal, highly generative relation between body and writing that
has been my subject.39
This chapter has argued that in the twin discourses by which writing
and privacy are figured together, a material model of textuality emerges: a
cluster of prevailing metaphors, ones that carry into the act of reading a
set of concrete analogues. Governed by the logic of the private dwelling
and shaded by the nineteenth-century sexualization of things hidden—
and, even more generally, by the intense somatic bias of nineteenth-cen-
tury thought—the concept of the text becomes that of an intimate space,
one with definite borders that are also permeable, susceptible to violation.
As is especially evident in the commentary on the sonnet form, the phys-
ical dimensions of the text are thought through architecture and architec-
ture’s social functions; writing’s materiality is confused both with the
architectural spaces that bespeak intimacy and with the bodies those
spaces protect. If this argument holds, then we can say that few concepts,
at least in literary criticism, have effaced their own origins more success-
fully than that of reading, than that of the text.
As a coda, and as a way of developing still more explicitly the signifi-
cance of the preceding analyses, I offer the following: In 1964, W. H.
Auden wrote the introduction for a Signet Classics edition of Shakespeare’s
sonnets. Auden opened up his subject with a polemic against biographical
readings of imaginative literature; he did so in terms of privacy and, even
more specifically, in terms of private papers located within an enclosed
architectural space: “A great deal of what today passes for scholarly research
is an activity no different from that of reading somebody’s private corre-
spondence when he is out of the room, and it doesn’t really make it moral-
ly any better if he is out of the room because he is in his grave.”40 Following
in the tradition established by Browning and many other Victorian readers
(or nonreaders) of Shakespeare, Auden decrees that Shakespeare’s “room”
and “grave” must remain sealed against “the desire for truth,” a desire hard
to distinguish, Auden says, from “idle curiosity” (89). But if the room, the
grave, and “Shakespeare the man” must remain impervious to “desire,” this
desire works its way back into the solely textual kind of reading Auden
advocates, as he imagines the “shade” of Shakespeare feeling “grateful” for
the “loving care” bestowed on his texts by William Empson in an explica-
tion of one of the sonnets (91, 90). Nor is that all, for in speculating about
the dating of Shakespeare’s sonnets—are they the product of youth or
maturity?—Auden hesitantly adopts the former, “because the experiences
the sonnets describe seem to me to be more likely to befall a younger man
than an older” (91). It is hard in such moments to tell whose experiences
Auden is talking about, or whose privacy he would protect—his own or
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Shakespeare’s. It is hard, in other words, not to associate the kind of read-
ing Auden both forbids and practices with his own sexual history, his slow-
ly emergent sense of himself as a gay man. What is clear is that figuring the
text as an enclosed and private space—a room or a grave—cannot be disen-
tangled from homosexual reading here, and that Shakespeare’s sonnets are
still, in 1964, giving that model of textuality its distinctive shape. I would
suggest, then, that the material models of reading I have traced in this chap-
ter rework the textual condition, bestowing upon it the shape of the closet.
Similarly, the constellation of texts assembled here affirms one of the cru-
cial arguments Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick makes about the closet, which is that
the private/public distinction is one of those “contestation[s] of meaning”
which is “indelibly marked with the historical specificity of
homosocial/homosexual definition, notably but not exclusively male, from
around the turn of the century.”41
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c h a p t e r  s i x
Adulterous Matter
would like to begin with two working principles of James’s late fictionI that together prove enormously generative even as they seem, from a
strictly logical viewpoint, only barely reconcilable. The first is that these
narratives are centered, with enough obsessiveness to make one suppose
that James had fully recognized and embraced his master-metaphor, on the
act of adultery; the second is that these narratives so complicate their
claims to reference—their own allegations that their grip on a reliably solid
world outside themselves is firm—that to ask about the reality of, say, The
Turn of the Screw’s fornicating ghosts, is, fundamentally, to mistake the
nature of the text being read. To put this dual claim more succinctly, the
late fiction centers on and effaces the adulterous body, posits that body as
both a central and an absent truth. One way this tension appears within
the late fiction is as an impulse to “trace” bodies, to locate them within a
set of spatial coordinates: “People are always traceable . . . when tracings
are required,” Colonel Bob Assingham remarks of the presumed tryst of
Charlotte and Amerigo (24:134). The Turn of the Screw’s governess
“trace[s]” little Flora to her rendezvous with Miss Jessel by the lake and tri-
umphantly concludes that the ghost “was there, so I was justified; she was
there, so I was neither cruel nor mad” (12:270, 278). The narrator of The
Sacred Fount considers himself “on the track of a law”—a principle of
interpersonal relations that would explain how adulterous lovers transform
each other—as he traces these lovers through the meanderings of a coun-
try-house weekend.1 All of these epistemological adventures arrive at an
adulterous body, an equivocal figure that will not settle into a stable ontol-
ogy; they end with ghosts (The Turn of the Screw), perpetually transform-
ing bodies (The Sacred Fount), and a woman who, defined as a turning fig-
ure, frustrates efforts to “definitely plac[e] her,” to define her (The Golden
Bowl ) (23:53–54). The condition of having a body should entail the con-
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dition of having a spatial location, but that more or less necessary truth
seems one the late novels deny; they consistently characterize the body
along the lines of what William Dean Howells, in his collection of stories
about spiritualism, called “questionable shapes,” figures that carry with
them a sense of physicality that nevertheless cannot be held in physical
place.2
If we move from the narrative patterns of the late fiction to those texts’
moments of description, we find this sense of illocality borne out by the
pronounced lack of a whole body, as characters are represented by a single
part, a few strands of hair (like Chad Newsome’s gray streaks in The
Ambassadors) or one accessory (Miss Barrace’s tortoise-shell glasses in the
same novel) or a single prop (the narrator’s cigarettes in The Sacred Fount).
At an early point in The Ambassadors, Strether dwells at great length on the
ribbon, the “broad red velvet band with an antique jewel—he was rather
complacently sure it was antique—attached to it in front,” which Maria
Gostrey wears round her neck (21:50). At this point in the novel, this rib-
bon is the only part of Maria the reader can “see” clearly, save for a passing
glimpse of her dress, which is “‘cut down’ . . . in respect to shoulders and
bosom.” Hence this ribbon almost floats free of the body it accessorizes, a
body that is very nearly absent from the passage’s representation of Maria.
An appurtenance by definition appertains to some more significant entity,
but here in late James, the entities to which such ornaments refer are large-
ly missing, practically invisible as the passage stays resolutely focused on
this “added” “value” and leaves only dimly adumbrated the body it adds its
value to (21:50, 51). At least for this moment, then, the way the text ren-
ders reference problematic and the way it represents the accessory coincide.
This ribbon loosens referential moorings in another way as it becomes
a sign of adultery. It is, after all, a red ribbon, one that inevitably points
back not only to Hester Prynne’s scarlet A but also to the “cherry-coloured
ribbon” that seems so incriminating a piece of evidence in the faux-adul-
tery plot of Dickens’s David Copperfield and, more generally, to the taste
for ornament that for Flaubert’s adulterous Emma Bovary seems insepara-
ble from a taste for extramarital liaisons.3 The ribbon is one of what The
Ambassadors will later call Maria’s “promiscuities,” a term with which the
novel pulls together indiscriminate social relations with a discriminatingly
chosen collection of frills and bibelots, relations and bibelots that, taken
together, define the mode of women like Maria Gostrey and Madame de
Vionnet. A flexible accessory that can be tied and untied, the ribbon asso-
ciates itself with the body of the adulteress, which is often explicitly
defined as “flexible” in James’s late fiction and so reflects in physical form
the looseness with which that character regards binding ties (23:47;
10:320). Further, by having an intimate dinner with a woman who is not
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Mrs. Newsome, his presumed fiancée, Strether is committing something
he considers akin to adultery, an effect heightened by the contrast of
Maria’s ribbon to the austere ruff Mrs. Newsome wears instead, by
Strether’s inhalation of the “vague sweetness” of Maria’s perfume, and by
Strether’s realization that “never before—no, literally never—had a lady
dined with him at a public place before going to the play” (21:50, 52).
I want to bring to a close these readings of Jamesian matter by arguing
that in James’s late fiction, a suppressed account of adultery reappears as
an account of the material world. At its simplest, this argument will be
that the late Jamesian object takes on the characteristics of bodies that
have come unstuck from their social moorings and floated into illicit
unions: the objects of the last novels are both “slippery” and “sticky,” like
Lionel Croy’s repulsive sofa at the opening of The Wings of the Dove; they
are full of “duplicity,” overly capable of flexible redoubling, like the prop-
er things that serve as cover for the adulterous Selina in A London Life;
they are “promiscuous properties,” like the ornaments and relics that fur-
nish Madame de Vionnet’s apartment in The Ambassadors (19:3; 10:292;
21:244). With these promiscuously ambulant, amorphous, sticky yet slip-
pery objects, James endows the slippage of reference with material proper-
ties; the missing accounts of sexual liaisons work their way into the novel’s
representations of the concrete world as the material things of these nov-
els paradoxically objectify the condition of groundlessness.4
More generally and more complexly, this chapter will argue that the
instability of the late Jamesian text equals and is accomplished through an
instability of the body. What is radical about the late fictions is that they
evolve a materialism without reference, a concrete materiality that will not
fix itself to its bodily referent; persons come to be defined through mate-
rial processes that won’t sit still, figures that turn perpetually. As in the rep-
resentation of Maria’s ribbon, the superficial ornament does not necessar-
ily refer to any substantial integrity; the ribbon functions as the focal point
of a passage that only barely gestures toward a body held within its knot.
In this sense, James’s late style functions at the point where synecdochic
logic begins to break down as it elaborates a part at the expense of a whole
that is ostentatiously absent.
James’s term for this nonreferential matter is “promiscuous properties,”
a phrase that first of all reflects the typical understanding of adultery as a
threat to the orderly inheritance of the estate, a concern that finds its way
into and shapes the plots of all the late novels as the Verver fortune, the
Newsome family factory, and Millie’s “thumping bank account” seem in
danger of becoming floating inheritances or of being falsely assigned.
Further, the phrase “promiscuous properties” carries this sense of adulter-
ous, wayward matter into the domain of perception and, ultimately,
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ontology; it suggests that the qualities of material things become detached
from the things they’re proper to. They thus have the capacity to mix with
and meld together consciousnesses as textures, sheens, glazes, lights, and
smells seem to exist in the late Jamesian text without the need to stay sit-
uated within an object. In his book on Baudelaire, Sartre observes that the
smell of bodies was for Baudelaire a way of possessing the body of anoth-
er—“the smell of a body is the body itself ”—but it is also the possession
of a body “with the flesh removed, a vaporized body which has remained
completely itself but which has become a volatile spirit.” Such scents,
Sartre concludes, are “at once bodies and, as it were, the negation of the
body.”5 In The Ambassadors, James conveys a very similar conception of
decorporealized embodiment through the sense of smell, as in the “soft fra-
grance” Maria exudes in Strether’s pretheatre dinner with her, or in the
“charming scent” that, Strether explains to Waymarsh, made him linger in
Chad’s flat: “I don’t know what to call it . . . It’s a detail, but it’s as if there
were something—something very good—to sniff ” (21:50, 105). Both are
presumably scenes of adultery (as the contrast between Maria and Mrs.
Newsome underscores in the first, and as Waymarsh’s question about
whether Chad “live[s] there with a woman” underscores in the second); in
both, the adulterous relation that is not quite visible but only presumed is
reenacted at the level of the senses, reenacted as a tiny sensory plot that
operates in a zone between the emphatically physical body and its vapor-
ization into what Sartre calls “volatile spirit.”
James is at his most materialist, then, at the point where matter can’t be
held to or contained within the objects and bodies to which it rightfully
belongs. In saying that James is at his most materialist at this point, I mean
to underscore the way in which the extreme focus on consciousness in the
late novels is conceived according to a bodily model: the small sensory plots
that compose so much of the late Jamesian text account for and count as
consciousness, even as they mold themselves after a larger, largely absent
plot about adulterous bodies, a plot that is wholly inferential, never spoken,
only assumed and disowned. The Sacred Fount, the novel that prefaces the
major phase, is James’s full-length study of this displacement and dispersal
of the adulterous body into the realm of the intellect, for in hypothesizing
that one lover siphons off the wit and intelligence of another, the novel
places at its center a metaphor that displaces bodily matter even as that
metaphor is impossible to understand without imagining it in bodily terms:
it is hard to think of exchange without thinking of substance, and hard to
think of persons exchanging something without thinking of either objects
or, in this case, the bodily fluids swapped in sexual union.
The connections drawn in late James among adultery, matter and prop-
erty, and consciousness are ones at least latently present from the origins of
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modern British philosophy; an exploration of the relations and metaphor-
ic resemblances among some key concepts in Locke’s thought will clarify
how adultery, mixed matter, and thinking verge on each other’s domains
and employ each other as examples. In The Second Treatise of Government,
Locke famously defines property as whatever man has “remove[d] out of
the State” of nature, “mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something
that is his own.”6 Locke’s theory of property relies on the concept of mix-
ing, a concept that in turn is based on the inalienability of what the body
has incorporated, physiologically made part of itself. Developing his defi-
nition through the example of harvesting acorns, Locke argues that the
acorns become one’s own as soon as one picks them up. But the whole
example is prefaced by an assertion of the fact that whoever “is nourished
by the Acorns he pickt up under an Oak . . . has certainly appropriated
them to himself. No Body can deny but the nourishment is his.” Similarly,
Locke earlier in the same chapter observes that “The Fruit, or Venison,
which nourishes the wild Indian . . . must be his,” must become “a part of
him,” before it can fulfill its function.7 This theory of property, which
finds its inarguable base in bodily fact, cannot be wholly disentangled
from Locke’s theory of cognition; indeed, owning and knowing will
remain entangled in Anglo-American philosophy for hundreds of years
(they remain emphatically so for William James, for instance).8 Hence the
mind in Lockean epistemology is imagined in similar terms, as a “Store-
house” “furnished” with objects of knowledge, a “stock” of “materials,”
“plain Idea[s]” it can grasp. Possessive individualism becomes a model for
cognition not only because the Lockean mind knows by acquiring, but
also because it forms a “Collection” out of the material it acquires, a col-
lection it keeps in a “Store-house”; both the contents of the mind and its
nature as a container are thus shaped after things that epitomize owner-
ship.9 The very idiom with which Locke characterizes thinking—“mixed,”
“flow,” “properties,” and “figures”—reflects a model of bodily appropria-
tion; thinking in Locke is the mixing of cognitive labor with the world,
and that account implicitly carries with it and derives much of its intuitive
appeal from the mixing of bodies and substances.
Perhaps this commitment is why, in explaining the nature of “mixed
Modes” or abstract ideas, Locke gives as one example the “Idea of
Adultery,” for adultery inheres in an improper mixture of bodies that
reflects the type of thinking Locke is trying to explain at the same time
that it only exists between bodies and so is irreducible to substance. As a
complex (as opposed to simple) idea, adultery is for Locke empirically
wayward, almost licentious, resistant to referential precision; in forming
such ideas, “the Mind takes a liberty not to follow the Existence of Things
exactly.” Such ideas are formed without comparison to “the real Existence
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of Things,” are not verified and perhaps not even verifiable through an
examination of “Nature” (429). Hence adultery emerges in the Essay as
both wholly embodied and wholly abstract: wholly embodied because it
obliquely reflects the Lockean devotion to mixed matter and because it is
a name for something bodies do, and wholly abstract because it names no
one substance and is left unsubjected to ocular proof.
This chain of overlapping metaphors in Locke’s philosophy usefully
highlights the structure imagined for consciousness in late James. It brings
forward, first of all, the image of the mind as a storeroom, a cabinet, clos-
et, or gallery, in which James’s protagonists lodge their perceptions, their
“accumulations,” as The Golden Bowl puts it, of the hints and dark glim-
mers of an adultery plot unraveling around them (24:14). In What Maisie
Knew, this “collection of images and echoes to which meanings were
attachable” is housed in a “dim closet” with “high drawers,” a “receptacle”
in which stray remarks of Maisie’s promiscuous parents are “tumbled”
together (11:12). In The Golden Bowl, this space is figured as “a roomful
of confused objects, never as yet ‘sorted,’” a “confusion” or “heap” of things
Maggie knows she doesn’t know, a closet that is her own version of
Amerigo’s “cabinet” containing all the things he knows intimately well
(24:14; 23:46). In The Sacred Fount, this space is a “little gallery,” “a small
collection,” a “museum” of adulterous couplings (29). A long and volumi-
nous tradition of commentary centered on consciousness in late James has
often obscured the principle that these passages make striking: conscious-
ness in these fictions becomes thinkable, representable, susceptible to
being given a structure through adultery. Adultery makes consciousness
graphic, and the material properties of adulterous bodies, which I have
argued always give off on the world of things, are what make the process
of thinking in late James seem substantial, concrete, replete with tangible
acquisitions. Consciousness only acquires the minimum degree of opacity
necessary for representation when it is adulterated.
But if James falls in line with Locke’s account of the mind as a storehouse,
he also perceives the instability of the matter he places there: in the passages
quoted above, material instabilities convey epistemological ones as James’s
prose hovers between construing matter as significance and matter as con-
crete substance that slides away from its signifiers. As in Locke’s Essay, adul-
tery in late James is a coupling of bodies that fails to inhere in any substance
and so uncouples words from their referents. Hence the figure of the store-
house is in these fictions emphatically materialist and referentially troubled
at the same time. In The Golden Bowl, the “confused objects” Maggie accu-
mulates make up a “mass of vain things, congruous, incongruous,” a “heap”
(24:14–15). Evidence of promiscuity is itself promiscuously intermingled,
“never as yet ‘sorted.’” Like a mass of secondhand goods, cognitive property
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is here so jumbled that things appear to slide away from their names even as
they take on momentary “affinit[ies]” with each other; they are hence “con-
gruous” and “incongruous,” slipping away from referents while sometimes
sticking to each other in new and alarming combinations (24:14, 15). In
Maisie, such objects of knowledge are a “tumbled” “assortment” of things “to
which meanings were attachable,” a phrase that casts the relation between
signifier and signified into a materialist idiom even as that relation is undone
by the very copiousness of this jumble of matter (11:12). In The Sacred
Fount, the narrator thinks of his own mind as a “museum” that contains
embodied questions: he thinks of his collection of transformed adulterers as
“the museum of those who put to me with such intensity the question of
what had happened to them” (29). They are materialized aporias, then,
turning figures that are simultaneously understood as solid bodies and
ungraspable flow.
The image of the cogito as storehouse oscillates in another important
way as James’s names for it shift between characterizing it as a private
“closet” and a public “museum” and so shift between thinking of it as a
place where goods are consumed in solitude and a place where goods are
publicly displayed but never used up. These images are nearly interchange-
able for James, as they are for much of the prehistory of the museum, in
which private cabinets serve as quasi-public signs of status and in which
civic museums originate in the collection of an individual.10 The Ververs’
career as collectors is a study in this shifting boundary between private
goods and public treasures as they travel with their “smaller pieces” that
they “arrange” in their hotel rooms (to make these transiently private com-
mercial spaces “less ugly,” Maggie says), store their larger pieces in “ware-
houses, vaults, banks, safes, wonderful secret places” on the Continent,
and plan a municipal museum for American City (23:13). Maggie’s men-
tal “closet” carries with it, then, a sense of ambivalent movement between
the deeply subjective and the openly shared: consciousness in late James is
construed in terms of a figure that very nearly forms a continuous surface
between highly private spaces and places of public access. Indeed, the
sense in the late novels that consciousness can be externalized depends in
large part for its sense, its comprehensibility, on the material practices I
have been highlighting, the practices of collection and display.11
These indeterminacies in the storehouse metaphor—between public
and private, between the materially sticky and the referentially slippery,
between embodiment as something graspable and as ontologically fluid—
replicate the scene of adultery. For in the late fiction, the art gallery
becomes for James the locus of the adulterous couple, and the processes by
which bodies give off on each other and objets d’art give off on bodies
become fused. The museum, the headquarters of high culture, becomes a
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space of promiscuous properties; James’s last fictional account of what I
will call the matter of culture lies in this recurrent association of illicit or
barely licit sex with the highly valorized, nearly officially sanctioned prac-
tice of museum-going. By the word “culture,” I mean both the narrower
sense of personal cultivation through exposure to works of art and the
broader sense of all a society’s forms, objects, and attitudes; my argument
is that in his gallery scenes, James is concerned with the material blurring
or blending of these senses and that gallery-going, with its combination of
static of works of art and directionless, even random movement of specta-
tors, epitomizes his sense of daily life as the endless equivocation between
persons and things. As I have already briefly sketched, the figure of the
gallery is furthermore the image that blurs the difference between the
Jamesian investment in consciousness and the Jamesian investment in
embodiment which, I have argued throughout this book, underwrites and
is itself overwritten by James’s epistemological and psychological interests.
In the homology between the mind figured as storehouse and the gallery
figured as the scene of promiscuity, the distinction between the cognitive
flexibility of which James’s protagonists are so capable and the bodily flex-
ibility of which his adulteresses are so capable dissolves.
In a bracing footnote in Capital, Marx defines “the only materialist” his-
toriography as one that uncovers how abstractions and apotheoses arise
from “the earthly kernel,” “the actual, given relations of life.” The history
of technology is what produces “every particular organization of society,”
even when that social form seems most abstracted from the machines, the
concrete arrangements of tools and laborers, that have made it.12 While my
goal is more modest than those of Marx’s philosophy of history, I am going
to begin my reading of James’s adulterous matter in the same spirit by
claiming that the abstractions of the late fiction originate in a highly par-
ticular moment and a specific turning body in a novel of the late 1880s, A
London Life.
Squarely centered on—and ultimately decentered by—adultery, A
London Life announces itself early on as a novel about the “duplicity” of
objects, of houses and decor, of the interior architecture of upper-class
England (10:292). James’s American heroine, Laura Wing, sees the settings
characteristic of English country life as producing the gentry and holding
in place the persons it has made. “English things” have the “bright durable
sociable air” of “being meant for daily life, for long periods, for uses of high
decorum”; they tell a “story” of stasis, “of a comfortable, liberal, deeply
domestic effect, addressed to eternities of possession” (10:271, 291). The
estate that Laura’s sister Selina has married seems like “immutabl[e] ‘prop-
erty’” (the quotation marks in the text suggest not just the iteration of the
idiom as a constantly invoked description, but also the term’s potential
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undoing) (10:270). Lady Davenant, the aged friend of the family dowa-
ger, personifies this sense of “symbolic security” conveyed by the knick-
knacks characteristic of the upper-class drawing room; seeing her seated
amidst “chintz and water-colour,” Laura has a momentary glimpse of how
comforting it would be to “jump all the middle dangers of life,” pass
through the awkward hazards of courtship and desire, and arrive “at the
end safely, sensibly, with a cap and gloves and formulas and phrases”
(10:283). The image of security in this novel, its very picture—Lady
Davenant is both “full of life” and more like a “fine portrait than . . . a liv-
ing person”—is that of a woman nestled among her things, her habitual
accessories that are so thoroughly established that it’s not clear whether
they’re her own innovations or ones inherited from her forbears (10:272).
As this nearly impossible image of the living but static portrait sug-
gests, what stabilizes the social order in A London Life is a most precari-
ous ontology. While the early pages of the novel manage to bring a dia-
grammatic neatness to their vision of upper-class culture, every one of the
figures they advance hovers on the edge of logical impossibility, carries
with it the germ of its own disintegration. The static “story” told by the
accoutrements of country life is barely a story. The watercolors and
chintz, which image security, seem too amorphous or flimsy to serve as
things that could anchor a social structure, even symbolically. Property is
by definition not “immutable,” but alienable. More precisely, the relation
between persons and the objects that should hold those persons in place
is a hazardous one, prone to detachment and to new and promiscuous
combinations: bodies in A London Life tend to come unglued from the
concrete things that might stabilize them and to mix indiscriminately
with alien matter. The text explicitly names these slippages as a problem
of reference: thinking of the “stable-stamped composition” of her randy
brother-in-law Lionel and of the “fine things,” like “the sweet old wain-
scoted parlour,” that surrounded his upbringing, Laura wonders, “what
visible reference was there” in the former to the latter? (10:291). Such set-
tings, Laura concludes, convey a “sense of . . . curious duplicity (in the
literal meaning of the word)”; they project a tone of “peace and deco-
rum,” while the real “spirit” that “prevail[s]” is “contentious and impure”
(10:292). By the “literal meaning” of “duplicity,” Laura appears to mean
the figurative one: while the more usual sense is “deceitfulness,” the liter-
al sense is merely “the state or quality of being numerically or physically
double” (OED). Duplicity is itself doubled between the sense of a cun-
ningly false front and the sense of physical doubling; the loss of referen-
tial hold yields a text where the literal and the figurative keep turning,
keep exchanging places. For perhaps Laura does mean the literal here in
the sense of the doubled bodies of the adulterous couple, the beast with
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two backs, the “monstrous” creations generated when the hold objects
have on persons gives way (10:321).
Uncontainable within any single figure, this duplicity is nonetheless
exemplified by the body of the adulterous woman, in this case Laura’s sis-
ter, Selina, for whom trips to Parisian dressmakers serve as minimal cover
for trysts with her lover, Captain Crispin. From the beginning, the text
cannot decide whether Selina is a “foreign element” that has poisoned the
estate, introducing desires that cannot be held in place, or whether some-
how the estate has corrupted her American innocence. While Selina and
her “doings” seem to Laura wholly “discordant” with the values material-
ized by Mellows, the country house, there is still a suspicion—one clearly
enunciated but left unrationalized—that at Mellows Selina “had found her
occasion, all the influences that had so transformed her” (10:271–2). The
adulterous woman cannot quite be relegated to some social margin here
because she exemplifies and exaggerates both the text’s model of culture
and the weak point of that model: Selina’s “flexib[ility]” and acquisitive-
ness, her ability to accept so readily “the mark of her couturière,” are both
ideal and deviant (10:320). In other words, the same material processes
that produce a person designated as “wife” or “mother” are the ones that
threaten to undo that designation. A London Life tends to understand per-
sons as generated and perfected by the objects from which they must some-
how remain distinguishable. To use the text’s own characteristic figure for
this difficult position, persons must be portraits framed by their material
circumstances, but only framed by them, not mixed with or adulterated by
them. Even so, objects are the “frame” that has “made” persons into ideal
“picture[s],” into “the perfection of human culture” (10:292). And as the
texts and episodes discussed in chapter 4 indicated, frames can be points
of traffic instead of rigid boundaries.
It is not surprising, then, that the frame of reference will be definitive-
ly broken in a museum scene, a scene that merges the disorienting confu-
sion of person and thing with the adulterous disruption of marriage.
Museums are almost by definition places for objects that have floated free
of their contexts, come unstuck from their referents, and merged into new
combinations; perhaps that is why James habitually associates them with
sexual desire and thinks of them as likely settings for relatively chaste
courting (Strether, having married young, had “missed the time natural in
Boston for taking girls to the Museum” in The Ambassadors), or for more
random and less licensed encounters (Kate and Densher meet at a gallery
opening in The Wings of the Dove) (21:52). In A London Life, this associa-
tion of the museum with the collapse of context is at its strongest, for the
museum in question is the weird assemblage of architectural models, clas-
sical busts and fragments, funerary urns, mirrors, landscapes, portraits, a
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human skeleton, a model of Stonehenge, and an Egyptian sarcophagus,
crafted by the architect Sir John Soane (1753–1857) in the building
adjoining his house in Lincoln’s Inn Fields in London.
Recent studies of the cultural poetics of museums place strong empha-
sis on the rationalized narratives museums make out of their objects, and
on the ways that objects wrenched out of original context are systemati-
cally classified into an artificial and hegemonic unity. In his disciplinary
critique Rethinking Art History, Donald Preziosi writes that “everything
takes place in the museum in some eternal contemporaneity; all
diachrony, all difference, all multivocality is enframed in synchronicity.”
The museum “orchestrates . . . contradiction into a single visible field” and
“situates all objects within . . . spaces that evoke and elicit a proper view-
ing stance and distance.”13 This description is largely what the Soane
Museum is not, nor is it the way nineteenth-century museum-goers expe-
rienced what they saw. Indeed, James almost directly answers this under-
standing of the museum as hegemonic in his description of the Soane col-
lection as one of “heterogeneous objects,” a “queer” collation of “thing[s]
you couldn’t find anywhere else” (10:356–57). Further, Soane was far
more a connoisseur of spatial disorientation than a classificatory thinker,
and his principles of composition owed at least as much to the sensibility
governing the Gothic novel as it did to a Palladian ideal of order. An early
admirer of Piranesi’s etchings, Soane recreated their visual disorienta-
tions—their confusion of surface and depth—in his chambers, particular-
ly in the basement area known as the Crypt, where the climax of James’s
novel takes place.14
Everything about Laura’s journey down into the Crypt defies rational-
ization: she is going there with Mr. Wendover, a man she has picked up at
one of her sister’s receptions and so a man who, for all his seeming innocu-
ousness, is also associated with Selina’s adulterous household; the city
appears a great “labyrinth” through which one must “thread” one’s way;
the Museum itself, although a public institution, is also “one of the most
curious things in London and one of the least known” and seemingly
empty of other visitors (10:355, 356). Along the way downstairs, Laura
and Wendover inspect “the sarcophagi, the mummies, the idols,” and then
admire Soane’s collection of Hogarths (Soane owned The Rake’s Progress),
paintings redolent of the adulterous atmosphere Laura has come to the
Museum to escape. The effect of the strange antiquities similarly intensi-
fies the anxious-making “duplicity” of things in the earlier scenes at the
country house: “there were uncanny unexpected objects Laura edged away
from and would have preferred not to be in the room with,” phrasing that
itself edges away from its objects and, in doing so, associates those objects
with the kind of impure woman one ought not to visit or even name
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except by such syntactic indirection (10:357). As a thunderstorm gathers
its force (this scene pulls out every Gothic stop), the labyrinthine quality
of the “dim irregular vaults” and “little narrow avenues” intensifies, as does
the “ambiguous sinister look” of the fragments and figures, until the jour-
ney downward and inward ends where all journeys through a labyrinth
do—with a discovery of the monstrous, perpetually turning figure:
“It’s very fearful—it looks like a cave of idols!” [Laura] said to her
companion; and then she added, “Just look there: is that a person or
a thing?” As she spoke they drew nearer the object of her reference—
a figure half blocking a small vista of curiosities, a figure that
answered her question by uttering a short shriek as they approached.
The immediate cause of this cry was apparently a vivid flash of light-
ning, which penetrated into the room and cleared up both Laura’s
face and that of the equivocal person. The girl recognised her sister,
as Mrs. Lionel had unguardedly recognised hers. “Why, Selina!”
broke from her lips before she had time to check the sound. At the
same moment the figure turned quickly away, and then Laura saw it
accompanied by another, a tall gentleman with a tawny beard that
shone in the dusk. These wanderers retreated together—melted away
as it were, disappearing in the gloom or in the labyrinth of wonders.
(10:357–58)
At the center of the labyrinth in Ovid lurks the Minotaur, half-bull, half-
human, a monstrosity born of the adulterous affair of Minos’s wife and hid-
den away in Daedalus’s spatially disorienting maze, a maze Daedalus con-
structed by “confusing the usual marks of direction, and leading the eye of
the beholder astray by devious paths winding in different directions.”15
Spatial and sexual confusion are traditionally linked in this way, a tradition
James follows as he locates his Hogarthian plot in a Piranesian setting,
exploiting the varied properties of the Soane Museum by finding the thread
between them. The turning figure, “the equivocal person,” here is momen-
tarily indistinguishable from a thing and so is a hybrid creature, half one sub-
stance and half another, like the Minotaur. Already duplicitous, this figure is
redoubled by the presence of her lover, a figure presumably intertwined with
hers. Hence as an “object of reference,” the figure escapes Laura’s perceptual
grasp and escapes the firm mooring of the marriage contract even as this
groundlessness itself becomes an account of the material world. The equivo-
cations of adultery and the equivocal relation between persons and things
become indistinguishable in this passage set in Soane’s Crypt, a place which
spatializes the loss of reference points, points by which the eye may orient
itself. Consequently, the passage actually spatializes the Jamesian lie (Selina
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has lied about what she is doing on this afternoon, saying that she will be
visiting a friend who is ill) because it maps onto an architectural space the
endlessly protean, ceaselessly malleable quality that James’s liars bestow upon
the world around them.16
In this scene, then, James materializes the adulterous loss of reference
that will be a hallmark of the late fiction; the last major novels are tales
from this Crypt, narratives that unfold and disperse the disorientations of
this episode in A London Life. In this scene set in a collection, James gath-
ers together the tropes of the late fiction, focuses within a narrow space the
uncanny ontology that will characterize the novels of adultery. On their
way down to the museum’s basement, Laura and Wendover take time to
inspect the “medals” and “pagodas,” images that will figure Amerigo and
his adulterous liaison with Charlotte in The Golden Bowl. The pagoda in
the later novel would appear to be a fundamentally different sort of object
than it is in A London Life because it is a purely mental image, a metaphor
with which Maggie pictures to herself her life’s strangely mixed filial and
marital attachments. But what is striking is how many of its material prop-
erties the pagoda retains as it is transformed into an object of cognition, a
thing that exists only in the space of metaphor. For example, Maggie
imagines the pagoda as creating an area around itself for her to
“circulate[e]” in, “a space that sometimes seemed ample and sometimes
narrow,” a space that recreates on a purely metaphorical level the wavering
dimensions of the museum in A London Life (24:3–4). The pagoda of The
Golden Bowl is “impenetrable and inscrutable,” hence an object that
excludes Maggie even as it appears as an object enclosed within her con-
sciousness. An unrationalizable object, the pagoda is a structure shut up
within Maggie that shuts her out. A material thing with a hard objectivi-
ty—it is described as “plated with hard bright porcelain”—the pagoda has
an emphatically durable character, which makes it an odd choice for some-
thing that is so ontologically amorphous as a mental image. Finally, while
readers practically always take this pagoda as an image for adultery, doing
so means taking it as referring to nothing so much as a textual gap, a hole
in the novel’s account of relationships. For what is conceptually most dif-
ficult about images like this one in late James is that they have a lavish
material specificity—the pagoda is “coloured and figured and adorned at
the overhanging eaves with silver bells”—without the firm referential
moorings that should accompany such a finely specified image. Even if we
tacitly agree to fill in the epistemological gaps of the late fiction and take
a figure like this one as an image for adulterous relations, we are still left
with the image as a materially objective sign for the coming-loose of the
marital frame of reference adultery represents.
As the trajectory of this pagoda from A London Life to The Golden Bowl
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implies, the materialism without reference generated in the Soane Museum
is generalized in the late fiction; the slippages and adherences of the adul-
terous body can no longer be contained within a highly eccentric space like
the Crypt. Rather, the unmoored matter and the uncanny dimensions of
that episode in A London Life recreate themselves everywhere—in individ-
ual consciousnesses, in landscapes, in domestic interiors and public
spaces—until the logic of inside and outside (and even just the logic of in)
loosens and unravels. Spaces and contexts in the late James take on the
properties of the ribbon, an appurtenance that intimates the presence of a
body, is associated with adultery, and has no inside or outside. Or, to shift
to a metaphor even more central to these decentering texts, all spaces in the
late fiction become like the museum, a space that takes materialism as its
very basis, yet that can only barely contain its material properties within
any kind of context, a space constructed around the paradox of preserving
objects while also making their qualities ambulatory.
These claims would probably hold loosely true of museums throughout
history, but there are particular reasons for making them of museums as
conceptualized in the years around 1900, reasons that lend historical depth
to an understanding of James’s nonreferential materialism. Indeed, the mat-
ters of context and adulteration, the poetics of metamorphosis, and the
functions of the “storehouse” are explicitly at issue in the first history of the
museum, the Scottish historian David Murray’s three-volume Museums,
Their History and Their Use, published in 1904.17 Murray’s work is part of a
much larger effort to rationalize the curatorial profession and so to bring
structure to the kind of cornucopian jumbles that collections like the Soane
Museum represent; the Museums Association in Great Britain began hold-
ing an annual conference and publishing a monthly journal in the same
years as Murray was writing his history.18 For Murray, the contemporary
state of the museum is epitomized by a narrative of frustration he tells sev-
eral times over in his preface. He goes to a city or town museum and asks
for its handbook, only to be told that the proprietors “have lost all trace of
[their] catalogue” (viii). Even the British Museum is not immune to this ref-
erential crisis: it “possesses far more works on museums in general than any
other library . . . but it has not a complete collection of the works relating
to itself ” (viii–ix). The museum is a place where things have wandered away
from their names and origins, a situation repeated in the physical disarray
of the collections themselves, where “odds and ends,” things “presented to
the museum simply because they are old,” “gifts by friends in foreign
lands,” “birds, beasts, eggs, and fossil” are “huddled together in cabinets”
(265). Murray’s vision of the disordered museum is itself practically a study
in the poetics of adultery as the foreign, the decadent, and the bestial
promiscuously jumble together into an intimate confusion.
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In Murray’s history, as in the work of more recent historians of the muse-
um, such unstable matter is central to the museum’s origins. Even
Enlightenment collectors, Murray notes, were “too fond of monsters and
other things strange and unusual,” too fond of curiosities and objects that
had undergone inexplicable, marvelous transformations (195). Murray
dwells at length on the seventeenth-century taste for petrified objects (espe-
cially body parts), on the fascination with water that could supposedly turn
to stone, on the fixation on the story of Lot’s wife, turned to a pillar of salt
as she looked back at the lascivious cities of Sodom and Gomorrah (194,
196). This prototype of the perpetually turning, adulterous and adulterated
body lies at the center of Murray’s history not so much because of any
extraordinary historical influence she might bear, but because for him she
embodies the problem of the museum as a collection of objects that must be
held to a referential stability but which must also give up their properties
and promiscuously mix with other minds and bodies.
For while the disorderly museum is anathema to a classificatory thinker
like Murray, the properly structured museum is only barely more ontolog-
ically stable than the jumble it seems to replace. In Murray’s account,
museums are the exemplary cultural institution because their objects
escape the vicissitudes of value and the ravages of time; museums are bet-
ter than libraries because their “objects are not depreciated in value by
being passed through the hands of casual visitors or made vehicles of dis-
ease, as often happens with books,” which are mistreated by “so-called
reader[s] with foul clothes and filthy hands” (280). Yet museums must also
be “open to all alike,” providing “recreation and instruction for all class-
es”; “familiarity with [the museum’s] models insensibly cultivates the taste
and trains the eye” of the visitor (259, 270). Murray’s conception of the
museum is structured around the paradoxical goals of simultaneously con-
taining and disseminating culture, but as the modifier “insensibly” here
implicitly acknowledges, he has difficulty explaining how to do both at the
same time. Unlike many other commentators discussed earlier in this
study, Murray does not even move to a construction of looking as touch-
ing here as the structure of the museum cuts off the affiliations between
the visual and the tactile, which much of nineteenth-century thought had
woven together.19
But if Murray leaves a hole where his account of perception should
appear, other museum theorists explained the acquisition of culture
through metaphors of the porous, even the promiscuous, body. In
Museum Ideals, Benjamin Ives Gilman, the secretary of the Museum of
Fine Arts in Boston, wrote that “our enjoyment of a picture or a statue
grows by contagion from that of a companion”; “any fruitful interest in
fine art demands repeated contact with it.”20 Gilman’s metaphors here are
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those of bodily contact, of bodies giving off on each other, of persons min-
gling with art and bearing fruit, or at least “fruitful interest.” His
metaphors are, in other words, the figures of The Sacred Fount (1901), the
novel in which James so exaggerates his metaphor of the turning, trans-
forming body that bodies become almost too fluid to lend themselves to
convincingly realistic representation, exaggerates his metaphor of the body
that gives off so that lovers drain each other of vital fluids, and exaggerates
his metaphor of the prostheticized body so that at times all we see of a
character is a foot. All of these exaggerations yield a materialism without
reference, an instability of matter that James conveys most often in this
novel through the metaphor of the museum, which itself tends to spread
promiscuously throughout the text.
Of all James’s fictions, The Sacred Fount may be the most difficult to
materialize, the most resistant to the kinds of reading I have pursued in this
book. It is also strangely and frankly dependent on the body it nearly fails
to make a place for. Because this novel is so heavily invested in thinking, it
would seem the body disappears; as Sharon Cameron observes, The Sacred
Fount’s “subject is the narrator’s collusion with the thinking of other char-
acters about still other characters—his attempt to make those to whom he
confides his thoughts think as he does.”21 Cameron’s is the most logically
rigorous rendition of the traditional approach to this novel; it is always
taken as a comic meditation (sometimes also as a profound one) on inter-
pretation, on the endlessness of what the hypothesizing intellect can do, or
on the dangers of adopting too radically the observer’s role.22 It is never
taken as a meditation on the body because its epistemological concerns
seem wholly to have displaced ontological ones.
And yet this novel materializes thinking in such a radical way, renders
so substantial the metaphors for cognition, that it calls for the materialist
reading it seems just as radically to efface. “The sacred fount,” a figure in
the text for vitality and intellect, perpetually hovers on the brink of phys-
iological specificity; as I suggested earlier, it only makes sense if we imag-
ine it as a vampiric or sexual union. Hence James embodies the “Fountains
of Knowledge” with which Locke in the Essay characterizes the source of
our ideas (104). Similarly, the novel’s fascination with intelligence as some-
thing that can flow makes literal William James’s metaphor of the stream
of consciousness. It is as if in The Sacred Fount James set himself the goal
of rereading the epistemological tradition as if it were a materialist one.
Alternatively, it is as if he set for himself the experiment of testing his poet-
ics of the appurtenanced body: in a novel that seems to establish a world
of pure thought, set in a place only dimly adumbrated and centered on acts
that seem totally intellectual, how might the body and its objects reintro-
duce themselves, force their way back in?
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In a way, the question is slightly misleading because it almost answers
itself: the epistemological tradition is already a materialist one, figuring
itself in metaphors of the ownership of rarities (like Locke’s storehouse)
and the rushing waters of thought. This is a tradition James wholly hon-
ors in The Sacred Fount and in the late fiction generally; it is also a tradi-
tion he wholly decenters. He honors it in moments where The Sacred
Fount’s narrator conceives of his theories, his hypotheses about the sexual
liaisons that have so depleted one half of each couple, as his property; he
“guard[s] to the last grain of gold” his “precious sense of their loss, their
disintegration and their doom” (189). Here the narrator imagines himself
as a miser guarding his treasure; at other points he imagines himself as a
collector who arranges perceptions in his mind as if they were the bric-à-
brac that adorns a house, “a perfect palace of thought,” or paintings on the
walls of a private gallery or “exhibition” (214, 130). The two couples who
are the objects of his scrutiny become for him like “bronze groups” that
accessorize either of the “two ends of a chimney-piece” (130).
With these figures, James falls in line with the tradition of construing
things one knows as like precious things one owns; indeed, he very near-
ly literalizes that metaphor by making it one of the more finely tuned,
carefully detailed elements in his text. (This is true of The Golden Bowl ’s
pagoda, as well.) But James embraces this metaphor only to decenter it:
these objects the narrator collects have a material concreteness without any
firm referential hold on something in the world, something known for
which they serve as symbols. Indeed, for several reasons, it is hard to say
what the narrator’s bronze groups and horde of gold are. While they
should be purely metaphorical, they don’t stay firmly placed in the realm
of the figurative because the narrator seems a Jamesian type who really
does collect such things; it is hard to read his narrative without assimilat-
ing him to the category of sterile Jamesian dilettantes like Osmond in The
Portrait of a Lady or Sanguinetti in “Rose-Agathe,” who displace the emo-
tional life onto the material one. Yet this is one of those treacherous “trans-
lations into late James” that Ruth Bernard Yeazell warns of, one of those
moments in which we almost unavoidably, but also quite wrong-headed-
ly, fill in the blank spaces of the late fictions with our knowledge of what
the earlier fictions typically do in such vacancies.23 For unlike earlier man-
ifestations of this character-type, there is practically nothing to know the
narrator by; his name, age, physical appearance, and family are all wholly
absent. The “things” he “collects” have more ontological security than the
narrator does—the bronze groups and the gold serve the same function as
the objects that make Mrs. Gereth distinct in The Spoils of Poynton, for
instance—but here, that security is a false one.
These objects of property convey a thick sense of materiality without
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stable reference in another way because the perceptions they stand for may
be false; the gold may be fool’s gold, in other words. The Sacred Fount ends
with Mrs. Brissenden thoroughly routing the narrator’s theories, leaving
his hypotheses a “heap of disfigured fragments,” or so it seems: the ending
leaves the reader in a mild state of aporia over which lovers are feasting on
each others’ intellect and beauty and a stronger state of aporia over whether
this vampiric feasting is an actual phenomenon at all (214). Hence the fig-
ures that serve to crystallize knowledge take on a stronger sense of reality
than what they serve as figures for; James gives primacy to the metaphori-
cal texture of the epistemological tradition and then cuts the strands that
tie those metaphors to things outside themselves.
More precisely stated, the metaphors for knowledge in The Sacred Fount
are both referentially unstable and too close in nature to the objects of that
knowledge; they match the world outside them too closely and hardly
match it at all. On the one hand, these emphatically material objects are in
no certain relation to the world outside themselves because the knowledge
they symbolize may be wholly spurious. On the other hand, these objects
are so close in kind to the world of objets d’art that they symbolize knowl-
edge of—to the bibelots, galleries, and sculpture gardens of the great coun-
try estate that is the novels’ only setting—that they can hardly be symbols
at all; they are so much a part of what they should symbolize that they can-
not serve as abstractions, cannot make knowledge seem autonomous or
distinct or self-sufficient. The bronze groups, the horde of gold, the interi-
or gallery of paintings are all materially continuous with the world outside
the narrator’s mind at the same time they are referentially disconnected
from that world.
James stages these continuities and disconnections most explicitly in a
long scene set in the great estate’s picture gallery. The narrator draws May
Server into the gallery in order to watch her; he is convinced she has sur-
rendered her intellect to some lover he cannot identify and he is bent on
verifying his thesis. This particular gallery seems a very different place from
the Crypt of the Soane Museum; it is ordered, light, and refined, not jum-
bled and dark. But it spatializes the promiscuous mixing of properties any-
way, as its “high frescoed ceiling arch[es] over a floor so highly polished
that it seem[s] to reflect the faded pastels set, in rococo borders, in the
walls” (47). Everything here is in a state of reflection as material things
exchange their properties in a setting that will, like the Crypt, serve as the
scene of adulterous unions (albeit of more indeterminate couplings than in
A London Life) and that in its own way will, also like the Crypt, make
unclear whether “that is a person or a thing.”
As May enters the gallery, she becomes absorbed in its frescoed ceiling,
and the narrator becomes absorbed in watching her absorption:
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Mrs. Server, with her eyes raised to the painted dome, with response
charmed almost to solemnity in her exquisite face, struck me at this
moment, I had to concede, as more than ever a person to have a lover
imputed. The place, save for its pictures of later date, a triumph of
the florid decoration of two centuries ago, evidently met her special
taste, and a kind of profane piety had dropped on her, drizzling
down, in the cold light, in silver, in crystal, in faint, mixed delicacies
of colour, almost as on a pilgrim at a shrine. I don’t know what it was
in her—save, that is, the positive pitch of delicacy in her beauty—
that made her, so impressed and presented, indescribably touching.
She was like an awestruck child; she might have been herself—all
Greuze tints, all pale pinks and blues and pearly whites and candid
eyes—an old dead pastel under glass. (48)
May is here a likely adulteress because, this passage opens by saying, she is
susceptible to mixing, aesthetically permeable. The “piety” she feels is a
“profane” one, and the sexual flow of the novel’s title here becomes the
flow of paint which has regained its liquid quality and dropped down on
May, transforming her into a painted lady. She is both revitalized by the
painting because it touches up her “pale pinks and blues” and petrified by
it as she becomes “an old dead pastel under glass.” She is, then, both a
crystallized figure, durable enough to figure as an object in a collection,
yet perpetually in a state of flowing transformation.
The novel’s interests in adulterous and material exchanges become
indistinguishable here as the narrator’s supposition that lovers have
“rubbed off on each other” becomes a description of the relation between
persons and things, as well (26). The gallery in this scene is a museum of
equivocal figures, just as the narrator assembles his little “gallery—the
small collection . . . the museum of those who put to me with such inten-
sity the question of what had happened” to change them so (29). These
two museums—one presumably inside the mind and one presumably out-
side it—themselves mix and swap attributes even though their status as
representations of each other is wholly undecidable: it is not clear how one
would determine whether the figures the narrator mentally collects are
reliable reflections of the characters he sees in the gallery. The collection,
the storehouse, the image of achieved knowledge is literalized and redou-
bled in this scene; the metaphorical texture of the figure for cognitive
acquisitions is thus exaggerated, even as its material properties keep undo-
ing the possibility that the figure does, in fact, signal the attainment of
some reliable knowledge.
The central painting in this gallery scene continues this development
of a destabilizing materialism and embodied equivocation because it por-
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trays a man with a mask but renders it undecidable which is the mask and
which the real face. The figure’s own face is “pale, lean, livid,” and
“whitened”; he holds in his hand
an object that strikes the spectator at first simply as some obscure,
some ambiguous work of art, but that on a second view becomes a
representation of a human face, modelled and coloured, in wax, in
enamelled metal, in some substance not human. The object thus
appears a complete mask, such as might have been fantastically fitted
and worn. (50–51)
Of all James’s turning figures surveyed in this book, this is one of the most
unstable. Its instabilities, furthermore, serve as an icon for culture as The
Sacred Fount conceives it, and as an icon for adultery. The dead face the
figure wears is an image for the depleted half of each couple; the lively
mask (if it is lively) serves as an image for the other half that has absorbed
its lover’s vitality. Yet as the narrator and the other characters stare at the
painting, their visions differ radically; the painting has the quality of an
optical illusion susceptible of two readings that exclude each other. Thus
May Server can only see the mask as an “awful grimace,” while the narra-
tor sees it as “blooming and beautiful” (51). The narrator therefore entitles
the painting The Mask of Life, while May calls it The Mask of Death. Like
the wavering figures studied in the first and second chapters of this book,
vitality itself is potentially lodged in an accessory, the “ambiguous work of
art” that turns out to be a mask. The portrait here is itself an image of an
economy between body and object, one that will not sit still. That the
mask looks like May Server and the real face like Guy Brissenden, anoth-
er of the depleted lovers, emphasizes the way that this portrait is practical-
ly unframeable, is both itself in motion and forges ambiguous and so
mobile connections to those who view it.
This painting in The Sacred Fount points to the most famous ekphras-
tic moment in the late fiction, Strether’s encounter on the river with Chad
and Madame de Vionnet, a scene in which a landscape by Émile Lambinet,
glimpsed by Strether in a Boston gallery in his youth, comes startlingly and
beautifully to life. Here I would like to turn to The Ambassadors, and to
that scene in particular, to indicate more fully how the unstable ontology
of adultery and its materialist slipping of reference become for James a cul-
tural model, a way of grasping the unstable physicality of aesthetic experi-
ence. All along in this book, I have been seeking to explain the place James
assigns the body and its objects by studying instances of what he some-
times calls “rubbing off on,” as in The Sacred Fount’s description of lovers
as people who’ve “rubbed off on each other” (26). In the texts studied in
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these chapters, these acts of abrasion, scoring, stroking, cutting, determin-
ing distinctions and grades, taking possession, or turning pages have
always carried with them problems of containment. These texts have per-
sistently located acculturation within a fluid interchange between the
body and its objects, a fluidity they have often had to work very hard to
oppose to more disorderly cultural realms, as in The Spoils of Poynton. At
other moments, James has registered the pressure of objects as a deeply
and disturbingly conservative cultural force, one that carries within itself
the source of its own undoing, since the relation between person and thing
always carries the potential to destabilize fixed identities; that is the way
James figures the relation between bodies and objects in the country-house
culture of The Tragic Muse and A London Life. Because James understands
culture as so thoroughly a matter of mixed matter, made up of substances
of different orders and generated by processes of endless reproduction,
there is always the potential in his fictions for unpredictable combinations
that cannot be held in place or attached to a stable referent.
This uncontainable instability is dramatized—even uneasily celebrated,
if celebration can be uneasy—in those moments in the late fiction where
James dissolves the fixity of material things and lets their properties lique-
fy. One of these moments comes in The Ambassadors, in one of the early
Parisian scenes, where James reworks and undoes an aestheticist cliché:
[Strether’s] greatest uneasiness seemed to peep at him out of the
imminent impression that almost any acceptance of Paris might give
one’s authority away. It hung before him this morning, the vast
bright Babylon, like some huge iridescent object, a jewel brilliant
and hard, in which parts were not to be discriminated nor differences
comfortably marked. It twinkled and trembled and melted together,
and what seemed all surface one moment seemed all depth the next.
(21:89)
The passage almost frankly reworks Pater’s mandate, in The Renaissance,
to live a life of aesthetic entrancement: “To burn always with this hard,
gem-like flame, to maintain this ecstasy, is success in life.”24 James revers-
es the order of Pater’s trope here, since he makes the jewel the more liter-
al component of the metaphor and the melting flame the more figurative
half, whereas Pater did just the opposite. Thrown in reverse, the metaphor
exaggerates the protean nature of the self that was a hallmark of Pater’s
thought: the image in James’s hands becomes almost counterintuitive,
since jewels have a proverbial hardness that precludes melting. This loos-
ening of properties from their objects happens in this passage under the
sign of adultery: Babylon is a stock image of the sensual and licentious,
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“the whore of Babylon” a catch phrase lurking behind this passage that
thus faintly associates the fluidity of the scene with the kind of flexible
woman we have encountered so often in James’s texts.
In the scene on the river, much later in the novel, Strether spends the day
wandering around the landscape, which he experiences as if it were the
Lambinet he did not buy years ago in the gallery in Tremont Street in
Boston. The scene is one of “mixture” and of “liberties”: the remembered
landscape mixes with the actual one, and this happens as Strether gives him-
self up to a randomly chosen destination and to a sort of vacation from the
strain of his role as go-between and confidant (22:246, 248). Like the pas-
sage that imagines Paris as a Babylonian jewel, this scene is headed toward
the image of the flexible female figure, a figure who will become real when
Chad and Madame de Vionnet appear as the collation of brush strokes that
complete the painting. But even before that moment, the scene is a licen-
tious one because the setting’s material surfaces resist fixity. This is so first
of all because of the ambiguities of landscape itself. In his aesthetic treatise
The Sense of Beauty (1896), George Santayana writes that “the natural land-
scape is an indeterminate object; it almost always contains enough diversi-
ty to allow the eye a great liberty in selecting, emphasizing, and grouping its
elements.” The natural landscape, Santayana concludes, is “promiscuous.”25
This kind of promiscuity appears in The Ambassadors in Strether’s sense that
the relations between these elements that make up this stretch of country-
side are wholly ambiguous: the river is “flowing behind or before” the vil-
lage; “one couldn’t say which” (22:252). While the scene seems to Strether
as if contained by the “oblong gilt frame” that had contained Lambinet’s
painting, this frame is one that “draw[s] itself out for him,” that stretches in
order to match itself to wandering perceptions. Landscape is understood
here as a setting that oscillates and wavers, a wavering that both Santayana
and James capture in the language of adultery.
In its relation between the painting and the real thing, the episode
destabilizes material surfaces in another way as well. Strether refers what
he sees to the painting he did not buy, the painting he has lost sight of.
Hence he sees this scene in terms dictated by a material referent that is
missing. Further, the scene oscillates in Strether’s vision between the view
of the French countryside before him and the view of that countryside as
glimpsed in the Boston gallery: “it was Tremont Street, it was France, it
was Lambinet.” As he circulates around this patch of countryside, Strether
feels the presence of the gallery’s maroon-colored walls, which had dis-
played Lambinet’s patch of “special-green vision” (22:246–47). Strether
sees the scene before him in terms of the gallery, in terms of a place that
traffics in cultural objects, that exists for the purpose of exchanging aes-
thetic properties.
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The indeterminacy of landscape and the spectral presence of the gallery
should prepare us for the famous moment which unfolds next, the appear-
ance of Chad and Madame de Vionnet, lovers who, Strether realizes before
he recognizes them, are “expert, familiar, frequent,” who know “how to do
it” (22:256). These figures are figured as “figures,” as elements that “had
been wanted in the picture.” Their physicality therefore hovers between a
frank sense of embodiment and a sense that they are not all that real but
more like the bodies in painting. These bodies are substantial ambiguities,
figures both in the sense of trope and in the sense of the shape of real flesh,
graphic both in the sense of representation and in the sense of an emphat-
ic physicality that promises to obviate the need for representation’s medi-
ating work. As the presence of the gallery, the painting, and the transfor-
mative powers of the Parisian setting suggest, James conceives of culture
in terms of turning bodies like these, bodies that lead Strether, and James
himself, to imagine “innumerable and wonderful things” (22:266).
PART II: PRACTICAL AESTHETICS132
Otten_CH6_2nd.qxp  4/19/2006  1:38 PM  Page 132
Part III
T h e  Mat t e r  o f  L i t e r a ry  Cr i t i c i s m
Otten_CH7_2nd.qxp  4/19/2006  1:39 PM  Page 133
Otten_CH7_2nd.qxp  4/19/2006  1:39 PM  Page 134
c h a p t e r  s eve n
Literary Studies as
Sublimated Physicality
he previous chapters have offered a redefinition of Jamesian ambiguityTas a matter of the body, its habitat, and its objects; in doing so, these
chapters have frequently mixed their idiom and their practice, sliding
between vocabularies and methods that emphasize trope and rhetoric and
those that emphasize embodiment as they make claims for identifying his-
torically specific formations. On the one hand, these chapters have tried to
physicalize James’s meanings and imagery, for example, replacing the mate-
rially amorphous concept of point of view with a shell of material things
that defines consciousness; on the other hand, these chapters have repeat-
edly made use of a terminology of figure, of missed reference, and of lin-
guistic indeterminacy. In other words, the turning body has brought with
it a methodological ambiguity, a slippage between the methods associated
with turns of phrase and those associated with the embodiment of mean-
ing—methods associated with deconstruction and those associated with
the history and politics of the body.
Rather than defending my own eclecticism (or the catachrestic diction
of contemporary literary studies in general), in this chapter I would like to
explore the relation between the two large movements in literary studies
upon which I have drawn; I want especially to reveal what they share, and
what the convergence of their terms means. As we will see, transformations
of the body—the body’s shifting shapes, the interplay between personal
identity and the concrete objects that nestle against it, and the architectur-
al spaces that supply it with a habitat and a definition—are crucial and
definitive (they define discourses that might otherwise seem to compete
with each other) for both deconstruction and materialism. This conver-
gence is not accidental; rather, it suggests that there is a material model
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powerfully at work at the centers of both deconstruction and materialism,
a model that is given its definitive shape in the late-nineteenth-century
aesthetics of daily life that I have been describing. The argument here will
be that we imagine and organize literary meaning and literary language by
means of conceptual structures, models derived from historically specific
complexes of objects in the physical world. In other words, I will be try-
ing to identify “the material unconscious” of much criticism produced in
North America in the last 30 years or so—to use the term by which Bill
Brown designates “literature’s repository of disparate and fragmentary,
unevenly developed, even contradictory images of the material everyday.”1
In the course of critiquing the emptiness of the concept of “the materiali-
ty of the signifier,” a stock phrase by which a great deal of theory laid claim
to deal with the realm of physical things, John Guillory argues that the
criticism that endlessly employed that term “produced no supporting
analysis of the concept of materiality itself.”2 What Guillory is pointing
out can be taken as the presence of an unnamed, unanalyzed concept of
materiality at the heart of literary studies; some of the features of that con-
cept are what I want to identify here. The purpose here, then, is to outline
the habitus that much literary criticism inhabits, the “structuring struc-
ture, which organizes practices and the perception of practices,” as Pierre
Bourdieu has named it.3 To give my claims focus, I will emphasize the
work of Elaine Scarry and Paul de Man.
The choice of de Man is problematic, perhaps at this date unwarrant-
ed—or even “bizarre,” as one reader of an early version of these pages put
it. It is especially problematic because I regard de Man’s work neither as a
historical artifact nor as a still-viable critical resource, but uneasily as both.
De Man has emerged as the bad conscience within the recesses of the dis-
cipline’s psyche; he is the figure whose career, after the discovery of the
anti-Semitic journalism written during World War II, presents us with the
anxiety that methods of interpretation have no ethical grounding; more
specifically, his example presents us with the worry that the philosophical-
ly informed, rigorous close reading so valorized in the discipline in the era
before cultural studies can proceed with a perfect unawareness of its own
political assumptions, implications, even its own moral grounding. For
the scandal of de Man is neither that the mature work is clearly continu-
ous with the very early fascist writings, nor that the mature work private-
ly critiques those early writings, but instead that it is impossible to know
which is the case.
As Catherine Gallagher put it, in an essay written shortly after the dis-
covery of the wartime journalism became public knowledge, “We have not
yet learned what it is we have to learn from the example of de Man.”4 But
de Man functions as a bad conscience—a part of the past one does not
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want to examine—for another reason as well, at least for those scholars
who worry, whether openly or privately, that the various abilities and
approaches that characterize his work are in danger of being lost, and that
the books have been prematurely closed on deconstruction and even on
theory. As Avital Ronell has recently written, “his ghost took something
down with it,” something like “an unprecedented insistence on rigor.”5
Perhaps, then, de Man’s example is still influential enough that it needs to
be read while also having receded enough that we can gain some purchase
on it. In any event, my goal here is to identify a conception of literary
meaning in de Man that has received no attention in the voluminous com-
mentary on his work, a conception that is also at work in a more recent
and enormously influential account of language and the body. I will be
emphasizing the material models by which de Man and Scarry structure
their work and focus their analyses; I will be looking at the concrete things
that give the conceptual its shape. As in the previous chapters, my empha-
sis will be on the turning body, the array of objects that surround that
body, and the house that contains and blends into all of them.
In a sense, de Man and Scarry put opposite emphases on a phenome-
non that they conceptualize very similarly. Both see the matter of reference
as what is at stake in the twists and transformations the body can be made
to undergo. For de Man, the turning body is a textual moment where lan-
guage confesses its hugely figurative nature; the turning body and its acces-
sories become the locus of “referential aberration,” places where the unde-
cidability between language as rhetorical trope and language as significa-
tion distills itself in its most dramatic form.6 Hence in “Semiology and
Rhetoric,” it is the inseparability of the body and the body’s motions—the
dancer and the dance—that epitomizes the intertwined and mutually
incompatible rhetorical and semiological sides of a text (11). In “Aesthetic
Formalization in Kleist,” it is the fencer who exemplifies the ways in which
language “always refers but never to the right referent,” and the
Marionettentheater, with its puppets turning on their lines, that exemplifies
the formalized nature of textuality and the accompanying loss of refer-
ence.7 In the famous reading of Rousseau’s Confessions, the purloined rib-
bon is the epitome of a “free signifier” (Allegories 289). In these examples,
language’s potential for endless signification is identified with the body and
its appurtenances. De Man’s late essays assemble a kind of catalog, a col-
lection of things that turn or spin or fold over; they collate a set of objects
oddly similar to the Jamesian ones I have been describing and find in those
objects properties that advance an argument of referential skepticism.
The body in Elaine Scarry’s The Body in Pain has a far more stubborn,
far denser materiality than the de Manian body seems to have; far from
being a figure that reveals the undecidability of linguistic propositions, it
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is a substance that makes reference stick. In Scarry’s account of wounding
and warfare, the incontestable reality of the wounded body “anchors” the
disputed issue that led to that wounding; abstract ideas and rhetorical
structures become real and convincing when they are tied to bodies that
have been damaged or destroyed, when they can be seen as reflected in a
horrific view of a battlefield strewn with corpses, for instance.8 But what
is important to note here is that the wounded body itself is “nonreferen-
tial”; whatever reference it held to the culture that shaped and identified
it has been undone by injury, and it will take on a new referential func-
tion only when it is tied to the outcome of a war, when its materiality is
linked with an idea, a piece of language, a political position (119). The
process of “making” works in precisely opposite fashion because it relieves
persons of pain, makes of them something more than the burden of their
embodiment, unlike wounding, which reduces persons to nothing but
their corporeality. What it means to have a body is only knowable if it is
externalized, projected into the made things around it that mime its struc-
ture, like a chair that mimes the backbone, the legs, the distribution of
bodily weight (290–91). As poems and paintings do more overtly, ordi-
nary things carry with them, on Scarry’s account, a representation of the
body; as William James says in a passage I quoted earlier, Scarry would say
that the body is never known by itself, but always through the mediation
of some other object (PP, 286).
In this entirely superficial survey, I have tried to emphasize a material
grain in the rhetorical critic and to emphasize the referential and hence
linguistic argument of the materialist one. This doubling of materialist
and rhetorical techniques becomes even more pronounced when de Man
and Scarry take up the same image. Early in The Body in Pain, Scarry ana-
lyzes the room, “the simplest form of shelter,” as simultaneously an
“enlargement of the body” and a “miniaturization of the world, of civiliza-
tion” (38–39). The room’s material attributes replicate yet “stand apart
from and free of” the body’s structure and functions. Walls, for example,
mimic the body’s potential to protect the self and so they externalize the
need to keep something internal and private; at the same time, windows
let in some of the outer world and so lead the room’s inhabitant to inter-
nalize something exterior to herself. Although she does not say so, Scarry
perceives the room as a lyric structure, endowing it with the hermetic per-
meability of a small poem in which a speaker simultaneously turns away
from and speaks to—closes off from and opens up to—a social world.9
When de Man takes up the image of Marcel’s room in Proust’s Du côté
de chez Swann, he takes up a passage that accords perfectly with the way
Scarry would later conceive of the fluctuating privacy of the room: for
Marcel, the room’s “almost closed blinds” that admit just “a glimmer of
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daylight” permit him to grasp “the total spectacle of the summer” in a way
he could not if he were taking a walk outside.10 This passage is specifically
about language—Marcel has retreated to his room to read—and its odd
claim that one can comprehend a totality in a “glimmer,” whereas immers-
ing oneself in that totality means experiencing it “by fragments,” becomes
in de Man’s reading a master-image for his account of figurative language
as he goes over the passage not once but twice in Allegories of Reading (14).
For de Man, the passage asserts the superiority of metaphor over
metonymy but advances that claim by means of the metonymic structure
it disavows. It hears in the sound of buzzing flies what Marcel calls a “nec-
essary link” to the summer day, and so claims a metaphorical identity
between them (A is B), yet it goes on to define that identity in images that
depend for their sense not on identity, but on the adjacency of metonym,
contingent associations like the “running brook” which, at the end of the
passage, relays the cool darkness of the room and which depends not on a
necessary connection, but on mere adjacency (13, 66). The room becomes
for de Man a physicalization of how literary language undoes itself; it
becomes the concrete image of deconstruction and the undecidabilities
that are that method’s indispensable foci.
The point I want to draw from this structure in de Man and its resem-
blance to Scarry’s materialism is fairly simple. A material structure that
might seem to stabilize historical criticism turns out to be a master image
of cultural and rhetorical ambiguity, turns out to keep on turning inside
into outside, keeps turning into each other a stubborn sense of the con-
crete and a slippery sense of rhetorical play. Turning to theory, we find it
repeating at a higher level of abstraction the oscillations I have been
describing in the first sections of this book: Scarry’s and de Man’s analyses
of the room find it a space halfway between the actual and the imaginary
(like Hawthorne’s parlor in “The Custom-House”), halfway between outer
and inner, halfway between a figure that epitomizes material shelter and a
figure that epitomizes a linguistic activity like reading.
I want to argue that James and his culture understand this oscillation as
itself a material process: the relation between rhetorical and bodily figure
is in James’s texts and milieu a matter of ceaseless “embellish[ment]” and
“disfigur[ation]” (to adapt terms I quoted earlier from the preface to Daisy
Miller), a matter of matter rubbing off on bodies, of artifact lending its
material properties to the persons who handle or violate or merely look at
it (LC 2:1277). Scarry and de Man present their rooms as endlessly gener-
alizable images, transhistorical models for how culture and literature work;
each theorist is completely frank about this claim, de Man writing that
“there is absolutely no reason why analyses of the kind here suggested for
Proust would not be applicable, with proper modifications of technique,
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to Milton or to Dante” (16–17), and Scarry generalizing her model of the
room into a structure of the city and then to the process of “civilization”
itself (39). But behind these images of the room hovers one more room
that de Man and Scarry never mention but that nevertheless guides their
interpretations; for this conception of domestic space as one that is simul-
taneously physical and “half-spiritualised,” that seems “actually to . . .
become a part of the texture of [the] mind,” epitomizes late-nineteenth-
century aestheticism, as the phrases I have just quoted from Walter Pater’s
“The Child in the House” suggest.11 For Pater, the relation between the
room and its inhabitant is one in which “inward and outward being” are
“woven through and through each other into one inextricable texture—
half, tint and trace and accident of homely colour and form, from the
wood and the bricks; half, mere soul-stuff, floated thither from who
knows how far.”12 This “inextricable texture” melds inner and outer,
weaves together body and appurtenance so tightly the seams barely show.
My point in bringing forward this image from Pater, and in noting its
similarities to the spatial images of Scarry and de Man, is to suggest that
these critics partake of and come at the end of a historical movement
toward the non-anxious identification of bodies and objects. The materi-
al relationships that are formed and re-formed in the rooms of Hawthorne
and William and Henry James and Pater yield, in both the deconstructive
and the materialist critic, an aesthetic that presents itself as endlessly gen-
eralizable and so detaches itself from the history of production and repro-
duction to which James himself is far more alert. In other words, both de
Man and Scarry present as a philosophical argument something that, I
have been indicating, is a historical formation. That history of bodies and
things—a contingent, variable, microeconomic reshaping of matter—
becomes in the work of these critics a conceptual, abstract way of organ-
izing literary meaning. This abstraction is what makes their work power-
ful; it is also one that in Scarry is a source of some tension or conflicted-
ness, while in de Man it becomes a formation that occludes his method’s
material foundations.
For while in The Body in Pain, Scarry developed a philosophy of mak-
ing easily transported across different economies and different material
worlds, ones separated by centuries, in the long essay “Work and the Body
in Hardy and Other Nineteenth-Century Novelists,” published the same
year she examined that aesthetic within and showed it arising out of a late-
nineteenth-century economy and a late-nineteenth-century cultural poet-
ics. Much more specifically, as Scarry reads Hardy, Dickens, Zola, and
George Eliot, it is those novelists’ concrete micronarratives that generate
what at the end of the essay she will frame as the diaphanous image of
beauty, the epitome of the aesthetic image. The “many small moments” of
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material precision in nineteenth-century realism—the genre’s ability to
take in a touch of fresh paint that gives off on passers-by as they enter
through a gate, or the intimate contact between an orchard-keeper’s hands
and the branches of his trees as the keeper prunes the branches and the
branches scratch his hands—are what underwrite the much larger claims
of The Body in Pain.13 As Scarry puts it with characteristic recursiveness,
the “human creature” is “forever rubbing up against and leaving traces of
itself . . . on the world, as the world is forever rubbing up against and leav-
ing traces of itself . . . on the human creature” (50).
Human creature/world/world/human creature: this chiasmus forms the
very center of Scarry’s aesthetic, as the reversal of The Body in Pain’s subti-
tle—The Making and Unmaking of the World—suggests. What the Hardy
essay makes clear about this theoretical model is that it transforms into a
general aesthetic a nineteenth-century philosophy of the body; alternative-
ly, it translates and condenses into a rhetorical trope the ways in which in
the nineteenth century real physical conditions were coded. This is true
first of all because the trace is crucial to Scarry’s thought: in focusing so
microscopically and so insistently on Dickens’s dirt or Hardy’s smudges of
paint or, in The Body in Pain, on Marx’s conception of the commodity as
“the materialized objectification of bodily labor” (247), Scarry imports
into contemporary aesthetics a nineteenth-century conviction that events
leave behind a material fragment as evidence that they have occurred, that
actions leave residues, that nothing is ever lost.14 It is true second of all
because the hand and the sense of touch are crucial and privileged for
Scarry’s attempts to embody meaning. In The Body in Pain, Scarry explic-
itly follows Engels in his emphasis on the hand as “the direct agent of mak-
ing” (253). But the Hardy essay reveals a less-obvious assumption that sus-
tains the aesthetics at work in both texts: all the senses are reconceived
according to the model of touch and reaching-out (“seeing” and “hearing”
are “forms of reach,” Scarry writes [74]). Hence the bodily experience and
the acts of making that Scarry generalizes so broadly in her book take as
their norm a tactile model, one that conceives of the body as interacting
with a world that is very close to it, a world in which objects are handcraft-
ed and in which things that are seen and heard are within the body’s grasp;
the large model at work here cannot readily assimilate the society of the
spectacle, for example, or a culture in which much of the work is done by
pushing buttons.15 Accompanying this emphasis on the sense of touch is a
third continuity between Scarry’s work and nineteenth-century thought
about the body—a conception arising out of Marx, but given greater speci-
ficity by sensation psychology—of the tool as a prosthesis, an extension of
the physical senses. Citing the psychologist James Gibson’s The Senses
Considered as Perceptual Systems, Scarry writes in both the Hardy essay and
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in The Body in Pain of the fact that “a person can literally ‘feel’ at the end
of a walking stick the grass and stones that are three feet away from his
hand, just as a person holding the handle of a scissors actually feels the
‘cutting action’ of the blades a few inches away.”16 This knitting-together
of human physiology with external implement is the continuity that Mark
Seltzer has named “the body-machine complex”; it is a habit of thought
that typifies both nineteenth-century realism’s way of treating the world of
objects, tools, and appurtenances and nineteenth-century psychology’s
focus on the sensorium.17 As has been noticed in chapter 2, in the
Principles of Psychology William James makes exactly the same observation
as Gibson does about the walking-stick effect and other tools, such as a
pencil or a knife, writing that sensations “migrate from their original local-
ity” into the implements that link—and blur the difference between—the
perceiving body and the perceived world (685). Hence when in The Body
in Pain Scarry writes of the “reach of sentience, and the unity of sentience
with the things it reaches,” she transforms into a trope the metamorphic
and mixed quality of the nineteenth-century body, the body whose edges
blur into a material margin that surrounds them, one from which they
cannot be easily distinguished (249).
A fourth way in which Scarry’s chiastic figuring of the body and its
habitat abstracts into a rhetorical pattern a nineteenth-century cultural
poetics is more general and more all-encompassing: it lies in Scarry’s focus
on the body itself, her reduplication of the “intense somatic bias” of nine-
teenth-century thought (as Cynthia Eagle Russett has called it), her
assumption that bodily shape and cultural change will be interrelated and
that the latter will always somehow involve the former.18 As Scarry con-
cludes in the penultimate paragraph of the Hardy essay, “all human acts
take place through and out of [the] body,” a claim that may be true but
that places no limits on the body as an explanatory device (82). In The
Body in Pain, this body is almost breathtakingly generalized into a
hermeneutically all-purpose body. One moment where this abstraction of
the historically specific into a generally applicable and hence philosophi-
cal language becomes most apparent is when Scarry quite frankly detach-
es Marx’s thought from its thorough critique of the inequities of nine-
teenth-century capitalism—Marx is too “often narrowly perceived in his
capacity as critic of western economic structures,” Scarry writes—and
instead views his work as a widely valid theory of the nature of things, “our
major philosoph[y] on the nature of material objects” (179). In this
moment (and admittedly it is an unusually broad one, for there are other
passages where Scarry does not suspend Marx’s involvement with the
specificities of factory labor and the workings of capital), Scarry simulta-
neously crosses out nineteenth-century contexts and adopts one of the
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nineteenth-century’s precepts, the one that makes the body the explana-
tion for everything or, more specifically, the one that holds that all com-
pelling explanations must involve and appeal to the materiality of the
body.
To grasp this move is to understand how the philosophical abstraction
of the body is itself a product of specific historical processes; it is to under-
stand that innumerable material processes underlie and keep current and
shade the usage of a term that can seem to stand apart from history. In the
Grundrisse, in a passage that Scarry does not consider, Marx theorizes
abstraction in ways that can be used to analyze the logic and even the his-
torical significance of her project. The passage is a powerful one because in
it Marx seeks to historicize not any particular economic manifestation but
the concepts of political economy itself. Alternately put, he seeks to reveal
as particular manifestations of economic history the abstractions that gov-
ern his own discipline. Taking labor as his example, Marx argues that this
abstraction, so basic to the thought processes of political economy, only
appears in its most general form when the types of labor have arrived at the
multiplicity of the kinds of work found in his own time: “As a rule, the
most general abstractions arise only in the midst of the richest possible
concrete development, where one thing appears as common to many, to
all.”19 Crucial to Marx’s explanation of how abstractions emerge is the
teemingness, the variegated and specialized nature of nineteenth-century
life, of “bourgeois society,” which is “the most developed and the most
complex historic organization of production”; labor becomes thinkable as
a general concept when “individuals can with ease transfer from one labour
to another” and “the specific kind is a matter of chance for them.”20 The
abstract concepts of political economy thus reflect a culture of material
flux, concrete change, and social randomness.
Applying Marx’s precept to the matter at hand, we can say that the body
in the nineteenth century becomes thinkable in abstract ways through the
incessant material changes it undergoes and the stylistic variations it takes
on. The freestanding body, susceptible to the generalizations of theoretical
claims, is generated by contingency; Charlotte’s scarf in The Europeans,
Rose-Agathe’s earrings and coiffures, Madame Merle’s clothes, Mrs.
Gereth’s treasures, Mrs. Churchley’s enormous red-feathered fan in “The
Marriages,” and Maria Gostrey’s red ribbon in The Ambassadors all produce
the body as a concept. These specific processes of adornment and person-
al stylization—specific in terms of their class, fairly specific in terms of
gender, and materially specific in the kinds of things at work—are what
Scarry renames “the body.” In other words, when Scarry conceives of
objects as “fragments of self-extension,” when she posits the “artifact’s
inherent freedom of reference,” when she speculates that “freestanding
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artifact[s] close to the body” are where invention begins, she generalizes on
the fungible, pliable, mobile materials that nineteenth-century bourgeois
culture first saturated with significance (196, 317, 321). Indeed, those
objects’ multiplicity and mobility are what made generalization possible in
the first place. Rhetoric in this instance lifts the body out of history and
transforms it into a philosophical entity: Scarry’s chiasmus becomes a
widely portable trope derived from the specific material conditions, and
ways of thinking about those conditions, that it nonetheless leaves
behind.21
I want to identify these conditions and their effects more precisely by
turning back to de Man; I want to consider de Man in more detail because
I wish to show that specific material models can shape critical practices
that have no overt or announced interest in the material world. In a way,
the point here is simpler than those made about Scarry, since de Man’s
project is far less multilayered; in large part, the power his writings once
had came from his relentless focus on the figures of rhetoric. In a way, the
point is more challenging, however, since it must ferret out the traces of
bodily and material styles that in de Man’s writings often (but not always)
verge on disappearing. I will seek to show, however, that the air of philo-
sophical abstraction in de Man turns out to be an allegation that renders
nearly invisible his adherence—even his devotion—to a fairly specific
material model. More particularly, the ambiguity of literary language is
only conceivable for de Man in the material terms of the body, its acces-
sories, and its domicile—only conceivable, that is, according to the con-
tours of a material model specific to a certain (admittedly large) historical
formation (the privatization of experience and the growth of commodity
culture), a historical particularity de Man often takes pains to deny, as in
the essay on lyric in Blindness and Insight.22
Indeed, the turn to problems of language in de Man’s later work brings
with it a turn to the body. In de Man’s later work, the turn to rhetoric
means that “we are no longer within a thematic context dominated by self-
hood but in a figural representation of a structure of tropes” (Allegories,
186). The discursive centrality of the self, its (failed) function as a psycho-
logical principle of unity, is replaced by an economy, one that de Man
identifies—and cannot imagine except by means of—the body, its exten-
sions, its appendages, its shell. When de Man writes in the early 1960s of
Montaigne, the issue is rather insistently or even obsessively one of “sub-
jectivity”; when he writes of Montaigne in one of the late essays on Kant
and materialism, the associations are with that strand of the essayist that
imagines the body as severed parts, as “limbs, hands, toes, breasts, or what
Montaigne so cheerfully referred to as ‘Monsieur ma partie.’”23 While it is
probably true, as Terry Eagleton has observed, that “few critics have been
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more bleakly unenthused by bodiliness—by the whole prospect of a cre-
ative development of the sensuous, creaturely aspects of human existence”
than de Man, it is also true that de Man depends on the body, its surrogates
and doubles, its habitats and accessories, for making clear his most basic
meanings.24
This dependence on and denial of physicality both emerge with extraor-
dinary clarity in de Man’s reading of Rousseau’s Pygmalion, a reading that
centers on—and attempts to cancel—the text’s immoderate interest in the
human body. On the one hand, material properties play a large role in the
analysis: de Man quotes Rousseau’s descriptions of the coldness of the mar-
ble and the trembling touches Pygmalion and Galathea exchange; he argues
that “the intrinsic quality of the self is borrowed from the surface of its phys-
ical shape” when Pygmalion extols the beauty of Galathea’s soul; indeed, he
seems to move against any dematerialization of the signifier as he indicates
that “the abstraction and the generality of a linguistic figure manifests itself
necessarily in the most physical of modes” (Allegories 182). On the other
hand, the materiality at work is explicitly denied: the coldness of the marble
becomes a figure for the shock Pygmalion experiences at finding his own
work of self-expression standing before him—“entirely alienated,” as de Man
puts it—and so neither exclusively himself nor exclusively other but baffling-
ly both. Indeed, de Man goes well out of his way to transform into a matter
of rhetoric Rousseau’s strongly sensory interests, to conceptualize the corpo-
reality of this Pygmalion story: “this coldness [Pygmalion’s emotional state]
has nothing in common with the coldness of the original stone; Bachelard’s
thermodynamics of the material imagination would find nothing to feed on
in Pygmalion. ‘Hot’ and ‘cold’ are not, in this text, derived from material
properties but from a transference from the figural to the literal that stems
from the ambivalent relationship between the work as an extension of the
self and as a quasi-divine otherness” (178). Because he wants to maintain this
reading of Pygmalion as a text in which “the deconstructive discourse of truth
and falsehood . . . undoes selfhood . . . and replaces it by the knowledge of
its figural and epistemologically unreliable structure” (187), de Man is forced
to suppress Rousseau’s climax: one would never know from Allegories of
Reading that the moment when Pygmalion first feels Galathea’s flesh coming
alive is when he chisels away some of the draperies that hide the figure’s
breasts. This final touch needs to be suppressed because it would reveal the
materiality of the reciprocity that de Man treats as purely rhetorical: it would
be hard, in other words, to ignore the extraordinary abstraction of de Man’s
formulations if this moment were brought into play, hard not to instill in the
reader a sense that something—too much—was lost in this critical allegory,
or that the allegory de Man reveals brings to the foreground matters his
method is ill-equipped to elucidate.
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Examining de Man’s reading of Pygmalion reveals a material basis with-
in his method, a source of illustrations and examples without which that
method’s results would make little sense. This examination has revealed, as
well, two sources of anxiety for that method’s dematerializing materialism,
two points that threaten to make the physical world very hard to abstract
away. One, epitomized by Galathea’s breasts, is the female body. The
other, which makes its presence felt in the dismissal of Gaston Bachelard,
is the phenomenological strain of twentieth-century French criticism.
Although it may seem that these two entities are wholly unrelated, I will
argue that in de Man’s thinking they are tightly intertwined, not only
because they both exert a kind of materialist pressure on his method but
also because when, in the mid 1960s, de Man edited and revised a trans-
lation of Flaubert’s Madame Bovary, he encountered them together. Since
this phase of his career was also the moment in which de Man developed
the viselike method of rhetorical analysis that became his most influential
style, it is plausible to suggest that this encounter was a transformative
one.
More specifically, in Madame Bovary and in the critical commentary on
that novel, de Man finds a repertoire of images by which he will go on to
organize literary meaning, a material economy that he will turn into a
matter of rhetoric. The physical particularity of nineteenth-century
French realism serves as an occulted source for his later work: he never
writes about Stendhal or Balzac, and never writes about Flaubert again
after editing the Norton Critical Edition, published in 1965, that I will
focus on. Similarly, de Man’s production of this edition is totally absent
from critical commentary on his career, even from the two important
book-length studies, those by Christopher Norris and Rodolphe Gasché.25
Hence in several different ways, or rather at several different levels, de
Man’s career epitomizes the privilege accorded to general hermeneutics
and the detachment of idealist aesthetics from the arts of everyday life:
even as a material culture gets renamed as theory, so too is a text like
Blindness and Insight accorded a prominence denied to a critical edition.
Against these powerful sublimations of the material world, Madame
Bovary can serve as a powerful weapon; it can desublimate the physicality
of the abstract critical methods that it itself helped to shape. Flaubert’s rep-
resentations of desire and consumption entail a scrupulous attention to
bodily gesture, to nervous mannerism, to the tiny acts of use; no physical
motion is too small, and so the novel takes in Emma ecstatically “scratch-
ing the velvet of the [theatre] box with her nails” at the melodrama in
Rouen, or pricking her finger on the wire of her wedding bouquet as she
rediscovers it shortly after the dance at Vaubyessard, or admiring the way
“young beaux” so unlike her own Charles lean “the tight-drawn palm of
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their yellow gloves on the golden knobs of their canes.”26 Such processes of
friction seem indispensable to the production of meaning in Madame
Bovary because they are crucial both to the novel’s account of material life
and to its account of psychological life; in fact, they link these two levels
of the text so tightly that they appear to merge together. One of Flaubert’s
terms for this chafing action is frottement—“rubbing,” “friction,” and,
more figuratively, “contact,” “interaction”—as when, after dancing, Emma
finds that the ballroom floor’s wax has left a residue on her shoes even as
the experience has left its imprint on her desires: “. . . ses souliers de satin,
dont la semelle s’était jaunie à la cire glissante du parquet. Son cœur était
comme eux: au frottement de la richesse, il s’était placé dessus quelque
chose qui ne s’effacerait pas” (“. . . the satin shoes whose soles were yel-
lowed with the slippery wax of the dancing floor. Her heart resembled
them: in its contact with wealth, something had rubbed off on it that
could not be removed,” in de Man’s translation).27 Similarly, as Rodolphe
contemplates his letter breaking off his affair with Emma, he looks at
Emma’s miniature as he recalls his memories of her, until memory and visu-
al image somehow efface each other—“comme si la figure vivante et la fig-
ure peinte, se frottant l’une contre l’autre, se fussent réciproquement
effacées” (“as if the living and painted face, rubbing one against the other,
had erased each other”).28 Finally, a more abstract example comes when
Emma grows tired of Léon and analyzes his faults; the narrator reflects that
“le dénigrement de ceux que nous aimons toujours nous en détache quelque
peu. Il ne faut pas toucher aux idoles: la dorure en reste aux mains” (“the
picking apart of those we love always alienates us from them. One must not
touch one’s idols, a little of the gilt always comes off on one’s fingers”).29
As the progressive abstraction of these quotations suggests, a material
process—one specific to the nineteenth-century body, as I have argued
above—governs the text’s sense of significance. The more figurative enti-
ties of Emma’s “cœur,” of Rodolphe’s mental images, of an idealized Léon
carry a materiality that, Madame Bovary insists, nothing can efface
(“quelque chose qui ne s’effacerait pas,” as the passage on the dancing shoes
puts it). This strong sense of materiality is the focus for a strand of Flaubert
criticism that begins with Charles du Bos in the 1920s and develops in the
1950s into a more sophisticated version with the work of two members of
the Geneva School of phenomenological critics, Georges Poulet and Jean-
Pierre Richard. While there are important differences among these critics
and their accounts of Madame Bovary, three common characteristics need
to be noted here. They all take the novel’s material processes as images for
how consciousness works in the physical world, treating the relation
between subject and object as a frottement, a friction, a swapping of attrib-
utes, a “giving off on,” as de Man sometimes translates it in Flaubert’s text
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(the nearly oxymoronic English idiom of “off ” plus “on” captures the sense
of incessant, irresolvable quality of this back and forth movement fairly
precisely).30 Hence du Bos’s early explanation of Flaubert’s “genius for
materiality” as the “power to identify himself with matter” becomes, in
Poulet’s account, “a deliberate confusion . . . between the subjective and
the objective” “as if, by penetrating Emma’s soul, the images of things had
lost their objectivity and been transformed into feelings, or as if Emma, by
becoming affected by material things, had become also somehow materi-
al.”31 In Richard, this crisscross movement between subject and object is
characterized as a blending of sensation and memory, a “mélange,” a
“fusion,” as he calls it.32
Second, all these critics identify this material consciousness with the
female figure. In Poulet’s reading, Emma epitomizes Flaubert’s own psy-
chic disorientations by materializing her author’s emotional vicissitudes;
Flaubert’s very conceptual-seeming vertiginous “whirl of ideas” becomes
Emma’s very physical-seeming fragmentation, dispersed as she is among
the various objects of her desires.33 In du Bos, this dispersal of male iden-
tity is associated—in ways du Bos does not quite rationalize—with both
“a feminine scent” and with the “genius” for “materiality” du Bos so val-
ues in Flaubert.34 In Richard, the reciprocity of matter and consciousness
is figured as a process akin to touching—the one necessarily reciprocal
physical sense—and specifically as the touch of a woman (“Woman
attracts as if she were water, and water caresses like a woman,” Richard
writes as he characterizes a description of bathing in one of Flaubert’s let-
ters, a letter that becomes a point of orientation for the argument of
Richard’s Littérature et Sensation).35 In ways that are neither directly
acknowledged nor totally obscured, women give substance to the enter-
prise of phenomenological criticism; even when, as in du Bos, the sub-
stance at work is as amorphous as a scent, the female figure is a crucial
physicalization for these critics, the figure that bestows definition upon
the theme of consciousness, which might otherwise seem too amorphous
to conceive clearly.
A third thing these three essays have in common is that they are all
selected by de Man for the critical essays section of his edition of Madame
Bovary. While an edition produced mainly for college courses might seem
mere journeyman work, there are suggestions in the introduction that de
Man thought of this book as something more than that: de Man writes
that his “principle of . . . selection” for the essays has “very definitely been
oriented towards problems of method that are important in the contem-
porary criticism of fiction” (xi). Inasmuch as the essays comment on each
other and react to each others’ claims, the selection “gives insight into the
unified development of critical thought in the twentieth century” (xii).
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Self-consciously producing a primer on literary criticism, then, de Man
might also be seen here as constructing a lineage of his crucial predecessors,
one that includes Saint-Beuve, Baudelaire, James (whose identification of
“the real” in Flaubert with “the accessories” in the passage reprinted from
Notes on Novelists merges the problem of bodily boundaries with the prob-
lem of literary significance as the phenomenologists would later do),
Sartre, and Auerbach, as well as du Bos, Richard, and Poulet.36 In com-
menting on these latter writers, de Man credits them with the ability to
“recaptur[e] the creative consciousness of the writer,” even as he suggests
their limitations in their indifference to narrative structures (xii). But he is
still quarreling with their legacy as late as the revised edition of Blindness
and Insight, and still working through problems of materiality in what is
virtually his last essay.37 All of which suggests that de Man’s deconstruction
is in part produced by a phenomenological and materialist inheritance lost
sight of in much commentary on that deconstruction itself, a sense of lit-
erary significance that cannot be fully abstracted from what de Man in his
introduction to Madame Bovary calls the “material imagination” (xiii).
For if we turn to Allegories of Reading, we find that the fluctuations in
meaning, which are what that book is really about, are conceived accord-
ing to the material fluctuations in Flaubert, ones that de Man labored over
as he revised Eleanor Marx Aveling’s translation, ones that the phenome-
nologists had made their focal point. Indeed, these fluctuations—these
rhetorical and grammatical ambiguities—are practically inconceivable
apart from the physical objects and processes that, for Flaubert and many
other nineteenth-century novelists, compose everyday life. This tight bond
between meaning and a specific materiality is not so surprising in the chap-
ter on Proust, where, as I argued above, linguistic structures and the archi-
tectural structure of the bourgeois home become in de Man’s reading total-
ly inextricable. It is more surprising—and so more revealing—to find the
same material model at work in the chapter on Rilke, a writer whose work
would seem far less invested in the physical matter of everyday life and
whose favored genre of the lyric has so often seemed to preclude a strong
concern with substance.38 In de Man’s reading, linguistic processes are
described as physical ones; in reaching for specific and so sharable charac-
terizations of the conceptual intricacies of language, de Man draws on a
repertoire of metaphors that do their work almost unnoticeably in his text
but that bespeak the presumption of a shared sense of the material world.
There are, first of all, some relatively unremarkable moments—but I am
here trying to alienate somewhat our usual metaphors for what a text is—
in which de Man draws on circulatory, knotted, and spatial figures in order
to explain the workings of Rilke’s lyrics. Poems’ metaphors “do not con-
note objects, sensations, or qualities of objects”; instead, they “evoke” an
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“activity that circulates between” voice and poetic topic (Alleegories 29,
30). “There is . . . nothing in the poem that would entitle us to escape
beyond its boundaries in search of evidence that would not be part of it”
because the “interlacing” of theme and speaker “that constitutes the text”
is “so tight that it leaves no room for any other system of relationships”
(31). At some moments, the argument of Rilke’s poems is carried by pure
sound as each sound effect is “enclose[d]” into another, “as a larger box can
enclose in its turn a smaller one” (31). In each of these instances, de Man
explicitly cancels the material world and then reintroduces it as a charac-
terization of language; purely rhetorical matters turn out to be a matter of
small and private spaces, of worked and crafted (or corseted) ornament, of
a transfer of properties between two things. If we are not explicitly in a
world of Flaubertian frottement here, then we are in a material world
nonetheless, one with some properties in keeping with Flaubert’s very
physicalized sense of how the literary text makes its meanings.
In the pivotal analysis of the chapter on Rilke, de Man’s substitution of
a general truth about language for a historically specific material forma-
tion emerges with even more clarity. The analysis—of “Am Rande der
Nacht” (“At the borderline of the night”)—is pivotal because it establish-
es the chiasmus as “the determining figure of Rilke’s poetry,” determining
because it is “the crossing that reverses the attributes of words and of
things” (38). As my preceding analysis of the chiasmus in Elaine Scarry’s
work might lead one to expect, at issue here are the exchanges of attrib-
utes between person and artifact that are central to a nineteenth-century
aesthetic of everyday life. The poem is quite explicitly about the speaker’s
room (“Meine Stube”) and about the status of personal objects (“Die
Dinge”); as in his discussions of Proust, so here too, de Man formulates his
theory not in terms of the machine—as other commentators have suggest-
ed—but in terms of domestic space.39 Perceptively noting the dynamism
of the objects in comparison to the flatness of the voice that describes
them, de Man argues that the “inwardness that should belong, per defini-
tion, to the subject is located instead within things”; that the “usual struc-
ture has been reversed: the outside of things has become internalized”
(36). Yet because these objects seem expressive without being fully assim-
ilated to the poem’s speaker, de Man characterizes the poem as represent-
ing “objects as containers of a subjectivity which is not that of the self that
considers them,” a paradox that, he asserts, is “difficult to comprehend . . .
on the level of the themes” (37). This discrepancy is what opens the way
for the interpretation of the poem as about “the coming into being of
metaphor”; since the thematic reading of the poem makes no sense, the
poem must be about “a potential inherent in language,” in this case “the
outside-directed turn that occurs in all metaphorical representations” (37).
PART III: THE MATTER OF LITERARY CRITICISM150
Otten_CH7_2nd.qxp  4/19/2006  1:39 PM  Page 150
I emphasize this moment in Allegories of Reading because it is one in
which de Man almost straightforwardly renames a particular historical and
material formation as an exclusively linguistic one. The reversals in Rilke’s
poem of inside and outside, in which “the outside of things has become
internalized” while objects serve as “containers” of “subjectivity,” are not
unique discoveries of this poem, but instead constitute a definitive paradox
of the discourse of decor (36, 37). An allegory of reading—for this chap-
ter contains the broadest possible claims about “a paradox that is inherent
in all literature”—is shaped by a specific sense of the objects of consump-
tion, decor and personal ornament (50). In other words, the conundrum
of the expressive power of objects, the personality of objects, is here not a
purely philosophical point nor purely a question of rhetoric: it is Madame
Merle’s question much more particularly (“What shall we call our ‘self ’”
when “we’re each of us made up of some cluster of appurtenances”?), tak-
ing that moment from Portrait of a Lady as a summation of the cultural
movements sketched in the previous chapters. At this moment in de Man’s
work, the very terms of literary criticism are formed by a specific material
model—the hermeneutics of the accessory, the detailing of decor, the
newly intimate sense of one’s belongings.
So powerful are these material formations that they supply the terms
when de Man seeks to cancel or circumvent the thematic criticism that
could otherwise lead to an analysis of Rilke’s place in the history of things,
the history of personal property. Writing of Rilke’s shortest and most
opaque later lyrics, de Man argues that these poems “impl[y] a complete
drying up of thematic possibilities.” They are poems of “pure ‘figure’” in
which Rilke comes as close as any poet can to “the purity” of “semantic
askesis”:
The figure stripped of any seduction besides that of its rhetorical elas-
ticity can form, together with other figures, constellations of figures
that are inaccessible to meaning and to the senses, located far beyond
any concern for life or for death in the hollow space of an unreal sky.
(48)
De Man asserts the complete abstraction of the rhetorical figure by means
of a specific materiality; this exclusion of reference from the figure is itself
figured through the historically particular physicality it is said to preclude.
It is not just that the “elasticity” mentioned here links the passage to the
pliable accessory of dress and ornament, an association that operates cru-
cially as well in the later chapter in Allegories of Reading in the discussion
of the purloined ribbon of Rousseau’s Confessions. Nor is it only a matter
of realizing that the passage practically defines real and rigorous reading as
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the purging of those ornaments, the “stripping” away of obsfucatory lay-
ers—an implication that means that the sense this passage makes depends
on the material world the passage would deny. What really involves the
passage with a specific materiality is the figure—the bodily one—that
holds its own figures together.
For if positing the “elasticity” of a “stripped” and “seduct[ive]” “figure”
strikes one as a hopelessly mixed metaphor, then one must also acknowl-
edge that women hold this catachresis together, and that the flexibility of
language and the flexibility of the nineteenth-century female body—par-
ticularly an adulterous one like Emma Bovary or Charlotte Stant or A
London Life’s Selina—have become impossible to distinguish. It is as if the
nearly-naked female body never mentioned in Allegories of Reading’s chap-
ter on Rousseau’s Pygmalion has migrated to another place in de Man’s
book, where it serves as an account of rhetoric, serves to encapsulate and
substantiate the master terms of de Man’s critical practice. Or it is as if all
rhetoric has taken on the properties of a stretchy and seductive falsifica-
tion that Flaubert imagines a laminating or embossing machine might
produce. Early in Part Three of Madame Bovary, when the reunited Emma
and Léon exchange exaggerated professions of their own passions,
Flaubert’s narrator observes that “speech is like a rolling machine that
always stretches the sentiment it expresses” (“la parole est un laminoir qui
allonge toujours les sentiments”).40 The metaphor receives its literalization
as Léon fabricates a desire to be buried in a coverlet (“un couvre-pied”)
given to him by Emma: the flexibility of rhetoric and the versatility of the
stuff that accessorizes the body are inseparable for Flaubert, an insepara-
bility that de Man and other twentieth-century critics absorb, adopt,
inherit.
What is at stake for literary criticism in the study of material culture,
the surfaces of the everyday world, the most superficial layer of civiliza-
tion? My answer has been that literary criticism’s own logic has repeated-
ly and often unnoticeably incorporated within itself aspects of the materi-
al world by relying on those aspects for its sense of what language and lit-
erature are. Literary criticism has come to think of such all-encompassing
categories as textuality itself in terms derived from specific material mod-
els, ones that idealist aesthetics would sublimate to the point of invisibili-
ty. One could argue at this point that there has been very little materialist
literary criticism because, if we survey Anglo-American criticism of the last
100 years, we find very few studies that do not prefer and privilege the
conceptual over the concrete aesthetic practices that make the conceptual
legible and sharable. Or one could argue that all literary criticism has been
materialist and usually failed to recognize itself as such; as de Man so fre-
quently does in the passages I have canvassed, criticism relies on a shared
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model of the material world in order to make its meanings clear, in order
to sustain its relation to its audience.
Attempting to achieve a truly superficial reading of Henry James, the
preceding chapters have focused their attention on objects and surfaces
crucial to the shaping of literary terms, concepts, and categories; they have
uncovered the specific material forms that critical constructs both depend
on and efface. By reading the world of decor back into the concept of con-
sciousness, I have tried to show how much material history is embedded in
an idea that has shaped Jamesian criticism for most of the last century; I
have tried to show how thoroughly the contingent surfaces of the fin-de-
siècle drawing room are interwoven with what counts as reading in depth.
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c h a p t e r  e i g h t
The color of air
New Materialism
hat color is Balzac’s air? That is the question James asks midwayW through his 1905 lecture “The Lesson of Balzac.” The question
springs from an extended meditation on “the individual strong tempera-
ment in fiction,” the special character that marks a novelist’s work as rec-
ognizably his or her own, a question on which, James notes, “there would
be much to say” (LC 2:125). James is attempting to catch “the nature of
the man himself . . . his very presence, his spiritual presence, in his work.”
Spirit proves elusive, however, so much so that eventually the long passage
settles down into a litany of distinctive settings, some of which are archi-
tectural spaces and some of which are landscapes, both of which are fur-
ther specified by time of day or season of the year. Dickens’s novels seem
to James “always to go on in the morning . . . in a vast apartment that
appears to have windows, large, uncurtained and rather unwashed win-
dows, on all sides at once”; George Eliot’s “general landscape” is that of an
autumn sunset, with long shadows; Jane Austen’s is that of “an arrested
spring”; Thackeray evokes “the light . . . of rainy days in ‘residential’
streets” (LC 2:126). “The question of the color of Balzac’s air,” on the other
hand, is less easily resolved: “rich and thick, the mixture of sun and shade
diffused through the ‘Comédie Humaine’” represents “an absolutely
greater quantity of ‘atmosphere,’ than we shall find prevailing within the
compass of any other suspended frame.”
Thick and colored air, a great quantity of atmosphere: this book on
James’s preoccupation with the material world ends with matter that is
mostly not matter, at least not the kind of matter susceptible to the sense
of touch nor the economy of acquisition nor the aesthetics of adornment
and personal ornament. This book ends, then, with a figure that seems
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beyond the reach of the analyses and arguments developed in the preced-
ing pages. Inasmuch as this image serves for James as the cynosure of the
aesthetic, it might lead to a very belated worry that materialism is not the
mode in which James characteristically thinks and that the present project
has exaggerated some minor moments in the fictions and a minor set of
intellectual habits of those fictions’ author.
I want to end with this image of air in order to show how the material
can become, in James, a complex amalgam of physical qualities, visual
impressions, representational practices, and signs of a larger political econ-
omy. More than that motive, however, what draws me to this figure is the
resemblance between James’s strategies and those of a strand of very recent
critical works that read the material world back into literature’s metaphors.
Having argued in the previous chapter that the terms and methods of lit-
erary analysis typically presuppose an unacknowledged material model, I
will close this book by examining the work of several scholars who strive
to reattach literary studies to the world of things and the life of the senses.
The passage on the air, the atmosphere, of the novels of James’s prede-
cessors may seem a moment where impressionistic criticism has deployed
an evanescent image to maintain the aesthetic as a wholly autonomous
realm of experience, a world one cannot touch. And yet when we begin to
examine the passages that lie behind the figure of colored air, we find that
it is produced by a whole system of objects, indeed that it is the figure of
the object system itself. The material nature of James’s air becomes clear if
we review several passages quoted in previous chapters. The “thick,
coloured air” of Poynton is an effect of the reflected “light” of its “treas-
ures” (10:146). Similarly, in The Other House, the “colour of the air” con-
veys a sense that the flowers and pictures, the florid, highly decorated
effects of things, make the spaces between those objects material, them-
selves thick with decor.1 In A London Life, the dowager Lady Davenant’s
drawing room has a “bright durable sociable air” that is the product of its
homely, unfashionable appurtenances, which preserve the past at the
expense of fashion (10:271). It is as if the air is itself a quasi-material medi-
um that conveys the implications of objects, linking their physical quali-
ties with the behavioral norms they connote, convey, even instill; the fig-
ure links a picturesque effect with a cultural code that is itself kept steadi-
ly present by the objects that make it real.
In The Ambassadors, James recurs to the figure so often that it seems he
is consciously working out its implications as he uses air’s quasi-physical
nature to give a sense of material reality to nuances that cannot otherwise
be named, as when “the air . . . thicken[s]” with “intimations” as Chad and
Madame de Vionnet come into view when Strether is taking in the river-
scape late in the novel, or when Strether, unable to capture the “something”
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that characterizes Madame de Vionnet’s drawing room, “come[s] nearest to
naming” it “in speaking of it as the air of supreme respectability,” or when
Strether sums up the Parisian morning (and somehow the French setting is
crucial here) by reflecting that “the air had a taste as of something mixed
with art” (22:256; 21:245, 79).
In that last usage, the passage elaborates its metaphor of taste by going
on to imagine this “something” as the production of “a white-capped 
master-chef,” so that the sensory immediacy of taste is bestowed upon
atmospheric effects—they might almost be eaten—even as the figure also
suggests the elusiveness of a complex blend of flavors. What is it, exactly,
that leads James to endow the nebulous with a solidity here that seems to
deny its definitive nature?
In The American Scene, in the chapter on Baltimore, the boughs of the
trees “creat[e] in the upper air great classic serenities of shade” and “give
breadth of style,” an effect “borrowed . . . straight from far-away Claudes
and Turners.”2 Earlier, at West Point, the interpretive questions and inces-
sant study of the Jamesian analyst over how such a blank landscape could
possibly offer “romantic effect” are rendered irrelevant by the fact that it
does: such questions are “shivered . . . to mere silver atoms” by “the mere
blinding radiance” because “the very powers of the air” “transcend all argu-
ment” as they present a “tone good enough for Claude or Turner.”3 The
thing-like quality of the atmosphere takes precedence over analysis, as
even the most hazy and shapeless ontology makes epistemology seem sec-
ondary, over-intellectualized, belated.
This materiality of the air, The American Scene suggests, is firmed up
by, or even produced by, the medium of painting—the medium in which
an atmospheric effect has little or no physical difference from more solid-
seeming rocks or buildings, as both kinds of stuff consist of a thin layer of
oil on canvas. But this smoky, shimmering haze is hardly a natural phe-
nomenon occurring apart from a political economy and observed with an
innocent eye that simply takes in what it sees; rather, it is the now-natu-
ralized sign of industry generated by a host of paintings—particularly
French Impressionist landscapes—in which smoke is a figure for produc-
tion, as T. J. Clark observes in The Painting of Modern Life.4 Commenting
on Monet’s seashores, Clark notes that these paintings are “absolute with
industry” as “the play of paint . . . absorb[s] the factories and weekend vil-
las” alike “with scarcely a ripple”; economic activity builds rather than
mars the coherence of the picture.5 Or, as James puts what is almost the
same point in The American Scene, “in the splendid light, nature and sci-
ence were joyously romping together” in the New York harbor; the harbor
is blackened and smudged, but not so much so that “light of the pictur-
esque” cannot “irradiate [such] fog and grime.”6 This passage from The
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American Scene is unusual for James in that it makes explicit the link
between his recurrent figure of air and the atmospheric effects that became
a pictorial sign of industry. But even when his point of comparison is
Claude, for example, we can speculate that the seventeenth-century haze
of that painter is for James brought to newly heightened visibility by the
painterly conventions governing the portrayal of nineteenth-century
industry.
With his figure of “Balzac’s air,” then, James uses the concrete medium
of one art to transform the material culture represented by another art into
a critical concept: thinking of the air of a text as in some sense visible
depends for its sense on one’s having seen the atmospheric effects of paint-
ing, which are themselves a sign of a still larger economy rapidly expand-
ing in James’s time. This kind of largely dematerialized material character
of each author—George Eliot’s sinking sun, Austen’s arrested spring,
Thackeray’s “light . . . of rainy days”—becomes James’s way of telling them
apart, becomes a critical tool for distinguishing their definitive attributes.
Hence the figure of the air carries into the realm of the conceptual and the
critical the matter of industrial production and the stuff of oil paint, as well
as the perceptual habits reinforced by French landscape painting. Pushing
back a little further in James’s career, I want to suggest that the figure of
the air in the late Balzac essay brings to bear upon the literary text the
motif with which James had in his fictions attempted to capture the
decor—the systems of taste—that made up his various settings: the “thick-
en[ed]” air of The Ambassadors, the “thick, coloured air” of The Spoils of
Poynton, is in turn used to scrutinize La Comédie Humaine. Hence a con-
struction of objects itself becomes a tool of literary analysis, critical com-
mentary, and aesthetic judgment. But far from acting as a dematerializing
figure, James’s metaphor of the air draws lines of connection between
industry, material culture, art, and novelistic discourse.
To grasp the nature of the Jamesian figure of air, then, is to understand
that figure as definitively mixed, as maintained by a recursive movement
between the material and the conceptual. This movement between the
physical details of daily life and the metaphorical figures of theory and phi-
losophy has guided this book from the beginning: A Superficial Reading of
Henry James has attempted to uncover the material nature of such concepts
as consciousness, portraiture, the text, and even culture. Perhaps the histo-
ry of literary theory still needs a good deal of rewriting: perhaps the way
we conceive of theory needs to be continually challenged, thinking of it, as
we habitually do, as defined by the thinness of abstraction, as abstracted
from the thickness of material life.
In her Reading in Detail: Aesthetics and the Feminine (1987), Naomi Schor
critiqued what she called “idealist” aesthetics as a construct maintained at the
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expense of women, the ornament, and the decorative; the tradition of liter-
ary theory, stretching from the Greeks to Reynolds and Dr. Johnson to
Hegel and beyond, monumentalized in huge textbooks like Walter Jackson
Bate’s Criticism: The Major Texts and Hazard Adams’s Critical Theory Since
Plato, attains much of its coherence by sublimating the concrete, the minute,
and the quotidian.7 When Reading in Detail appeared, it seemed far different
from the new-historicist commitment to the anecdote and the new-histori-
cist fascination with the workings of power that had come to dominate liter-
ary studies at that time. And in fact, Schor’s book has never been fully assim-
ilated within the discipline (the book is now out of print). Yet it brought
together two related impulses in the humanities that I think will emerge as
highly characteristic of our own fin de siècle and that will also emerge as hav-
ing been genuinely useful and productive. One is a skepticism over the con-
ceptual itself; the other is a new valuing of the physical matter of everyday
life. When, in her book Reinterpreting Property (1993), the legal scholar
Margaret Jane Radin defended a “thick theory of the self” that bestowed legal
status upon the objects that are “so bound up with me that I would cease to
be ‘myself ’ if they were taken”; when the art historian Norman Bryson, in
Looking at the Overlooked (1990), revalued the genre of still life by approach-
ing it as a history of the table, a history of “the conditions of creaturality, of
eating and drinking and domestic life”; when, in On Longing (1984), the lit-
erary critic and folklorist Susan Stewart wrested from the problem of literary
form a material poetics, these scholars lowered the threshold of hermeneutic
attention, coaxing into existence a new particularism that they poised against
the abstractions of the foundational concepts of their disciplines—person-
hood, narrative, or even (in Bryson’s case most explicitly, but all three writers
just named do this in one way or another) subject matter.8
This thickening of the conceptual is how I would define the new mate-
rialism that emerges in the work of these and other scholars. Such work
resists the disciplinary mandates that I spoke of in the beginning of this
book, the ones that hold that the material world must be brought forward
but not for too long before it is abstracted away by critique (of commodi-
fication, say) and by an agreed-upon level of necessary generalization, a
commitment to the assumption that episodes in the history of artistic and
material practices can always be usefully restated as higher-order claims that
can then take their place in what Schor critiqued as idealist aesthetics.
As it happens, contemporary criticism has recently evolved an idiom
that captures the view of meaning I am attempting to describe, a cluster of
terms and connotations which do some of the same work as James’s figure
of air. That idiom is the various shades of meaning carried by the word
“sense,” as in the titles of Bill Brown’s A Sense of Things (2003), Diana Fuss’s
The Sense of an Interior (2004), and Susan Stewart’s Poetry and the Fate of
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the Senses (2002).9 “Sense” and “the senses” might seem to pull in almost
opposite directions, because they nominate on the one hand an understand-
ing, an intelligence, even a wisdom and, on the other, one of the least
rational, most immediate and physical zones of human experience. But it is
crucial to the argument of these books that these senses of “sense” are not
detachable from each other: these critics, so different from each other in
many ways, nonetheless all oppose a decoupling of the literary figure from
the world of sensory experience. Hence Brown characterizes his approach as
exploring the “convergences of” “the sensation of thingness” and “the
understanding” (17). Hence Fuss argues that the concrete domestic envi-
ronment shapes the work of her chosen writers “in ways both intensely
physical and deeply philosophical” (18). Hence Stewart seeks to demon-
strate that “it is only by finding means of making sense impressions intelli-
gible to others” that lyric poetry becomes readable in the first place (3).
As well as entailing a more concrete set of practices that I will detail in
a moment, this continuum between sense and the senses is a view of mean-
ing that may well represent a decisive shift in the critical understanding of
the sign. Put most broadly, all of these critics suggest that the physical sens-
es are what bind sign and signified. In Stewart’s radically synesthetic
rereading of the lyric tradition, the words of erotic poems become a high-
ly corporeal event in the reader’s experience: by evoking the senses of smell
and taste—the senses of physical incorporation—language itself is identi-
fied with “the touch and feel of the object in the mouth,” is identified with
“the liquification of” the object. “The melting words of the lover, the
manipulation of words in the mouth as an extension of erotic manipula-
tion through hands and limbs” are crucial “resources for the poet of erotic
poems,” Stewart argues (32). This newly physicalized sense of language is
also, I believe, what motivates Fuss to concentrate on Helen Keller in her
study of writers and their rooms. For Fuss, it is crucial that Keller learned
to read by touching raised letters printed on cardboard which were in turn
placed on the objects they nominated. Hence, Fuss argues, “Keller’s tactile
linguistics never presupposes the alienation of subject and object that both
Saussure and Lacan identify as the central feature of the birth of ‘the speak-
ing subject’” (112). In Brown’s account of the role of material culture in
late-nineteenth-century American fiction, what Brown calls “the logic of
reference” becomes a specific set of rhetorical practices that represent the
physical objects of a specific moment, a fairly particularized cultural milieu
(17). The techniques of fiction become “imaginative technologies for lift-
ing and redeeming” the “substratum” of “the material everyday” into a
reader’s awareness. In a complex reading of Sarah Orne Jewett’s The
Country of the Pointed Firs, Brown reconsiders that text’s naturalism by
emphasizing how the senses of taste, touch, and smell bridge the gap
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between characters and natural phenomena: the aromas, flavors, and tex-
tures of the herbs that are so crucial in Jewett’s descriptions of coastal
Maine are the means by which Jewett “establishes an overwhelming inti-
macy between natural and human matter” (90). Unlike sight, which dis-
tances perceiving subject and the object of attention, “smell . . . depends
on proximity, on chemical contact, on physical infiltration.” This imme-
diacy of sensation, on Brown’s reading, is what underwrites The Country
of the Pointed Firs’s brand of naturalism, which assumes a continuity
between people and natural objects, which figures characters as grasshop-
pers or trees. As Brown explains, “the metaphorization of the . . . villagers
themselves as both flora and fauna seems so artless,” so inevitable, because
“it simply reads like the rhetorical effect of the narrated fact of the intima-
cy between people and place” (90). That is “the way that objects become
figures of thought and of speech,” to use the terms with which A Sense of
Things explains its purpose as a whole (16).
I am struck by two intertwined aspects of Brown’s analysis of The
Country of the Pointed Firs that are important for the working definition of
new materialism I am developing here. One is the central role of the sens-
es, which on this account do a lot of the work of Jewett’s text and which
are considered explicitly, considered as topics in themselves. (You can write
a lot about a text’s visual imagery, say, without considering the senses at all,
without considering, as Brown does, that “the sight of objects always
depends on sufficient distance” [90].) Indeed, if one looks at the prominent
discussions of Jewett published a decade before Brown’s, one finds that the
physical senses play no role in these analyses.10 Another crucial feature of
Brown’s reading is the tight bind it discovers between the role of the sens-
es and the working of language, between material culture and linguistic
matters. The “logic of reference” is not, on this account, susceptible to the
kind of homogenizing ahistoricism I analyzed in the preceding chapter;
rather, language’s workings depend on a particular array of objects and on
particular ways of being involved with those objects. In other words (and
at the risk of exaggerating Brown’s position), an analysis of language in The
Country of the Pointed Firs would have to work differently if that novel were
about the proprietor of a general store rather than an herb-gatherer.
That is how a new concern for the physical senses reshapes the sense of
the sign in the critics I am discussing here. There are some other shared
intellectual habits, shared predilections, and shared aversions I want to
name here, ones that have a lot to do with the way these critics do their
work from one page to the next. Continuing the emphasis on practical
aesthetics I have adopted in this book, I will bring my project to a close
by itemizing three habits of reading that together characterize the
approach here nominated as new materialism.
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First is a newly intimate conception both of subject matter and of the task
of interpretation. Thus Brown indicates that one goal of A Sense of Things
is that of achieving a “grittier, materialist phenomenology of everyday life”
(3), while Fuss thinks of her topic as “the everyday friction between peo-
ple and things” (Fuss, 15). In practice, that topic leads Fuss to an extend-
ed discussion of the myriad treatments Proust kept on hand for his aller-
gies, to the way the couch in Freud’s consulting room positions the
patient’s body, to the precise dimensions of Emily Dickinson’s bedroom
(191–92 , 90–91, 55). As in Brown’s attention to the sense of smell in
Jewett, “close reading” in these instances means a reading that stays close
to the body. Arguing that “every literary figure has a literal base,” Fuss
takes up the thematics that their several critical traditions have assigned
to these authors—Proust’s shrinking from the world, Freud’s erotic con-
ception of the interpersonal, Dickinson’s emphasis on confinement and
liberation—and drives those themes back into their physical origins (7).
Declining the diagrammatic clarity of previous work on the body and its
habitats, such an approach seeks to discover a messy corporeality under-
lying the abstractions of critical truisms. Hence Fuss notes that while
Georges Poulet was among the first to emphasize the significance of space
in Proust’s time-obsessed novel, “Poulet’s investigation of Proustian space
. . . remains curiously intangible and indefinite,” wholly focused on
“metaphorical space” and wholly uninterested in “the space of the domes-
tic interior”—an interior Fuss herself goes on to detail with extraordinary
specificity (152).
Another example—another “sense” book I have not yet mentioned—
will make clearer the kind of hermeneutic shift I am describing here. In
Common Scents: Comparative Encounters in High-Victorian Fiction (2004),
Janice Carlisle reconsiders nineteenth-century British codifications of class
by analyzing how the sense of smell is used to create, convey, and sustain
those distinctions. “Repeatedly in the fiction of the 1860s,” Carlisle
observes, “encounters” between members of different classes “are depicted
in terms of an inodorate perceiver of smells and his or her smelly other.”11
Like the other books on “sense,” Carlisle’s work shuttles between what she
calls “the material and the immaterial,” “matter and spirit”: “Recognizing an
odor, registering its effects, comparing what smells to what does not—all
such perceptual activities when recorded in a novel of the 1860s provide
access to the common sense of that decade, the rarely articulated, taken-for-
granted result of experiences supposedly shared by all one’s fellows, if not by
all humankind” (21, 5). Hence something as complex and mediated as
what a culture believes goes without saying is sustained by innumerable,
involuntary, immediate bodily responses. Sometimes the matter that
Carlisle finds Victorian culture inspiriting is pleasant, like the rose leaves
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that scent the corridors of the best country homes, according to the olfac-
tory imagination of Rosamond Vincy in Middlemarch (153). But often
these smells are “gross,” as Carlisle says, evidence of messy bodies (“habili-
ments, impregnated with . . . the dirt of a life,” as one of the 1860s novels
quoted puts it) that one cannot shut out (32).
That messy body leads to a second distinguishing characteristic of the
new materialism, which is that it admits more concrete details than can be
contained by any neatly defined cultural logic. In the titles I am considering,
“sense” is the word that blurs the boundaries established by the more
schematic studies that precede these books; that word, in other words,
takes the place that “logic” would have occupied if these studies had
appeared fifteen years previously, as in Walter Benn Michaels’s The Gold
Standard and the Logic of Naturalism (1987), or Fredric Jameson’s
Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (1991).12 Brown
is explicit about his interest in what “the cultural logic of capitalism” can-
not explain, arguing “that the human interaction with the nonhuman
world of objects, however mediated by the advance of consumer culture,
must be recognized as irreducible to that culture” (5–6, 13). This resist-
ance to the reduction of culture to a “logic” helps to explain the extraor-
dinarily sudden eclipse of Michel Foucault in many recent literary studies:
he appears in the text of only one of these four “sense” books, in a moment
where Brown distinguishes the taxonomic scheme Foucault theorized in
The Order of Things from Jewett’s far more sensuous take on natural his-
tory (90). This “sacrifice” of schematic “clarity,” as Brown calls it (5),
makes for a certain shift in the diction of criticism, away from the “logis-
tics” and “relays” with which Mark Seltzer systematized the material world
in Bodies and Machines (1992), and toward a language of material partic-
ularity and emotional affect.13 If part of the challenge of writing criticism
at the end of the twentieth century was to reduce the multiplicity of cul-
ture to a set of “logistics,” the challenge now seems to be to lower the
threshold of perception and, at least on occasion, to give up a tone of
steely detachment. Hence Brown shifts his tone in the introduction of his
book from language that posits the “limit of modernism” to ask, “why do
you find yourself talking to things? . . . is it simply because you’re lonely?”
(12). Similarly, Fuss details with extraordinarily minute particularity
Proust’s “passionate attachment to the somber and seemingly lifeless fur-
niture of his parents,” arguing that this “object-love” for his mother’s
Boulle worktable and his father’s armchair “operates . . . as the antidote to
lost time” by bestowing upon the mourned figures a physical presence
(164–65). The point is not merely that Fuss reports such details, but that
by specifying such material practices so carefully, Fuss implicitly identifies
her project with the emotions that led her subject to maintain this furniture
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in the first place. Even such simple moments as Carlisle’s words “smelly”
and “gross” suggest a new relation to subject matter when matter is indeed
the critic’s subject.
Here a comparison to Stewart will further clarify the point, since Poetry
and the Fate of the Senses concerns a different genre than the other texts I
am considering, and since that focus on lyric carries with it less of a bur-
den to work against commodification-driven or Foucauldian, discipline-
centered analyses. In the introduction to her book, Stewart writes,
“Aesthetic activity viewed in the light of the history of ideological ends is
no longer aesthetic; it erases the free activity of pleasure and knowledge
that the aesthetic brings to human life” (40). This position could easily, but
wrongly, be critiqued as itself an instance of an aesthetic ideology, if one
did not take into account the sense in which Stewart means “ideology,”
and if one did not understand the claim in relation to the poetic analyses
Stewart performs throughout this book. In The Pleasure of the Text, Roland
Barthes usefully defines “ideology” as “the idea insofar as it dominates: ide-
ology can only be dominant.”14 Stewart’s strategy can be understood, then,
as one of dilating and particularizing sensory experiences associated with
poetry until they reach the point that no ideology can easily contain them.
She is not saying that the senses cannot be rendered the object of ideology;
indeed, the sentence I quote above comes in the midst of her discussion on
the history of attempts to regulate and hierarchize those senses. But she is
suggesting that the senses can be cultivated to resist ideology, that sensory
experiences have the potential for generating experiences and pleasures that
are not easy to keep within any political program. This is why Poetry and
the Fate of the Senses pauses so long over the “variegated chalcedony” of the
agate named in an H. D. poem, why it goes on at such length over the way
smell shapes and disorients readerly understanding in Jonathan Swift’s
lyrics, why it seeks to relate such varied uses of the senses as speaking, lis-
tening, smelling, and touching to the workings of poetry (36, 30–32). For
it is only through the force of accumulated examples in this long (447-
page) book that enough variety can be detailed to keep the aesthetic open,
beyond the reach of any reductive scheme.
The intimacy of the interpretations in question here and their resistance
to schematics virtually entail a third characteristic of the criticism I am talk-
ing about, which is that it resists adopting the subject/object dichotomy as
an explanatory device. Indeed, these critics argue—sometimes through the
way they handle their materials and sometimes by direct statement—that
the distinction between subject and object cannot be a guiding principle of cul-
tural history or literary studies. Fuss states the point directly, asserting that the
subject/object distinction is a “binary yet to be adequately challenged in
cultural criticism” (15). She makes this assertion in part because the sense
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of sight, which is so frequently inseparable from subject/object thinking,
proves to get at only a small part of her topic: as William James intuited in
the Principles of Psychology, inhabiting the physical world is an activity that
engages hearing, smell, taste, and touch as much as it does sight. Hence a
new interest emerges in the books under discussion in what Carlisle labels
“the chemical” senses of taste and smell (4) and in what Stewart identifies
as the “autocentric” senses (smell, taste, and some forms of touch), the sens-
es that are “physically localized on or in the body” (37).15 Though their top-
ics would seem to differ tremendously, both Stewart and Carlisle write
about these senses, so often coded as inferior ones, as ones that involve
“fusion” or “exchange” between perceiver and perceived rather than involv-
ing distance and objectification (Stewart, 38; Carlisle, 10). This new sense
of the exchange—whether psychological or material—of properties
between subject and object is basic as well to Brown’s approach, which
posits at the outset that the relation between human beings and things hap-
pens as an “indeterminate ontology where things seem slightly human and
humans seem slightly thing-like” (13).
As that word “indeterminate” suggests, the language used to capture
this fusion of human bodies and subjectivities with the material world is
loosely deconstructive in its origin, as is the impulse to undermine a bina-
ry opposition like subject and object. Hence the sensual resistance to the
subject/object dichotomy could be seen as a strictly philosophical argu-
ment, carrying with it the abstraction I have sought to identify in de Man
and Scarry. That possibility makes it important to recognize the ways in
which the large ambiguity I am discussing has a history, one these books
seek to trace. One way in which that tracing happens is through a new
attention to the nineteenth-century sciences that mixed matter and spirit,
bodies and objects, as in Carlisle’s discussions of psychophysiologists, who
tried “to merge philosophic conceptions of the mind . . . with research on
the anatomy and physiology of nerves and brain” (6), or Brown’s attention
to the late-nineteenth-century school of physiological aesthetics (26). In
the epistemology posited by these sciences, it is hard to know where
objects stop and human beings begin, as is the case with Bernard Berenson
and Vernon Lee, theorists of empathy I have discussed in preceding chap-
ters. Another way in which the “the join between mind and matter”
becomes a historical phenomenon is through the placement of the room,
that privileged trope of explication, within larger political economies
(Fuss, 16). Hence Fuss rereads the Proustian interior within the context of
the Haussmannization of Paris, the violent process by which the old
facades and shops were standardized into a uniform architecture that
largely obliterated visual remnants of the past; Proustian longing, the
“searching for the lost object,” emerges on this reading not (or not only)
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as a general human emotion, but as a set of feelings that emerges in
response to the work of the wrecking ball and the aesthetic-political pro-
gram it imposed (156).
This understanding of the senses as the merging of subject and object
becomes a historical narrative in Stewart as well, for Stewart’s whole book
is an attempt to take literally Marx’s pronouncement that “the forming of
the five senses is a labour of the entire history of the world down to the
present” (40).16 Hence Stewart might be said to have rewritten the histo-
ry of poetry according to the concerns I have been outlining in this chap-
ter, concerns for the particularization of the senses. As in her chapter on
the history of the romantic nocturne, poetic influence is re-understood as
successive expansions of consciousness, so that the reception of a poem
yields a broadening or fine-tuning of subsequent sensory experience: the
atmospheric qualities of night, the way that human beings rely on kines-
thetic perception in the darkness, the qualities of the colors when
glimpsed in faint illumination, and the synesthesia that leads the senses to
merge with each other all become knowledge that is inherited by
Wordsworth from Anne Finch, and by Keats from Wordsworth (259). In
this way, “new modes of moving and attending, of using touch, sight,
smell, and hearing, are the consequences as well as the source” of innova-
tions in poetic form (291). That is how the history of poetry, on Stewart’s
account, reflects Marx’s awareness that the senses themselves are historical
artifacts.
I have marshaled together these recent critical studies in an attempt to
capture something of the special quality of our own moment in the his-
tory of literary studies: my purpose here at the end has been to catch this
shift in a way that others may find inspiring or in need of correction or (I
hope) both. In his essay on “The Plates of the Encyclopedia,” Barthes
began by reflecting on the fact that “Our literature has taken a long time
to discover the object; we must wait till Balzac for the novel to be the
space not only of pure human relations but also of substances and usages
called upon to play their part in the story of passions.”17 At least in the
English-speaking world, it seems criticism has taken a similarly long time
even to begin to find terms adequate for the lives we lead in the material
world. Resisting the imperative to abstract, efface, or ignore that realm of
experience, I have taken Henry James as the focus of my attention because
his texts have the power to unsettle preferences for the conceptual (over
the material), the essential (over the ornamental), the theoretical (over the
practical). Perhaps the criticism that emerges from the recent materialist
turn will be radically recursive in its handling of those oppositions,
accepting the ironies of a discipline that is definitively miscellaneous,
sundry, itself a catachresis. Perhaps the dispensation in literary studies we
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are now entering will be an eccentric hybrid of rhetorical analysis and
material culture; it will do its work by means of swatches and samples of
matter in conjunction with the linguistic, imaginative works that think
their meanings, their aesthetic principles, their rhetorical structures,
through those substances.
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(William James, untitled review, in Essays, Comments, and Reviews, ed. Frederick
H. Burkhardt et al. [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987], 523–24). A
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long review of Berenson’s Florentine Painters of the Renaissance appeared in the
Atlantic Monthly while that journal was publishing serial installments of The Spoils
of Poynton (“The Philosophy of Enjoyment of Art,” Atlantic Monthly 77 [1896]:
844–48). Much later, in The Outcry, which was first a play (1909) and then a
novel (1911), James would draw on Berenson for his character Breckenridge
Bender, an American art dealer bent on raiding Europe for masterpieces.
28. Berenson, “Rudiments,” 145.
29. Nikolai Lange as quoted in William James, Principles of Psychology, ed.
Frederick H. Burkhardt et al. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 421.
See also the discussion of vision and touch in James’s chapter on “The Perception
of Space,” esp. 818, 821.
30. Bernhard Berenson, Florentine Painters of the Renaissance (New York:
Putnam’s, 1896), 27.
31. Robert Vischer, On the Optical Sense of Form (1873), in Empathy, Form,
and Space: Problems in German Aesthetics, 1873–1893, ed. and trans. Harry
Francis Mallgrave and Eleftherios Ikonomou (Santa Monica, CA: Getty Center
for the History of Art and the Humanities, 1994), 104.
32. Vernon Lee and C. Anstruther-Thomson, “Beauty and Ugliness,”
Contemporary Review 72 (1897): 550.
33. Lee and Anstruther-Thomson, “Beauty and Ugliness,” 554, 561.
34. Bernhard Berenson, Central Italian Painters of the Renaissance (New York:
Putnam’s, 1897), 74.
35. Berenson, Florentine Painters, 39.
36. Here it should be made clear that I am following Regenia Gagnier’s dis-
crimination of the varieties of aestheticism between Wilde’s “socially-oriented aes-
theticism,” which is “public, erotic, active,” and “the properly decadent aestheti-
cism” of Joris-Karl Huysmans’s Des Esseintes in À Rebours, which is “solitary, neu-
rotic, reactive” (Gagnier, “A Critique of Practical Aesthetics,” in Aesthetics and
Ideology, ed. George Levine (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1994),
270. On these terms, Nash is a decadent aesthete, while the other disciples of art
in The Tragic Muse struggle toward a devotion to making. Freedman makes this
discrimination more implicitly (Professions of Taste, 190).
37. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M.
Anscombe, 3rd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 48.
Notes to Chapter 5
1. Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,”
Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 195, 207. Further references appear parenthetical-
ly in the text. There is no shortage of commentary on Warren and Brandeis—
often called the most influential journal essay in American law—but there is not
much material that analyzes the article in the context of nineteenth-century
American culture. Three useful exceptions are James H. Barron, “Warren and
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890): Demystifying a
Landmark Citation,” Suffolk University Law Review 13 (1979): 875–922;
[Unsigned note], “The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth-Century America,”
Harvard Law Review 94 (1981): 1892–1910; Robert E. Mensel, “‘Kodakers Lying
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in Wait’”: Photography and the Right to Privacy in New York, 1885–1915,”
American Quarterly 43 (1991): 24–45.
2. On the tendency of Americans of the period to characterize their own time
as one of publicity and self-display, see Philip Fisher, “Appearing and Disappearing
in Public: Social Space in Late-Nineteenth-Century Literature and Culture,” in
Reconstructing American Literary History, ed. Sacvan Bercovitch (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1986), 155–88.
3. For earlier arguments that link James’s fiction with the origins of the legal
right to privacy, see Alexander Welsh, “Threatening Publicity,” in George Eliot and
Blackmail (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 61–64; Brook Thomas,
“The Construction of Privacy in and around The Bostonians,” American Literature
64 (1992): 719–47.
4. The Complete Notebooks of Henry James, ed. Leon Edel and Lyall H. Powers
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 40.
5. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 628, 630 (1886). This is not to say that the
majority decision in Boyd is a straightforward discovery of a right to privacy in the
fourth amendment or that Boyd is explicitly concerned with the right to one’s own
body. Though the decision does affirm the protection of one’s papers, its affirma-
tion of that right rests much more heavily on property rights than on privacy
rights.
6. Stephen Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 179.
7. Jonathan Goldberg, Writing Matter: From the Hands of the English
Renaissance (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 100. As the source of the
quotation perhaps suggests, the Renaissance is another point at which these rela-
tions acquire a high degree of visibility and urgency, and it is hardly coincidental
that the nineteenth-century literary commentary I will consider below devotes
itself almost entirely to certain Renaissance texts. Nor is it coincidental that one
point at which the body has emerged most visibly in the criticism of our own time
is Renaissance studies; there is a whole anthology made up of essays devoted to
individual organs and members (the leg, the tongue, joints, the anus) (see The
Body in Parts: Fantasies of Corporeality in Early Modern Europe, ed. David Hillman
and Carla Mazzio [New York: Routledge, 1997]). For work on the relations
between writing and the body in late-nineteenth-century American culture, see
especially Walter Benn Michaels, The Gold Standard and the Logic of Naturalism:
American Literature at the Turn of the Century (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1987), and Michael Fried, Realism, Writing, Disfiguration: On Thomas
Eakins and Stephen Crane (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); both dis-
cover a strong tendency in the Gilded Age to associate the materiality of writing
with the physicality of the self.
8. Meyer Schapiro, Words, Script, and Pictures: Semiotics of Visual Language
(New York: George Braziller, 1996), 173.
9. Henry James, The Princess Casamassima, ed. Derek Brewer and Patricia
Crick (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986), 302–3. Here I use the 1886 edition,
since its registration of the effects of writing is in this instance more concrete than
the New York Edition’s version of the passage.
10. Complete Notebooks, 195.
11. Fritz Machlup defines knowledge occupations as ones “that are designed
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chiefly to aid in the generation, transmission, or reception of knowledge of any
type, sort, or quality, including giving, directly or through instruments, visual,
aural, or otherwise sensible signals, and ranging from carrying new messages to
creating new knowledge” (Knowledge and Knowledge Production [Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1980], 228–29). Machlup’s term seems a useful one to
bear in mind here because it sees telegraph clerks, literary reviewers, paper manu-
facturers, bookbinders, and so forth, as part of the same developing economy of
information production and distribution—a perception which, I am suggesting,
Machlup shares with James. The term also seems to me useful for any attempt to
develop a more materially and historically specific understanding of the famous
Jamesian concern with knowledge. For more on James’s interest in scriptive pro-
fessions, see Mark Seltzer, Bodies and Machines (New York: Routledge, 1992),
77–80, 195–97.
12. Susan Stewart, On Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the
Souvenir, the Collection (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), 44.
13. Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, trans. Maria Jolas (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1969), 78.
14. On the construction of grave-robbing as a violation of privacy, see
Catherine Gallagher, “The Duplicity of Doubling in A Tale of Two Cities,” Dickens
Studies Annual 12 (1984): 125–45.
15. Complete Notebooks, 33–34. The literary history here is actually even more
intertwined, since Hawthorne knew Silsbee when both were living in England; it
is not clear whether or not James knew this. On Hawthorne’s acquaintance with
Silsbee, see James R. Mellow, Nathaniel Hawthorne in His Times (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1980), 479–80. See also Richard H. Brodhead’s incisive dis-
cussion of the uses that James makes in developing The Aspern Papers of
Hawthorne’s characteristic motifs (The School of Hawthorne [New York: Oxford
University Press, 1986], 106–7).
16. Laurence B. Holland, The Expense of Vision: Essays on the Craft of Henry
James, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 130–38,
144–45.
17. Walter Bagehot, Literary Essays, ed. Norman St. John-Stevas (London: The
Economist, 1965), 195.
18. Virginia Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1925), 113.
19. Edward Dowden, ed., The Sonnets of William Shakespeare (London: Kegan
Paul, 1881), 6. On nineteenth-century constructions of Shakespeare see S.
Schoenbaum’s fairly exhaustive Shakespeare’s Lives (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1970), 251–613. On the sonnets’ critical history, see also Hyder Edward Rollins,
ed., A New Variorum Edition of Shakespeare: The Sonnets (Philadelphia: Lippincott,
1944).
20. Robert Browning, The Poems, ed. John Pettigrew (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1981), 2: 438. Further references by line number appear paren-
thetically within the text.
21. Bachelard, Poetics of Space, 82. A longer analysis here might well pay atten-
tion to the further associations of sonnets and privacy in Browning’s representa-
tions of Shakespeare, as well as to the intertwining of portraits and poetry in both
Renaissance poetics and in The Aspern Papers. Briefly: in Browning’s well-known
essay on Shelley, Shakespeare stands as the prime example of the objective poet,
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an example that returns in “At the ‘Mermaid,’” another poem about Shakespeare
and the one that immediately precedes “House” in Browning’s 1876 collection,
Pacchiarotto and How He Worked in Distemper. “At the ‘Mermaid’” takes as its epi-
graph an adaptation of the first line of Ben Jonson’s “To the Reader,” a poem about
Shakespeare’s portrait which was printed opposite the portrait in the First Folio.
Jonson’s concluding lines—“Reader, look / Not on his Picture, but his Book”—
seem ironically echoed in the editor’s fixation on Juliana’s miniature portrait of
Aspern and on the sexual experience (or even just the lived experience) that
Aspern’s poems imply without really revealing.
Furthermore, sonnets and miniature portraits were sometimes seen in the
Renaissance as analogous forms which, as Patricia Fumerton argues, simultaneous-
ly revealed and concealed the true self. Fumerton demonstrates that both sonnets
and miniatures were strategically coded as private, revealed to others only in scenes
of stagy intimacy; both establish and test the boundaries between public and pri-
vate realms (“‘Secret’ Arts: Elizabethan Miniatures and Sonnets,” Representations
15 [1986], 57–97).
Finally, Susan Stewart suggests that the miniature offers a world that we can know
only through visual experience, a world that, since it is enclosed and contained, we
can never touch (On Longing, 57–70). In these respects, viewing the miniature is an
experience very close to the editor’s experience with Aspern’s poems and nineteenth-
century readers’ experiences with Shakespeare’s sonnets as I have summarized them.
For a rich analysis of James’s relation to Browning’s aesthetics and public image,
see Ross Posnock, Henry James and the Problem of Robert Browning (Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 1985).
22. Oscar Wilde, The Portrait of Mr. W. H., in Complete Shorter Fiction, ed.
Isobel Murray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 154.
23. Samuel Butler, Shakespeare’s Sonnets Reconsidered, and in Part Rearranged
(London: Longmans, 1899), 119, 87.
24. Marjorie Garber, Shakespeare’s Ghost Writers: Literature as Uncanny
Causality (New York: Methuen, 1987), 1–12.
25. Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, vol. 1, An Introduction, trans.
Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1980), 107.
26. Eve Kosofsky Sedwick, Between Men: English Literature and Male
Homosocial Desire (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 28.
27. William A. Cohen, Sex Scandal: The Private Parts of Victorian Fiction
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1996), 196.
28. C. M. Ingleby, Shakespeare’s Bones (London: Trubner, 1883), 28–29.
29. Ingleby, Shakespeare’s Bones, 18–21.
30. Henry James, “In Warwickshire,” in English Hours, ed. Leon Edel (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1981), 122–23.
31. Letter to Violet Hunt, 26 August 1903, quoted in Leon Edel, Henry James,
The Master: 1901–1916 (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1972), 145.
32. Letter to Harry James, April 1914, quoted in Edel, Henry James, The
Master, 142.
33. E. L. Godkin, “The Rights of the Citizen. IV.—To His Own Reputation,”
Scribner’s Magazine 8 (July 1890): 65, 66. Warren and Brandeis cite Godkin at the
beginning of their article, noting that “the evil of the invasion of privacy by the news-
papers, long keenly felt, has been but recently discussed by an able writer” (195).
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34. Henry James, “The Papers,” The Better Sort (New York: Scribner’s, 1903),
336. Further references appear parenthetically in the text. James’s most explicit cri-
tique of what he sees as the American “mistrust of privacy” comes in The American
Scene (1907; rpt., ed. Leon Edel [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968], 62;
see also 9–11, 166–68). For an important discussion of the roles played by gender
and the body in the dissemination of cultural values like privacy, see Lynn Wardley,
“Woman’s Voice, Democracy’s Body, and The Bostonians,” ELH 56 (1989): 639–65.
35. For my discussion of the story, see chapter 2.
36. Henry James, The Bostonians, ed. Charles R. Anderson (Harmondsworth:
Penguin, 1984), 123.
37. Golderg, Writing Matter, 97.
38. In addition to the preface, see the notebook entry that led to “The Private
Life” (Complete Notebooks, 60–61).
39. For the suggestion that we imagine ghosts as only partially disembodied, I
am indebted to Georges Rey, “Survival,” in The Identities of Persons, ed. Amélie
Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 57–61. Rey
notes that most pictures of “ghosts are pictures of familiar physical bodies, just
paler” (58). In Shakespeare’s Ghost Writers, Marjorie Garber provides a somewhat
different account from mine of the author as ghost, but she, too, emphasizes this
sense of the ghostly as the partially disembodied.
40. W. H. Auden, “Shakespeare’s Sonnets,” in Forewords and Afterwords, ed.
Edward Mendelson (New York: Random House, 1973), 89; originally published
as Introduction to William Shakespeare, Sonnets (New York: New American
Library, 1964). All further references are to the Random House collection and
appear parenthetically within the text.
41. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1990), 72.
Notes to Chapter 6
1. Henry James, The Sacred Fount, ed. Leon Edel (London: Rupert Hart-
Davis, 1959), 30. Further references appear parenthetically within the text. On
James and the breakdown of evidential reasoning, see Alexander Welsh, Strong
Representations: Narrative and Circumstantial Evidence in England (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 237–56.
2. William Dean Howells, Questionable Shapes (New York: Harper’s, 1903).
In thinking about the late fiction, I have learned from the deconstructive tradition
in general and in particular from Julie Rivkin’s analysis of deferred and substitut-
ed meaning in The Ambassadors. Obviously, I believe that Rivkin’s approach runs
the risk of restating a particular political economy as if it were a general condition
of language, but I will not deny that her argument has been instructive. See Julie
Rivkin, False Positions: The Representational Logics of Henry James’s Fiction
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 57–81.
3. Charles Dickens, David Copperfield, ed. Nina Burgis (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1983), 195, 199. On Emma Bovary’s taste for fashion as a taste
for adultery, see Tony Tanner, Adultery in the Novel: Contract and Transgression
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), 254–65, 284–91.
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4. My argument here is much indebted to Michael Trask, “Chance, Choice,
and The Wings of the Dove,” in Cruising Modernism: Class and Sexuality in American
Literature and Social Thought (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 44–73.
Trask’s argument associates the material properties of objects in the late Jamesian
text—especially slipperiness and stickiness—with James’s sense of how early-twen-
tieth-century social flux destabilizes referential security in his fiction. My argument
here bears similarities as well to Tony Tanner’s observation that adultery in the
novel is linked with the mixing of material things and the destabilization of prop-
erty (Adultery in the Novel, 284–91). But my argument differs hugely from
Tanner’s because where he insists that adultery causes the “collapse” of culture, I
argue that adulterous matters are culture, that they epitomize the ways in which
culture promulgates itself, or at least they do for James in the late fiction (65).
Tanner has a strong need to understand adultery as the pathological case, even
when his readings, especially in the case of Madame Bovary, blur beyond recogni-
tion the line between the pathological and the healthy.
Finally, for a canny discussion of the amorphous, ambient material qualities I
have been discussing as the never-to-be-pinned down marks of homosexual desire,
see Leland Monk’s analysis of James’s story “The Author of Beltraffio” (“A Terrible
Beauty Is Born: Henry James, Aestheticism, and Homosexual Panic,” in Bodies of
Writing, Bodies in Performance, ed. Thomas Foster, Carol Siegel, and Ellen E. Berry
[New York: New York University Press, 1996], 247–65).
5. Jean-Paul Sartre, Baudelaire, trans. Martin Turnell (New York: New
Directions, 1950), 174.
6. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1988), 288.
7. Locke, Two Treatises, 287.
8. See, for example, in the Principles of Psychology the characterization of
thoughts as “owned” (221), of the objects of consciousness as things that  we
“appropriate” (304), of the successive “pulse[s] of thought” as analogous to a herd
of branded cattle, marked with the sign of ownership (319), and of the self as a
“proprietor” (322).
9. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H.
Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 104, 117, 316, 150. Further
references appear parenthetically within the text. Here I have been guided by Neal
Wood’s argument that Locke’s conception of humans as acquisitive creatures
shapes his metaphors for knowledge (Wood, The Politics of Locke’s Philosophy: A
Social Study of “An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,” [Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1983], 159).
10. On this shifting relation between private collection and public museum,
see Lorraine J. Daston, “The Factual Sensibility,” Isis 79 (1988): 459–60, and then
the work she cites by Giuseppe Olmi, “Science—Honour—Metaphor: Italian
Cabinets of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” in The Origins of Museums:
The Cabinet of Curiosities in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Europe, ed. Oliver
Impey and Arthur MacGregor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 5–16.
11. For criticism that identifies in various ways the implication in James that
consciousness can be externalized, see Sharon Cameron, Thinking in Henry James
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), who shows in her chapter on The
Wings of the Dove how thought is “objectified,” “made material” (122–68); Ruth
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Bernard Yeazell, Language and Knowledge in the Late Novels of Henry James
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), who argues that characters’ con-
sciousnesses in the late novels “create the terms of” their worlds (12); Mark
Seltzer, Henry James and the Art of Power (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984),
who shows how in the late fiction that “the desire to know is also a will to power”
(77).
12. Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 1, trans. Ben
Fowkes (New York: Vintage, 1977), 493–94n4.
13. Donald Preziosi, Rethinking Art History: Meditations on a Coy Science (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 69.
14. For my knowledge of Soane and his museum, I have relied on the Museum
handbook roughly contemporary with James’s novel: General Description of Sir
John Soane’s Museum, 8th ed. (Oxford: Hart, 1905). I have also consulted Gillian
Darley, John Soane, An Accidental Romantic (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1999), and John Elsner, “A Collector’s Model of Desire: The House and Museum
of Sir John Soane,” in The Cultures of Collecting, ed. John Elsner and Roger
Cardinal (London: Reaktion, 1994), 155–76. Elsner’s essay strains the evidence
very hard in order to maintain his conception of the museum as the image of
rationalized totality, and I have implicitly argued against this essay in my own dis-
cussion.
15. Ovid, Metamorphoses, trans. Mary M. Innes (Harmondsworth: Penguin,
1955), Book 8, lines 165–67, p. 183.
16. On this malleability, see Leo Bersani’s argument, in “The Jamesian Lie,”
that James’s novels of falsehood “propose a language responsive almost exclusively
to the inspirations of its own surfaces” (Bersani, A Future for Astyanax: Character
and Desire in Literature [Boston: Little, Brown, 1976), 146.
17. David Murray, Museums, Their History and Their Use, 3 vols. (Glasgow:
MacLehose, 1904), 1:264. Further references are to volume 1 and appear paren-
thetically within the text by page number only.
18. For a study of the structuring of the archive in Britain at the end of the
nineteenth century, see Thomas Richards, The Imperial Archive: Knowledge and the
Fantasy of Empire (London: Verso, 1993).
19. On the shift toward a separation of vision and touch in nineteenth-centu-
ry thought, see Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and
Modernity in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990). I largely
agree with Crary’s hypothesis, but the texts I have examined in this book indicate
that the assimilation of looking and touching had a much longer half-life than
Crary suggests; Crary locates the separation of the senses in the 1850s, long before
the association had ceased to do its work in pedagogical theory or ideas about craft
(124).
20. Benjamin Ives Gilman, Museum Ideals of Purpose and Method (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1918), 388, 289.
21. Cameron, Thinking in Henry James, 159–60.
22. For other interpretations of The Sacred Fount as a novel about thinking,
interpreting, and observing, see Paul B. Armstrong, The Challenge of Bewilderment:
Understanding and Representation in James, Conrad, and Ford (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1987), who approaches the novel as a study in “the possibilities and
pitfalls that beckon to and threaten the composing powers of consciousness,” a rad-
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ical study in “Jamesian hermeneutics” (29, 31); and Allon White, The Uses of
Obscurity: The Fiction of Early Modernism (London: Routledge, 1981), who takes
“the central anxiety of the novel” as the question of whether the narrator is “an
obsessed voyeur indulging a vulgar fantasy, or an urbane observer who skillfully
unravels all the minute signals given out by” the other guests (144). Peter Brooks
brings forward the matter of the body in The Sacred Fount before letting it slip away
into the spectral realm of epistemological conundrum (Brooks, Body Work: Objects of
Desire in Modern Narrative [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993], 107).
23. Yeazell, Language and Knowledge, 1–15.
24. Walter Pater, The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry, ed. Donald L. Hill
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 189. Jonathan Freedman also
notes the use of Pater here and wittily characterizes the reversal as James’s transfor-
mation “of Pater’s hard, gemlike flame [into] a hard, flamelike gem” (Jonathan
Freedman, Professions of Taste: Henry James, British Aestheticism, and Commodity
Culture [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990], 197).
25. George Santayana, The Sense of Beauty (1896; rpt. New York: Dover,
1955), 83.
Notes to Chapter 7
1. Brown, The Material Unconscious: American Amusement, Stephen Crane,
and the Economies of Play (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 4.
2. John Guillory, Cultural Capital: The Problem of Literary Canon Formation
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 229. Guillory’s specific reference is
to the end of Paul de Man’s essay “Phenomenality and Materiality in Kant” (de
Man, Aesthetic Ideology, ed. Andrzej Warminski [Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1996], 90.
3. Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste,
trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 170.
4. Catherine Gallagher, “Blindness and Hindsight,” in Responses: On Paul de
Man’s Wartime Journalism, ed. Werner Hamacher et al. (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1989), 207.
5. Avital Ronell, Stupidity (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2002), 105.
6. Paul de Man, “Semiology and Rhetoric,” Allegories of Reading (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1979), 10. Further references to this book appear parenthet-
ically within the text; I have included the shortened title Allegories when context
alone does not make clear the source of the quotation.
7. Paul de Man, “Aesthetic Formalization: Kleist’s Über das
Marionettentheater,” The Rhetoric of Romanticism (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1984), 285–86.
8. Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 285–86. Further references appear
parenthetically within the text; I have included the title when context alone does
not make clear the source of the quotation.
9. Here I follow the analysis of lyric in Theodor W. Adorno, “On Lyric Poetry
and Society,” in Notes to Literature, vol. 1, ed. Rolf Tiedemann, trans. Shierry
Weber Nicholsen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 37–54.
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10. I quote the passage in de Man’s translation (Allegories of Reading, 13–14).
11. Walter Pater, “The Child in the House,” Imaginary Portraits, in Walter
Pater: Three Major Texts, ed. William E. Buckler (New York: New York University
Press, 1986), 223, 225.
12. Pater, “The Child in the House,” 224.
13. Elaine Scarry, “Work and the Body in Hardy and Other Nineteenth-
Century Novelists,” Resisting Representation (New York: Oxford University Press,
1994), 66. This essay originally appeared in Representations 3 (1983): 90–123; my
citations are from Resisting Representation, where the essay appears under the head-
ing “Participial Acts: Working.” Further references appear parenthetically within
the text; I have included the shortened title “Work and the Body” when context
alone does not make clear the source of the quotation.
14. On the nineteenth-century belief that nothing is ever lost, see Alexander
Welsh, George Eliot and Blackmail (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985),
98–109; Gillian Beer, Darwin’s Plots: Evolutionary Narrative in Darwin, George
Eliot and Nineteenth-Century Fiction (London: Routledge, 1983), 19–26.
15. On the importance of touch in nineteenth-century thought, see Jonathan
Crary, Techniques of the Observer (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990), 19.
16. The Body in Pain, 248. The idea is restated in almost exactly the same lan-
guage in “Work and the Body,” 85n11.
17. Mark Seltzer, Bodies and Machines (New York: Routledge, 1992), 4.
18. Cynthia Eagle Russett, Sexual Science: The Victorian Construction of
Womanhood (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 48.
19. Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy,
trans. Martin Nicolaus (London: Penguin, 1973), 104.
20. Marx, Grundrisse, 105, 104.
21. In the passage on abstraction in the Grundrisse, Marx does not quite ban
such philosophizing, such application to widely varying historical moments of
concepts made conceivable only by present-day economic life; he writes that one
can understand with a new rigor such feudal economic practices as tribute money
if one is acquainted with the modern system of rents. But to “identify” such
widely separated moments, Marx warns, is to “smudge over all historical differ-
ences” (Grundrisse 105); likewise, to write about the body can easily yield work
that is deeply involved with a contingent construction of physicality but that
does not understand itself as such.
22. See the once-famous passage at the end of this essay where, having trans-
formed modernity into an ambivalence of poetic language, de Man proceeds to
sweep away what he disparages as “genetic historicism” on the basis that an unam-
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